The Philosophical Roots of Waldorf Education

Part Three: From Schiller to Steiner[1]

Frederick Amrine

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Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) is best known in the German-speaking world as a dramatist. As a young man, he was the *enfant terrible* of the German stage, the leader of a movement called *Sturm und Drang*—"Storm and Stress." To call the young Schiller politically and culturally "radical" is an understatement: the epigraph to his first drama was "*In tyrannos*"—"tyrants up against the wall!" The leaders of the Revolution named him the first honorary citizen of the new French republic. Schiller started out as a combination of Elvis Presley and Malcolm X, but you then have to imagine that pair morphing into a professor of history, next into a first-rate philosopher, and finally into Arthur Miller: then you've got Schiller.[2] A fascinating man who is sadly neglected in the English-speaking world.

Even in the German-speaking world, Schiller is not well known as a philosopher, but that may be his greatest claim to fame in the long run. He wrote only a few philosophical essays, and only one of any length,[3] but right from the moment it was published in 1794, Schiller's treatise "On the Aesthetic Education of Man" was recognized by his contemporaries as a masterpiece. Hegel pronounced it the greatest philosophical work of the German nation, which is saying a lot considering what Kant had just accomplished. And yet when Rudolf Steiner took up Schiller's essay at the end of the 19th century and used it as one of the main foundations for anthroposophy, he was like an archaeologist who had unearthed a treasure long buried and forgotten. Over the course of those few decades, intellectual life in Central Europe had descended so deeply into materialism and positivism that it could no longer recognize the value of Schiller's treatise. And it is really only since the publication of Wilkinson and Willoughby's edition and English translation by Oxford University Press in 1967[4] that Schiller's essay has again entered the mainstream of intellectual history.

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Schiller's Essay in Its Historical Context

Let's begin by situating Schiller's essay within the larger context we established in the first two installments of this series. Schiller was an enthusiastic Kantian, but he was also disappointed and dissatisfied by the profound dualism embodied in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* or *First Critique* (1781, revised in 1787) and his major works on ethics, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and the *Critique of Practical Reason* or *Second Critique* (1788). Schiller's essay is part and parcel of that "inner revolution" described in the first installment: like Goethe and Fichte, Schiller wanted to rewrite the letter of Kant in the spirit of Kant. Curiously, Kant himself arrived at the same place late in his life when he wrote the all-important *Critique of Judgment* or *Third Critique* (1790).

I say "curiously" because Kant's discovery of key aspects of his revolutionary philosophy often seems to have been inadvertent. Kant planned his intellectual journeys meticulously, but he kept arriving at unexpected destinations. So it was with the *Third Critique*, which is devoted half to art and half to biology. What

these seemingly incongruous realms share is the faculty of teleological judgment: in both art and biology the whole somehow precedes and determines each individual part. This is a great riddle for rational thinking, which necessarily proceeds from the part to the whole. It would seem that there is no way humans can know this wholeness immediately, and indeed Kant gives up on biology—a resignation captured in his witty prediction that "there never will be a Newton of a blade of grass."[5] But Kant doesn't give up on art, and the result is thrilling.

Kant's philosophy is nothing if not systematic, and a great deal of its power flows from the latent energies of a rich and dense set of interlocking structures. Scholars tend to follow Kant himself in referring to this as the "architectonic" of his philosophy as a whole. Staying with this metaphor, one might say that Kant imagined his *Third Critique* as the final wing of a grand edifice that was nearly complete, but in the process of building it, he discovered a new and greatly superior architectural principle, as it were. Kant's intellectual honesty was so profound that he was willing to throw away what had made him famous and start over. But Kant was too old and tired to do it himself. Schiller and the other Young Turks, the younger generation of Kantians whose hair was on fire, all saw immediately what Kant had accomplished in his *Third Critique,* and they were more than glad to help out by rebuilding Kantianism in accordance with that new principle. So it is that—among many other things—Schiller attempts to rewrite and extend Kant's ethics in the spirit of Kant's aesthetics. In order to understand Schiller's accomplishment, we need to recapitulate Kant's ethics and aesthetics as succinctly as we can.

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Kant's Ethics

As he had in epistemology, Kant effected a great revolution in the field of ethics. Kant overturned both of the prevailing ethical paradigms. Against the Empiricists he argued persuasively that ethics must have its source in a mental activity that is non-empirical, self-sustaining, self-referential, and transparent. For Kant, this meant that its ultimate foundation must be rational. But the traditional rationalist account also proves inadequate. The arch-rationalist Socrates had asserted that "no man does evil knowingly," but Kant sees evil as having a real, positive source within human nature, outside of reason. We aren't tempted to make mistakes in math, but we are tempted to cheat on our tax returns. The source of temptation is desire or, as Kant calls it, "inclination" [*Neigung*], which sits in the will. For Kant, inclination is the sworn enemy of rationality, and ethics is about making a radical choice between inclination and reason.

Kant argues that inclination and reason strive toward different ends. Inclination strives for happiness in the form of satisfied desire, but in the realm of action, "practical" reason strives for autonomy and self-consistency, which Kant calls "duty" [*Pflicht*]. Both of these tendencies are real and present in all of us; hence, as ethical agents, we live in a state of constant tension between duty and desire. Inclination is the thing we must fear the most, and all the more so because it is so cunning: inclination lurks everywhere.

Again, practical reason strives for autonomy and self-consistency; nothing external should affect it. Which is to say, practical reason has no motives. If we have a motive—any motive—then the good ceases to be an end in itself, and it becomes the means to some other end. So, Kant asks, what are our motives in doing the good? We might say: it is good to give to the poor. But what if our motive for being charitable is to impress our friends? To feel good about ourselves? Or even to merit salvation? Then Kant sees reason as losing its autonomy and becoming

"heteronymous"—taking its law [*nomos*] from another [*heteros*] rather than itself [*autos*]. Then even giving to the poor is not ethical because we have lost our autonomy; we have allowed an alien motive to intrude upon the inner sanctuary of our freedom.

So how can we be sure that our deeds are good? Kant asserts that we can be sure only if they are performed against inclination. And Kant gives examples of moral actions that are appallingly unattractive: a charitable misanthrope, someone inclined towards suicide who soldiers on out of duty, and so forth. But that's Kant's point; such dreary deeds are guaranteed moral precisely because they are unattractive. So if motives are suspect as such, what can guarantee morality? Only a purely formal principle that generates self-consistency. And Kant puts forward as that principle his famous "categorical imperative": "Act in such a way that the maxim of your deed could become, through you, a universal moral law." The categorical imperative is a kind of machine that generates disinterestedness: for something to be moral, you have to be able to imagine and accept a world in which everyone else is acting according to the same principle you have prescribed to yourself. Kant imagines that all rational beings who follow the categorical imperative will make the same choices, and thereby become members of an ideal community, a kind of rationalist heaven that he calls "the kingdom of ends."

Whether the maxims that we prescribe to ourselves bear any relationship to reality is unknowable. Indeed, it is supremely important that we not know, because if we could demonstrate theoretically the truth of the ideas underlying our maxim (ideas such as "God," "Freedom," and "Immortality"), if reason could "touch" them and hence know them, they would immediately become determinate. They would become unfree, and hence useless for ethics. For Kant, ethics is about what "ought," and never about what "is," because a known "is" would determine us, and we would lose our freedom as ethical agents. Of course, Kant recognizes that we have a "natural" being, but that is not our ethical self. Kant's solution to the dilemmas of ethics is, like his epistemology, resolutely dualistic. We live in two worlds simultaneously: a world of causality that can be known but cannot be changed, and a world of freedom where we enjoy an autonomy that cannot be known. Kant calls this "dual citizenship," and he declares this dualism to be "a fortunate perplexity," since it solves—or seems to solve—profound philosophical problems. There's nothing perverse about Kant's intention: he's trying to protect moral freedom and religious faith from the encroachments of a nascent mechanistic paradigm by insulating them from causal necessity.

As I argued in the first installment of this series, it is difficult for us to appreciate how exciting and liberating Kant's philosophy felt, even to a profoundly revolutionary generation, because we live in the liberated world that Kant made, and we take it for granted. It's the air we breathe. For many people today, orthodox religious commandments, customs, traditions, and a thousand other passively received, unexamined values have lost their hold on our lives. But this is not something that just happened on its own: it happened in large part because Kant was so successful in undermining their authority, and because he put in their place the ideal of the autonomous individual who gives the moral law to herself. The price of this liberation was that we live divided against ourselves, but Kant was willing to accept that stark dualism as the price of freedom.

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Kant's Aesthetics

The thrilling discovery that emerged in the writing of the *Third Critique*, the new "architectural principle," is the existence of a different kind of autonomy that is free without being one-sidedly rational, and that transforms our natural being rather than merely suppressing it. It is an autonomy that need not be purchased at the price of dualistic self-division. Kant and the immediate post-Kantians realized that this new kind of autonomy had been implicit in his earlier philosophy, but its full power and promise was revealed to them all only when Kant began to write about art.

This new kind of freedom is most evident in two different aspects of aesthetic experience. The first is the spontaneous creative activity of the imagination. Here Kant goes so far as to claim that the genius enjoys the ultimate freedom of obeying her own set of laws. Kant's earlier epistemology in the *Critique of Pure Reason* had pointed to the spontaneity of the imagination as central to every act of cognition—even scientific—but it still invoked logic as the ultimate foundation of human knowledge; he saw the categories of logical judgments as an ultimate, eternal, and unchanging framework outside us to which all of our cognition is referred. But now in the *Third Critique*, creative imagination takes center stage. It plays the starring role in the drama of our inner life, and that makes it possible to imagine a fundamentally new kind of ethics: doing the good will depend not on conforming to a law, but rather on receiving a unique moral intuition and then embodying it in a specific, new form. Ethics will not be about conforming to some pre-existing norm, but about imagining the good and then creating it. The roots of philosophical Romanticism in all its forms (including much of the philosophical side of anthroposophy) can be traced back to this first insight into the fundamental nature of aesthetic experience, and the pervasiveness of that influence is surely what Hans-Georg Gadamer meant when he declared all subsequent philosophy to be "a succession of footnotes to Kant's *Third Critique*."

The second insight was equally profound, and it's no exaggeration to call it a great gift to the whole of humanity. It's the main reason why Kant is universally regarded as the founder of aesthetics in its modern form. Kant was the first to understand fully and argue persuasively that all genuinely aesthetic experience is a mode of disinterested contemplation. Art is not a means to some other end, not an instrument to produce edification and delight (as the hoary Horatian maxim had asserted). Art is precisely the opposite: an end unto itself, a state of pure freedom. The moment that insight into aesthetic experience arrives, we can see the promise of the new principle for ethics: it satisfies the requirements of autonomy, but it does so by transforming our sensuous and affective nature rather than just suppressing it. In his *Third Critique*, Kant plants the seeds of the genuine philosophy of freedom he had tried to cultivate in his first and second critiques, and he accomplishes it in a way that he himself had not imagined beforehand. Schiller will draw out all the exciting implications of Kant's discovery for ethics, but he will also extend the argument into a realm where Kant hadn't dared to go: politics.

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The Argument of Schiller's Essay

True to the spirit of its content, Schiller delivers a philosophical treatise with a unique and powerfully aesthetic form: he presents it

as a series of letters to his sophisticated and enlightened patron, the Duke of Augustenburg.[6] Schiller's essay has been well described as not so much a treatise on aesthetics as an aesthetic treatise; it is the thing that it describes and prescribes. Schiller consciously strove for—and achieved—tremendous density. His argument is compact, almost algebraic in its rigor, but the formal relationships are not logically analytic. Rather, they are organic; the argument is a beautiful tapestry in which every part reflects the whole.[7] The plot of the argument unfolds in rhythms, foreshadowings, climaxes, and dénouements. The style is everywhere suffused with figures of classical rhetoric embodying the meaning in aesthetic forms that speak to our feeling first and foremost.[8] And indeed, the epigraph to the essay, quoted from Rousseau's *Julie*, already anticipates the whole argument in a single ironic figure: *"Si c'est la raison qui fait l'homme, c'est le sentiment, qui le conduit"* [It may be reason that makes us human, but it is feeling that is our guide]. It moves us to ask: How can feeling be a guide to our conduct? Aren't we all Kantians now, and didn't Kant argue that inclination was duty's greatest enemy?

If anything, the title of the essay must have seemed even more ironic in 1794, so Schiller begins by posing the obvious question himself. The Reign of Terror has just unfolded; why write an essay on aesthetics when political events force themselves upon us so urgently? What does art have to do with politics? Schiller answers his own question with a bold and surprising thesis at the end of the second letter: "If man is ever to solve the problem of politics in practice, he will have to approach it through the problem of the aesthetic, because it is only through Beauty that man makes his way to Freedom."

And now Schiller homes in on deep problems in Kant's dualistic ethics that stem from his neglect of the developmental aspect of morality. Our physical, affective nature—inclination—is powerful. Can someone who has yet to conquer inclination just overcome it from one minute to the next by making a rational choice? Clearly not. And how will we learn to overcome our selfish interests and become disinterested? How can we opt for the moral law apart from—indeed in opposition to—all interest? Kant provides no answer to these questions, but Schiller argues that there is a solution: we need to call forth some new faculty, a new drive that will be the "champion" of reason within the realm of phenomena.[9]

Even worse, the Reign of Terror exposed yet another shortcoming in Kant's rationalist program. It's not just our sensuous nature, our "inclination" in Kantian terms, that threatens morality. The Jacobins have shown that untempered, cold, calculating reason is as much a threat to the good as our untransformed lower nature. The theorists of the French Revolution appealed to abstract ideals, but the result was, as Schiller puts it, that they "pulled away the ladder" of our natural affections too quickly. The Jacobins signed death warrants by the thousands in the name of a set of rational ideals, without the slightest moral compunction. Kant had understood well one kind of tyranny: the tyranny of inclination over duty. But Kant had failed to understand the tyranny of reason over feeling and sense. He tried to suppress them, and now they were in open rebellion! The mobs may have been "savages," but the Jacobins were "barbarians"—they were just a different kind of tyrant.

Why do we remain unfree in our politics, subject to these tyrannies on both sides? It's because we haven't transformed ourselves sufficiently, because we haven't fashioned ourselves into vessels capable of embodying the State as an ideal. The State must remain outside us, alien to us, and hence it can only tyrannize us, in one way or another. Until human nature itself is transformed, Schiller argues, the pendulum will just swing back and forth, ever more wildly, between these two

pathologies.[10] Where balance between these two poles hasn't been established, events can only careen out of control, as they had already begun to do in the French Revolution. Schiller ends the seventh letter with a stunning prophecy that sadly was fulfilled by Napoleon:

> Fearful of freedom, which in its first tentative ventures always comes in the guise of an enemy, we shall either cast ourselves into the arms of an easy servitude or, driven to despair by a pedantic tutelage, escape into the wild libertinism of the natural state. Usurpation will invoke the weakness of human nature, insurrection its dignity; until finally blind force, that great imperatrice of human affairs, steps in and decides this pretended conflict of principles as though it were a common brawl.

What we need is "a third character" that is able to mediate reason and affect, that is able to transform and ennoble inclination, rather than merely suppress it. Human nature itself needs to be transformed, so that our natural being can be brought into harmony with, and become the vessel of, our rational being. Where can we learn to find the universal within the particular? We can learn this from artists, who have solved this riddle through the self-transformation, the systematic self-ennoblement, of artistic practice. Art can teach us how to embody the ideal within the real. Art must become the bridge between inclination and duty.

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Now Schiller's argument takes another surprising, and surprisingly modern turn—into psychology. Kant had strenuously avoided this because, for Kant, psychology is merely empirical, mere "anthropology," the realm of the particular, the biographical, the sub-rational. Like Steiner, Schiller sees our human constitution as threefold; he postulates three drives [*Triebe*—the same word that Freud will use] as part of universal human nature, beginning with a drive for matter [*Stofftrieb,* which Schiller also calls *der sinnliche Trieb*, or "sense drive"] and an antithetical drive for form [*Formtrieb*]. So far so good: we're still on the familiar terrain of inclination and duty. But—working in the spirit of the later Kant against the letter of the earlier Kant—Schiller now goes further and postulates a third drive mediating these two, the "play-drive" [*Spieltrieb*]:

> The sense-drive excludes from its subject all autonomy and freedom; the form-drive excludes from its subject all dependence, all passivity. Exclusion of freedom, however, implies physical necessity, exclusion of passivity moral necessity. Both drives, therefore, exert constraint upon the psyche, the former through the laws of nature, the latter through the laws of reason. The play-drive, in consequence, as the one by which both the others act in concert, will exert upon the psyche at once a moral and a physical constraint; it will, therefore, since it annuls all contingency, annul all constraint too, and set man free both physically and morally.[11]

Spielen in German has the same range of meanings as "to play" in English: it's what children do by engaging their imaginations, but it's also what adults do when they act a role in a drama. Art is just childhood play at a higher level, and both are fundamental to our human nature. Psychologically, "play" i.e., art, has an all-important function. Oscillating between the antithetical poles, the play-drive gives form to inclination, and it warms up cold rationality so that it can take on particular forms and both speak to and be guided by our feelings.

In the sixteenth letter, Schiller argues that Beauty equals the highest equilibrium of reality

and form. But this is only an ideal: in reality, Beauty continually oscillates between the two poles of our nature. Through aesthetic play, Beauty intervenes to heal us in two very specific ways: it "melts" us or "energizes" us as the need may be, in order to restore our full humanity through active balancing. Indeed, Schiller goes so far as to assert that "man plays only when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he is fully a human being only when he plays."[12]

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The "inclination" that Kant had feared has been balanced out by Beauty in aesthetic experience; our feeling has been ennobled into a vessel that can receive moral intuitions directly. Inclination becomes selfless through art, and selfless inclination is just another name for love. Schiller embraces what Kant had feared because he could not imagine transforming it. Schiller has theorized, rigorously, ethical love as aesthetic experience. The ideal moral agent will be the ethical artist who has developed "moral imagination" and "moral technique."[13]

The fifteenth letter reveals the grandest triad: "The object of the play-drive, represented in the general schema, may therefore be called living form: a concept serving to designate all the aesthetic qualities of phenomena and, in a word, what in the widest sense of the term we call beauty." Art mediates the transition from inclination to duty, and thereby proves the wisdom of Rousseau quoted in the epigraph: feeling—art—truly is the guide of our moral conduct and what makes us most fully human. Art proves integral to both ethics and politics: indeed, it is the guide in all forms of life because in its highest manifestation, Beauty is "living form."

The Threefold Social Organism

If the ethical ideals of "moral imagination" and "moral technique" in Steiner's *Philosophy of Freedom* seem sketchy compared to Schiller's treatment of the same topics in the *Aesthetic Letters*, Steiner's characterization of a "threefold social organism," of which Waldorf education is an integral part, develops fully ideas of which there are still only bare hints in Schiller. Had Steiner not worked them out, doubtless we would fail to see them in Schiller's treatise. Nevertheless, Schiller's essay clearly provided Steiner with important anticipatory hints that helped him greatly in developing his own ideas.

The aspect of Steiner's threefold social organism that Schiller theorizes and justifies most fully is the call for the establishment of an autonomous "spiritual-cultural sphere," separate from the State. Schiller begins the ninth letter, for example, by arguing that we must "seek out some instrument not provided by the State" and "open up living springs which, whatever the political corruption, would remain clear and pure." He then proceeds immediately to conjoin art and science, realms that are conventionally viewed as antithetical, because both are "absolved from all positive constraint and from all conventions introduced by man; both rejoice in absolute immunity from human arbitrariness"—because, in a word, both art and science are free. The creation of this third realm of pure creativity is the note—the resounding triad—on which Schiller concludes the entire treatise:

> In the midst of the fearful kingdom of forces, and in the midst of the sacred kingdom of laws, the aesthetic impulse to form is at work, unnoticed, on the building of a third joyous kingdom of play and of semblance, in which man is relieved of the shackles of circumstance and released from all that might be called constraint, unlike in the physical and in the moral sphere.

Much of the twenty-seventh letter is devoted to an elaboration of this idea in terms that are, as in Steiner's threefold social organism, simultaneously psychological and political:

> If in the dynamic State of rights it is as force that one man encounters another, and imposes limits upon his activities; if in the ethical State of duties Man sets himself over against man with all the majesty of the law and puts a curb on his desires; in those circles where conduct is governed by beauty, in the aesthetic State, none may appear to the other except as form, or confronting except as an object of free play. To bestow freedom by means of freedom is the fundamental law of this kingdom.

Here we catch the first glimpse, albeit only a glimpse, of an economic sphere that had been governed by competitiveness, now sublated into altruism. Not just in the realm of ethics and the law, but here also aesthetic experience has the capacity to annul the compulsion of "the fearful kingdom of forces," to temper brute economic competition and begin sublating it into Steiner's high economic ideal of altruism.

For Schiller, as later for Steiner, the only way to resist the tyranny of the State and the alienation that inevitably results from the division of labor is to raise oneself up to the fully-developed Idea of human nature through self-transformation:

> One can, however, imagine two different ways in which man existing in time can coincide with man as Idea, and, in consequence, just as many ways in which the State can assert itself in individuals: either by the ideal man suppressing empirical man, and the State annulling individuals; or else by the individual himself becoming the State, and man in time being ennobled to the stature of man as Idea.[14]

The former is the way of tyranny and alienation; our only hope is to pursue the latter. Once human nature has been so ennobled, it will be possible to fashion the social order in the image of the human, because nature itself will have expanded and perfected itself sufficiently to embody the State within the realized Idea of human nature.

The precondition for social renewal is the balancing, healing, and transformation of faculties that can be accomplished only through art:

> If, therefore, the principles I have laid down are correct, and if experience confirms my portrayal of the present age, we must continue to regard every attempt at political reform as untimely, and every hope based upon it as chimerical, as long as the split within man is not healed, and his nature so restored to wholeness that it can itself become the artificer of the State and guarantee the reality of this political creation of Reason.[15]

Political and social reforms await educational reform. Steiner also saw this clearly, and that is why one of the earliest steps Steiner took in launching his social program was the establishment of the first Waldorf school in Stuttgart.

Waldorf Education

By now it should be clear that Waldorf pedagogy strives to realize Schiller's vision of an education that is fully humane because it is first and foremost an aesthetic education. When asked to describe Waldorf education, one way I sometimes start is to say: these are schools in which art is not a subject. The ideal is to teach everything artistically, and to turn the students into artists of their own future calling, whatever it may be. Steiner calls on Waldorf teachers to "release their students in freedom," and Schiller helps us to understand more fully what that ideal might mean in

practice. In the spirit of Schiller's treatise, Waldorf students must become free in at least two different senses, both of which are "aesthetic" virtues.

Like art, education should be "disinterested" in the Kantian sense: never a means, but always an end in itself. The other spheres of society must not be allowed to intrude on the curriculum; neither politicians nor businessmen should be allowed to dictate its contents. The ideal is the free development of all the students' latent faculties and talents, whatever they may be. In order for that to happen, the school itself must be autonomous, and it must actively cultivate and practice, and constantly work to strengthen, its own autonomy as an institution.

For Schiller, as later for Steiner, the only way to resist the tyranny of the State and the alienation that results from the division of labor is to raise oneself up to the fully-developed Idea of human nature through self-transformation.

But Waldorf education also seeks not just to allow latent talents to manifest; it also seeks to cultivate a new faculty in the students. It seeks to cultivate a talent for imagining what doesn't yet exist but could, which is the foundation of all genuine idealism. It seeks to develop an actively achieved talent for playing in the higher sense that is eminently aesthetic. In the twenty-first letter, Schiller describes the ability to sustain this aesthetic state as "the highest of all bounties" and "the gift of humanity itself." We are most fully human when we are balanced, when we are open to higher promptings, when we play, because play is the achieved indetermination that wrested itself actively from prior determination. It is a state of soul in which we are inwardly able and ready to move in any direction:

> If, by contrast, we have surrendered to the enjoyment of genuine beauty, we are at such a moment master in equal degree of our passive and of our active powers, and we shall with equal ease turn to seriousness or to play, to repose or to movement, to compliance or to resistance, to the discursions of abstract thought or to the direct contemplation of phenomena. This lofty equanimity and freedom of the spirit, combined with power and vigor, is the mood in which a genuine work of art should release us, and there is no more certain touchstone of true aesthetic excellence.[16]

Active indetermination is pure creativity, a talent for being poised and ready to move in any direction, to meet what the world brings and to bring novelty to the world.

Although he seldom mentions it by name, Schiller's long essay "On the Aesthetic Education of Man" is omnipresent in Rudolf Steiner's life and work. Indeed, it is arguably the hinge on which no less than three major turns in Steiner's career pivoted: the turn from more conventional academic studies to overtly esoteric teaching at the turn of the 20th century; the turn from esoteric lectures to artistic activities around 1910; and the turn towards practical initiatives in the aftermath of World War I. As we have seen, in this final phase Schiller's essay played a central, if often unspoken role in the development of Waldorf education. Truly, Schiller's essay is one of the deepest roots not just of Waldorf education, but of anthroposophy as a whole. We'll return to this theme in the final installment of this essay.

to be continued

Endnotes

1. This essay is the third installment in a series of four on "The Philosophical Roots of Waldorf Education." See the previous installments on Kant, Goethe, Hegel, and Fichte in the two previous issues of the *Research Bulletin* (Vol. XVII n2 and XVIII n1).

2. Some people consider him an outstanding lyric poet as well, and it is worth noting that everyone knows and loves at least one of Schiller's poems, "Ode to Joy," that Beethoven abbreviated and set to music in the last movement of his Ninth Symphony.
3. I consider his long essay "On Naïve and Sentimental Poetry" to be literary criticism rather than philosophy.
4. Gendered language aside, this is a magnificent translation, really the only English edition to consider. And the scholarly apparatus is magnificent as well: indeed, the 150-page introduction is so good that it was translated into German and published as a freestanding book. Another edition published originally by Yale University Press and now reprinted by Dover as an inexpensive paperback is much inferior as a translation, lacks the German original facing the English, and is prefaced by an interpretation that is less than penetrating. With great regret but for the sake of consistency and other practical reasons, I have retained Wilkinson and Willoughby's gendered language in most places.
5. Goethe takes great issue with this conclusion in his essay "Judgment through Intuitive Perception," where he asserts that, unlike "the Old Man of Königsberg," he need not give up on this "adventure of reason" because he has learned through scientific investigations how to intuit archetypes within experience. See Goethe, *Scientific Studies* (Suhrkamp and Princeton UP, 1988 ff.), pp.31–32. Note that even here Goethe's criticism is not that Kant is fundamentally wrong: it's that he has given up on "the adventure of reason" (Kant's own term) too quickly. Even Goethe wants to rewrite the letter of Kant in the spirit of Kant.
6. The treatise actually began as a series of letters sent to the Duke, but the published version is the only "epistolary" philosophical essay of which I am aware.
7. An excellent example of the formal "algebra" I mean would be the rhythm of "triads" that Wilkinson and Willoughby have discovered in the text. The concept appears and then reappears in ever more complex form in letters III, VI, IX, XII, XV, XVIII, XXI, XXIV and XXVII, 3 x 3 times altogether.
8. Consider for example the difference between the prosaic sentiment "Everyone should contribute to the welfare of the nation as a whole" and the rhetorical chiasmus that made John F. Kennedy's inauguration address so memorable: "Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country." Every paragraph of Schiller's essay contains such resonant lines.
9. Eighth letter.
10. Here we see hints of a key esoteric idea within anthroposophy: the duality of evil.
11. Fourteenth letter. The German verb that is translated as "annul" here, *aufheben*, will be taken up by Hegel as a key component of his dialectic. Both Schiller and Hegel play with the inherent ambiguity of the word, which means both "annul" in the sense of "remove" and "sublate" in the sense of "overcoming by raising up to a higher level."
12. Fifteenth letter.
13. "Moral imagination" and "moral technique" are, of course, key concepts in Steiner's *Philosophy of Freedom,* which will be discussed at length in the next installment.
14. Fourth letter.
15. Seventh letter.
16. Twenty-second letter.

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