



1973

The Golden Blade

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TWENTY-FIFTH (1973) ISSUE

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Reviews

SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT — COLERIDGE

SHAKESPEARE AND THE ROSE CROSS

THE UNKNOWN IN THE GOSPELS—MATURITY

Edited by Adam Bittleston and John Davy

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EDITORIAL NOTES

THE United Nations environment conference in Stockholm last summer was a focus for the growing concern about the health of the earth planet. It also underlined the strength of the forces opposing a proper care for the global environment, notably the powerful interests of national States.

A few months later, the Olympic Games opened in Munich and inevitably recalled memories of how the last Games to be held in Germany were exploited as a platform for one of the most dark and virulent forms of nationalism Europe has ever known. Hitler achieved, in the end, the opposite of what he believed himself to be striving for. Instead of forming one great Reich, central Europe was divided, at the end of the war, by the Iron Curtain. And far from destroying the Jews, Hitler's actions generated enormous support for the movement to establish the State of Israel.

In the Middle East, there is now one of the most dangerous confrontations of national feeling in the world--and this exploded into the Olympic arena at Munich in a grim and tragic form, as if to remind us that the 'Olympic Ideal' is hollow as long as such desperate conflicts remain unresolved.

The earlier events were centred in the heart of Europe; the Israeli-Arab crisis centres on Jerusalem, the place which in medieval times was felt to be the heart of the world. And both belong with a more intimate drama being played out in the human soul, a drama in which the true being of language, the Word in man, is deeply involved.

The use of language in the Middle East conflict is revealing. The very nature of the Arabic language, as several commentators have pointed out, makes it almost impossible to deliver a *temperate* political speech. The language flowers into passionate rhetoric so that unmanageable emotions rise up and cloud the judgement. But it is not only the Arab peoples who face this problem, or use language in this way. Israel, by contrast, is deeply imbued, also in her political language, with the style of a Western technological culture, clear, logical, efficient, but also easily soulless. In a scien-

tific age, all language is threatened with a kind of dessication and depersonalisation, so that many young people, especially in the West, have come to despair of language as a means of human communication at all. They are searching, with increasing urgency, for a language of true humanity, a 'heart language' which will make possible a community of man on earth.

Most of the essays in this issue are concerned with the nature of language and its redemption from the tragedies which threaten it. This is a concern of both art and science: modern poetry is searching in a wilderness. Yet as Paul Matthews shows, there may be more meaning in the search than is often realised. Scientists turn to the abstract language of mathematics, which may, as Owen Barfield describes, embody the beginnings of a new relationship with nature, although neither the layman nor the scientist himself may yet have clearly realised it. Here, too, there is a kind of social question, how to overcome the 'detachment' of science, the onlooker whose impersonal manipulations of the environment have led to the crises which prompted the Stockholm conference.

At this conference, the ideal of a united human community, caring for 'one Earth', was often mentioned, and was frequently reinforced with the image of "Spaceship Earth", an island in space which must live indefinitely from its own resources. But this image awaits a crucial transformation. The earth is indeed a kind of island in the universe at the present time: Rudolf Steiner often spoke of the fact that the forms of thinking and feeling in the souls of many human beings are so 'earthbound' as to be incomprehensible to the beings of the spiritual Hierarchies. If we have begun to picture the heavens as a dark void, it is because the earth has become dark for the heavens.

In the first of the two lectures by Steiner printed below, he points to the future 'heart language' which must be born in man as the realisation of the deed of the Christ Being in uniting His destiny with that of mankind at the Mystery of Golgotha. And in the second lecture, Steiner describes how the way in which language lives in us during the day deeply influences our relationships with the Hierarchies, both during sleep and in the forming of our destiny between death and a new birth. The 'Right Speech' which the Buddha preached at a time when men still had some recollection of the creative language which the gods once spoke to men, has to be found today in the human soul, renewed and rejuvenated, so that we can begin to

speak a truly human language to each other. Such language then resounds not only in man, but in the spiritual worlds. Men begin to speak to the Gods, and the earth ceases to be a lonely spaceship in a dark void, the 'Silent Planet' of C. S. Lewis's novel, and begins to find its way into the community of the heavens.

* * *

The new linguistics

The last few years have seen a great revival of interest in the study of language, and most university bookshops which supply universities and their students now have a substantial section for 'linguistics'. Curiously enough, one field of study which has prompted a renewed interest in language is computer programming. Attempts to use computers for translating one language into another have largely failed (except where the original and the translation have been so stereotyped and codified as to have lost almost all resemblance to real living speech). But failure has prompted a new sense of wonder at the extraordinary phenomenon of human language. This has been reinforced by another line of research, some attempts to teach animals to 'speak'. A recent experiment in America has succeeded in teaching a female chimpanzee a large repertoire of 'deaf and dumb' signs. But it seems that she uses these only in relation to the immediate present, prompted by events or objects in her surroundings, or her bodily needs. One of the pioneers of the new linguistics, Noam Chomsky (whose work is discussed in John Davy's article) has written in his book *Language and Mind*: "The examples of animal communication that have been examined so far do share many of the properties of human gestural systems, and it might be reasonable to explore the possibility of direct connection in this case. But human language, it appears, is based on entirely different principles. This, I think, is an important point, often overlooked by those who approach human language as a natural, biological phenomenon; in particular, it seems rather pointless, for these reasons, to speculate about the evolution of human language from simpler systems—perhaps as absurd as it would be to speculate about the 'evolution' of atoms from clouds of elementary particles".

* * *

Speech is in its reality no less complex than the being of man; it is indeed the same complexity. The senses, the inner organs,

the muscular system, the structure of the bones—everything is formed out of the creative Word, and *for* the Word.

The foundation for our sense of human equality is this consciousness—that we bear the same human form, endowed with individuality, though our personal qualities are so different. In social life it is very difficult to express this sense of equality, and at the same time to provide room for human differences, in a way that is generally felt to be just and fair. In this *Golden Blade* Charles Davy discusses these problems in a penetrating way. They are certainly very acute in present-day Britain, though they are partly disguised as questions of industrial organisation and the rate of inflation.

When a trade union is in conflict with management, or with the State, or in a sense with the public in general—it is only on the surface simply a matter of money. For money everywhere expresses relationships—and the energy behind a claim for more money comes in some way from a dissatisfaction with relationships. Those working in a particular industry may suffer from an acute sense of frustration in what they are doing, from which there seems no clear way out; *any* kind of change in ways of working or in the structure of the industry may seem threatening; the only security or satisfaction obtainable appears to be through incomes that rise faster than prices. In some industries it can be claimed that such increases are earned through growing productivity.

But the Western world in particular has now to ask very earnest questions about increased productivity as an aim of economic policy. At what cost to the earth, to our environment, to the humanity of our social life? We come back to the problems considered at Stockholm; and ultimately to that fundamental inter-relationship described by Rudolf Steiner between the economic life of production and consumption on the one hand, which is struggling to develop as a world-wide organic unity, and the realms of free spiritual capacity and of human rights, each needing their genuine independence, on the other. Only where spiritual life is free and creative will the right ideas and capacities flow into economic production; only where there is a strong sense of right and justice for all will the earth and the consumer be protected.

When he described what he called "Associations of producers and consumers" Rudolf Steiner was trying to sketch a form of organisation for industry—and economic production in general—

in which real human meeting over questions of work, production and price would not be so hindered as it still is today by the conflicts of power. He wanted it to be seen that *price* is appropriate for *commodities*, and not in the same way for human work, or land, or capital. All societies today, whether 'capitalist' or 'communist' or in between, are struggling with this problem in various forms. Europe has nowhere found effective, lasting answers. In Britain another way in which it is expressed is in the steep increase in the price of houses, with its threatening social effects. A house is not just a commodity.

There is a great deal of goodwill about—but we have a long way to go, before we learn to speak with one another effectively about these things.

THE RECOVERY OF THE LIVING SOURCE OF SPEECH

Lecture given by
RUDOLF STEINER
at Dornach, 13th April, 1923.

MY DEAR FRIENDS,

If you will remind yourselves of some of the things I have said in recent lectures, you will, I think, be able to call up a picture of the relationship of man's faculty of speech to those Beings in the spiritual world whom we are accustomed to assign to the Hierarchy of the Archangels. You will remember I explained to you the difference it makes to man whether the words he speaks are formed in such a way as to refer only to material things, in which case speech assumes a materialistic character, or whether in his speaking he unfolds a certain idealism, so that every time he utters a word, the feeling is present in him that he belongs to a spiritual world and that the words that ring in his speaking, coming as they do from the soul, must have some relation to Spirits. According as the one or the other is true, so does man come, between falling asleep and awakening, into a wrong or right relation with the Archangels. If he allows idealism to disappear altogether from his speaking, then he gradually loses the connection, which is so essential to him, with the Archangels. I am reminding you of this, because I want to speak to-day more particularly of one aspect of this relationship of human speech with the hierarchy of the Archangels. Speech, like everything else in evolution that has to do with man, as we have had full opportunity of realising in our study of his being, has had its history. What I want to bring forward does not refer to any one language in particular. The periods of time we have to take into view when we are studying some deep-seated change in speech are so long that even primitive languages show the same character as civilised ones in respect of such matters as we shall be considering. To-day therefore we shall not concern ourselves with the differences that exist between the several languages, but rather with those meta-

morphoses which human language in general has undergone in the course of the evolution of mankind on Earth.

If we consider the relationship man has to-day to language, we find that the words he speaks are nearly all of them signs for things that are round about him. As you will know, we have in the course of our studies alluded to a more intimate relationship between word and object. In our day however there is hardly any feeling left for this; words are very little more than mere outward signs for the objects indicated. Who is there who still feels, when the word *Blitz* (lightning) is uttered, something of the same experience he has when lightning actually flashes through space? To-day we are inclined to look on the word merely as a combination of sounds that is a *sign* for the phenomenon of the flash of lightning. It was not always so. If we go no farther back than to the earlier part of the Greek civilisation, we find that man's relation to language was not then one of thought, where the word is for him a sign and a symbol. The man of olden time entered with heart and soul into the sounds of his words and into the whole way the sounds were formed and arranged. And in the case of the languages of Northern Europe we do not even need to go back so far before we come to a time when the word *Pflug* (plough) gave man the same inner experience as did the activity of ploughing. This has been lost, and the word has become no more than a sign. But it is scarcely more than 1500 years or so since words were still *felt* in this way in the Northern parts of Europe. The feeling a man had when he was ploughing was similar to the feeling he had when he heard the word which in those days designated the plough. When anyone was listening to or speaking a word, it was not so much his thinking that partook in the experience as his feeling.

If now we go back into more remote ages, we find something different again; the *will* takes an intense and active part in the forming of words. But in order to study the times when man's relationship to external Nature was pre-eminently one of will, we must take our thoughts right back to Atlantis. For we have to reckon with long epochs of time when we are considering the evolution of language.

Within language lives the Genius of language. Language is not dependent for its evolution on the decision of man. *In language lives the Genius of language.* And the Genius of Language belongs to the hierarchy of the Archangels. When man speaks—when,

that is, an atmosphere is prepared around the Earth within which can live man's utterances articulated into speech, then that atmosphere of speech and language is the *element of the Archangels*. Hence are the Archangels the Spirits of the different peoples—the Folk Spirits as we call them. You will know of this from the lectures I gave on the *Mission of the Folk Souls*.

The evolution of language on Earth has thus a deep and intimate connection with the evolution of the Archangels. We can go so far as to say that in the evolution of speech and language we are beholding the evolution of the Archangels themselves. For even when we are studying something that has to do with the Earth, it is by no means impossible in the course of that very study to come to a knowledge of the evolution of higher spiritual Beings. We need only learn how to relate particular facts and phenomena to particular higher spiritual Beings, and we can arrive at a clear perception of how the continuous evolution of the Archangels is expressed and revealed in the changes that are to be observed in man's faculty of speech.

Now in those far-off times when an element of will came to expression in man's speech—that is, in the later part of the Atlantean evolution—it was not the same Beings of the Hierarchy who lived in his language as in more recent times. The whole relationship moreover was different. In those remote times man was not yet so interested in the feelings aroused in him at the sight, for example, of the blossoming of flowers or by changes in weather. These feelings interested him, it is true, in another connection, but not in respect of the faculty whereby the *word* welled up from the depths of his soul. Whether danger threatened him from this or that fact in Nature, summoning him to defend himself, or whether something else had a kindly and favourable influence and he would fain bring it into the orbit of his life, or again whether another object of perception were good or bad for his health,—in effect, how his *will* was aroused to activity, what he was induced to *do* under the influence of some fact or other,—this was the aspect of experience that interested him, and he formed his words accordingly. So that in those older times we find words that express how man reacts, what he finds himself impelled to do under the influence of the world around him. The most ancient language of all consisted almost entirely of expressions of will. How do we account for this? It was due to the fact that the Archangels came to language by way of

Intuition. Read the descriptions I have given in my books of the nature of Intuition, and you will have a picture of the activity exercised by the Archangels in the later part of the Atlantean evolution, when they bestowed upon man the *language of will*.


Later, these Archangels moved forward in their own evolution. In my little book, "The Spiritual Guidance of Man and of Mankind," I spoke about the evolution of the Leaders and Guides of humanity who live in the spiritual world. To-day we will extend this into a realm to which on that occasion we gave little attention,—the realm of speech and language. The advance made by the Archangels in their relation to language may be described in the following way. In the older faculty of Intuition they were standing within the worlds of still higher Hierarchies, giving themselves up in devotion to these worlds, so that together with speech they received something of the very being of higher Hierarchies than themselves. So long as it all depended upon Intuition, the Archangels surrendered themselves to the next higher Hierarchy,—Kyriotes, Dynamis, Exusiai. They were within the worlds of this higher Hierarchy, and it was the experience of standing intuitively within this higher Hierarchy that enabled them to put the speech-forming power into human life on Earth.

In the next epoch the Archangels make, as it were, a step forward, and then their speech-forming power flows no longer out of Intuition but out of Inspiration. They are not now completely surrendered to the next higher Hierarchy. (What they did still receive through their devotion to this Hierarchy underwent a change; it ceased to be something they could then communicate to man as speech or language). Now they hearken to the *Inspirations* of the *First Hierarchy*,—Thrones, Cherubim, Seraphim,—and from out of this Inspiration they pour down to Earth the speech-forming power.

If we go back to the earliest times of Post-Atlantean evolution, or even only as far as ancient Egypt and Chaldea, we find in every land that the source from which the Archangels drew, in order to communicate speech to man, is Inspiration. Language itself is metamorphosed. Words become an expression before all else of sympathy and antipathy, of every shade of human feeling. Instead of a language of will, as in former times, we have now a *language of feeling*. We have come to a stage where this feeling, which is called forth in man by an external process or being, is the very same as is experienced when the *sounds* issuing forth from the depths of his

being are uttered by the speech organs and articulated into the *word*.

We have reached a significant phase in the evolution of mankind. The Hierarchy of the Archangels is at first the receiver of Intuitions; and the language of will, brought down as it were out of these Intuitions, is created by these Beings. The Archangels move on further and become the receivers of Inspiration. And what they receive through the Inspiration of Beings of the First Hierarchy, gives rise to the language of feeling.



It was out of an extraordinarily deep perception that the well-known scholar and writer on the history of Art, Hermann Grimm, drew a clear line of division between the Greeks and the Romans. When we learn history at school or at the university, we are, he said, exhorted to take pains to *understand* what we learn; but as we go back over the evolution of mankind, we *can* only understand history as far back as Roman times. Cicero and Caesar we can still understand, for up to a point they are similar to the man of the present day,—although it must be said that the understanding generally brought to a study of Caesar is far from being free and natural. If we were not so thoroughly drilled and trained to it, we would never take much interest in Caesar! We would leave it to the pupils in military schools. Generally speaking, however, it is possible to trace a continuous stream back from our own day to Rome. A certain element of pedantry, which has gradually been creeping into man's life and has to-day reached a kind of culmination, first began to show itself in Rome. But, thinks Hermann Grimm, if we are honest with ourselves, we cannot claim to understand Pericles or Alcibiades. We understand them in the same way as we understand characters in fairy tales. As a matter of fact, it is only through a deeper study of Anthroposophy that one can come again to an understanding of the soul life of such figures; as you know, we have sought here again and again to enter into the whole way in

which a Greek thinks and forms his ideas. Hermann Grimm is aware of the distance that lies between the inner life of a Greek and the inner life of a man of the present day. To the Roman we can still feel ourselves near; then comes a great gulf. The way the Greeks are described in the schools to-day is really deplorable! They are made out to be just like ourselves. They were not so at all, their whole life of soul was of a different character altogether. We need to look round for quite other methods to describe the Greeks. You could not have more striking evidence of this than when the learned Wilamowitz undertakes to translate the Greek tragedians. The whole affair is simply a disgrace. I need hardly say, there is nothing of the Greek tragedies left in his translations, not a trace! And yet people are immensely pleased, quite enchanted with them. *Their* dramatis personae simply do not exist in the tragedies themselves.

Hermann Grimm showed a true and sure instinct, when he said that we come into an entirely different world when we come to Greece—to say nothing of the Orient. It is really no more than a ridiculous mockery for modern man to imagine he can understand anything of the true Orient out of Deussen's translations. The first thing necessary is to be able to comprehend the change that has come about since then in the very being of man's soul.

And now when we come to consider our particular sphere, the sphere of speech or language, then we find that the *language of feeling* still prevailed in Greece among the philosophers up to the time of Plato. The first philosophical pedant* is Aristotle, the great and universal spirit. It will surprise you that I give him these two appellations, one after the other, but we do not understand Aristotle unless we see in him the first philosophical pedant and at the same time the universal spirit. He is great in a certain aspect but he is in another aspect the first pedant philosopher, for he made *out of words* categories of thought. It would never have occurred to the Greek of an *older* time to take words and force them, as it were, to yield categories of thought; he still felt the words as something that is *inspired into* man, still felt the presence of higher Spirits in speech and language.

Well on into the Greek epoch and—for the man in the street, as we say—as late as the Mystery of Golgotha, we can still detect in

* 'Pedant' seems to be, in this connection, the nearest rendering for 'Philister.' (Note by Translator).

the speech-forming power of man the element of Inspiration, as it lives in the soul of the Archangel. True, the ordinary person lags behind the philosopher in certain respects; but in spiritual matters he is often less behind, and in the matter of the speech-forming faculty, he retains the Inspirations longer. Dates can of course be no more than approximate. In one region of the earth Inspiration lasts a longer, in another a shorter, time. In one region, men still feel how the word pulsates in them as the blood pulsates in the body; they feel it in the power of the breath. In the power of the breath as it enfills and surges through the body, they feel the presence of the Archangel, who is himself subject to Inspiration.

Then we come into a time when it is no longer so that the Archangel is yielding to Inspiration when he communicates to man the power of speech, but to *Imagination*. And language becomes the *language of thought*. Man begins to speak more out of thoughts; language approaches the abstract. And behind this lies a fact of great significance.



The Archangels, who belong to the Third Hierarchy, received Intuitions from the Second Hierarchy, and Inspirations from Seraphim, Cherubim, Thrones—the First Hierarchy. Whence do they receive Imagination? There is no Hierarchy beyond the First! The Imaginations cannot at any rate come to them from any one of the Hierarchies named in the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite. For he tells of no Hierarchy beyond the first. Certain Archangel Beings were therefore obliged to turn to the *past* for Imaginations, to find in the past the pictures of the speech-forming power,—for that is what the Imaginations are. What came from an earlier time had to be carried on into the future. There was no longer any immediate and present flow of the speech-forming power. And inasmuch as speech now took its source from an earlier stage, into it crept an *Ahrimanic element*. This is a fact of incalculable significance. And what the Archangels felt above them came to

expression in the world of man in a deadening of speech and language. Language became polished and at the same time paralysed, it no longer retained the livingness it had in earlier days.

Try to understand the significance of this change. Something enters into the life of man that in reality requires a higher hierarchy than the First. If we have a right understanding for this event in human development in all its tremendous significance, we shall come to see that a time had arrived when the Gods had to grow out beyond what is contained in the First Hierarchy. There is one thing that up to that time had not yet been achieved by the Gods, and was already present here on Earth in picture. What the Gods had not yet achieved is the *passage through Death*. You have often heard me speak of this. The Gods who stand above man in the various Hierarchies knew only of changes from one form of life into another. The actual event of death in life had not, up to the time of the Mystery of Golgotha, been an experience of the Gods. Death came as a result of Luciferic and Ahrimanic influences; it came, that is, through the agency of Divine Beings who had either remained behind in evolution or pressed forward too quickly. Death had no place in the life-experience of the higher Hierarchies. It enters into Their experience in the moment when the Christ passes through the Mystery of Golgotha—passes, that is, through Death, uniting Himself so deeply with the destiny of Earth Man as to have this also in common with him,—that He passes through Death. The event of Golgotha is accordingly more than an event of the life of Earth, it is an event of the life of the Gods. The actual event that took place in that moment on Earth, and the *knowledge* of the Event that finds its way into the hearts and minds of men—all this is an image of the infinitely more lofty and sublime and far-reaching Event that took place in the worlds of the Gods themselves. Christ's passing through death on Golgotha is an event whereby the First Hierarchy reached up into a still higher realm. Therefore have I always had to speak to you of the Trinity as standing above the First Hierarchy. In reality It only *came* there in the course of evolution. Everywhere there is evolution.

And so, if we are speaking of the Hierarchies as described in Dionysius, the Areopagite, we have to say that the Archangels lose the possibility of forming Imaginations from above. Consequently Man loses the possibility of continuing to build and fashion his language in a living manner. In the world of the Gods an event

takes place of which the Mystery of Golgotha is an earthly reflection. Therefore the Event of Golgotha contains among its many implications also this,—that as men gradually receive into themselves more and more of the Christ Impulse, they receive again *through the Christ Impulse* the living spring and fountain of language.


We have to-day the various languages that run their course like diverging streams. And if we look at these various languages in a free and unbiassed way, we cannot fail to observe how they carry in them—and more especially, the farther we go Westward—an element of death, how they tend to become mere empty husks. In Asia things have not yet gone so far, but as we go West we find increasingly how the languages show signs of dying.

There is only one way whereby the speech-creating power can be quickened into life,—and that is through men coming to realise the Christ Impulse as a living Impulse. Then the Christ Impulse can become a power in man that can create speech. And among all the facts to be noted if we want to form a true picture of the significance of the Christ Impulse in the whole evolution of mankind, this must also have place, that at the time when man went forward into freedom, he came right out of the Divine and spiritual stream in which he had been steeped hitherto. Had speech remained as it was in the time of ancient Greece, man would not have been able to evolve to freedom. That speech serves the purpose merely of a sign,—this absurdity (for so I must call it) had to come about when the Archangels lost the possibility of forming Imaginations from the present and had to resort to the past. During the time since the Christ first made Himself known to men, during all this time while He has let the Mystery of His Being and His activity be there on record in the Gospels, the *knowledge* of Christ has not come in its fullness, the knowledge men have had of Him has not been sufficiently spiritual, it has often been merely traditional. But when the word of the Gospel is quickened to life by an understanding of the Christ, an understanding that derives from the Christ Himself as He still works on in the world, continuing to have influence always upon man, then—and only then—will proceed from the Christ Impulse, from the living Christ Impulse, the speech-forming power.

Let us now set down on the blackboard what I have been indicating. Here up above, the Gods grow more and more exalted. Down below an evolution goes on among men. On the one hand they receive more and more of the Christ Impulse, on the other hand

they move further and further forward in the direction of freedom. And when man rises to a higher stage, the higher Hierarchies also reach a higher stage. The Archangels gradually receive more and more of the Christ, Who has found His home in the hearts of men on Earth; He enters with His Impulse right into the Imaginations of the Archangels, and these become alive, become quick with immediate present life.

We shall in the future have an altogether different kind of language-forming power. A quite new kind will begin to work. I have spoken of this from other points of view in earlier lectures.



We can describe the evolution that goes on above in the Heavens at the same time as mankind evolves on the Earth below. And we can also describe its copy or reflection on Earth,—the progress from the language of will to the language of feeling and thence to the language of thought or symbol. And we can know that amidst it all Archangels are ascending—or shall we rather say *descending*—from Intuition to Inspiration and to Imagination. We behold first the evolution of the Archangels and all that takes place in connection therewith among the higher Hierarchies, and when we turn from that to man in his evolution, it is on the evolution of language and of the word that we have to fix our attention. We will consider one particular stream in the whole history of mankind, into which a divine stream was interwoven. It goes back to the origin of all things, the far beginning of all things. “In the Beginning was the Word”. Where was the word in those distant ages, when mankind had a language of the will? The Word was with God, it had to be sought there by means of Intuition. “The Word was with God”.

The Archangels had to transpose themselves by means of Intuition into the Being of the Second Hierarchy. The Being that flowed over

into Them was the Word. "And a God was the Word".

In the Beginning was the Word

And the Word was with God

And a God was the Word.

We see how intimate is the connection of that stream in evolution which finds its culmination in the Mystery of Golgotha with the Logos, the Word. And it is all bound up with the great cosmic event of man's "becoming" and the passage of Christ through death. When those great sentences were uttered: "In the Beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and a God was the Word"—in those days the Word was felt as moving and weaving in the *soul* of man. With the Advent of the Mystery of Golgotha came a time when Christ was present in a human *body*—men beheld Him through the Word. The Word had entered into physical man. "And the Word became flesh".

Deep truths, deep facts of evolution, lie hidden in the ancient writings, but earnest and persistent work is needed to find them again. We must first be able to observe in the spiritual world. Above all, we must approach these ancient writings with reverence, knowing that we shall only be able to deepen our understanding of their content by learning to investigate these sublime matters for ourselves. And as we are able to enter into their deeper meaning we enter also into spiritual life itself.

Well indeed would it be for us in this age, had we a Michael civilisation, a culture and a civilisation fired by what I recently called the Michael thought! This Michael thought should be alive, above all, in the autumn time. The festival of autumn should be filled with it. The leaves have withered and are falling from the branches of the trees, the plants are fading away, life is being mineralised. All the fresh young sprouting life that we saw in the earlier part of the year is receiving death into itself, death and decay, and is fast undergoing mineralisation. Now must the Michael power well up from man's inner being; now must man recognise how, just where the physical and material grows weak and faint and tends to die away,—just there the *spiritual* enters in! The Autumn Festival of Michaelmas at the end of September should become a festival filled with life and impulse. It has to express how man, while he stands right within the decaying processes of Nature, grows correspondingly active in his soul. When the Michael Festival shall have this character, then all human activity will be fructified from

it. And how sore is the need to-day for such fructification! Let me give you an instance.

A short while ago, we heard a great deal about a resolve some people had made to study language. Nothing came of it, nothing at all. All manner of facts about language were collected, but the whole effort was completely lacking in spirituality. It was really so. There you had a group of young people, straight from school. At school of course, they had not yet woken up, but *now*—they are going to "study language"! They begin to plan it all and think how it will be when they have gone on studying for some time; a dazzling picture floats before their eyes of the fruit of all their labours. Actually all the preliminary steps are there; they could quite well have gone on to a recognition of the great miracle that unfolds before us when we look away from the present-day *language of thought*, through the *language of feeling*, to the *language of will*, and behold there the wonderful working and weaving of the Divine Archangels, behold too how their working and weaving stirs even yet in the language corpses of to-day. Were the life of the First Beginnings to flow again in language, what a sublime greatness were there revealed!

You must understand that the Michael thought is not a thing to be taken easily. You cannot simply say: Let us inaugurate a Michael Festival; it will be wonderful, and we shall then be in the very forefront of progress. The Michael thought has relation to the strongest and deepest impulses of the human will. It must reckon with these innermost impulses, and a Michael Festival cannot be other than a festival which gives a tremendous urge to human life, much as in those olden times, when man had the power to create festivals, the institution of the Christmas Festival or of the Easter Festival gave a new urge and impetus to the whole life of man on Earth.

THE FORMING OF DESTINY IN SLEEPING AND WAKING

A Lecture given by
DR. RUDOLF STEINER
Berne, 6th April, 1923

MY DEAR FRIENDS,

We will consider a certain theme today which may serve as an elaboration of the public lecture given yesterday.* I want to speak in greater detail of how the human being is placed within the sphere of the World Order that is connected with his destiny, with what we are accustomed to call Karma. How does the shaping of destiny proceed? In order to answer this question, not theoretically, but concretely in a vital and practical manner, it is necessary to study the being of man a little more closely.

Human life is often said to be divided into two different states of consciousness: waking life and sleep. The conception of sleep in most people's minds amounts to nothing more than this, that the human being *rests* during sleep. The scientific view indeed assumes that the activity of consciousness ceases when a man falls asleep and begins again when he wakes; in other words, so far as the organism is concerned, sleep is nothing but repose, a state in which human activity is at rest. But sleep is by no means merely rest; we must realise that from the time of falling asleep to the moment of waking, both the astral body and the Ego are present outside the physical and etheric bodies as active realities.

At the present stage of evolution reached by man in earthly life, it is not possible for him to have direct consciousness of what the Ego and astral body are doing during sleep; none the less their activities are, to say the least, as significant as those of waking life. The reason why the Ego and astral body cannot unfold consciousness of all the complicated circumstances in which they are immersed during sleep is that, at the present stage of the Earth's evolution,

* The Aim of the Goetheanum and the Task of Anthroposophy, Berne, 5th April, 1923.

Ego and astral body have no organs wherewith to become aware of the happenings in which they are involved. Nevertheless these experiences are undergone by the Ego and astral body during sleep and they work on into the life of day, into man's conscious life.

We can most easily form an accurate conception of the way in which the experiences of Ego and astral body work into the life of day, by thinking of the beginning of man's life. During the very earliest period, as a tiny child, the human being as it were sleeps his way into the earthly life. You must not think here only of the times when a child is actually and obviously asleep, but of the whole period which cannot, in later life, be remembered by ordinary consciousness. To external observation the child may give the impression of being awake during this period, but what is going on in the child's consciousness does not take a form which can be remembered in later life. When we speak of all that is experienced by the child without his having subsequent memory of it, we are referring to this period during which the human being is 'sleeping' his way into earthly life.

But now, what develops out of this sleeping state at the beginning of man's life on Earth? Three things must be considered if we are to understand the workings of all that the human being brings from his pre-earthly life and proceeds to weave, in the dim consciousness of sleep, into his physical existence. There are three faculties which the human being has to acquire, differently from the animals. Animals either do not have them at all, or already possess them—in greater or lesser degree of development—when they come into the world.

Of the development of these three faculties people have usually quite a one-sided and inadequate conception. Very little of the whole process receives consideration. The first faculty is *learning to walk*. Man enters the world, the earthly world, as a being who cannot walk, who has to acquire this faculty. The second is *speaking*, and the third, *thinking*. One faculty may take precedence in a particular child, but in general it can be said that the human being learns to walk, to speak and to think. The faculty of thinking follows that of speaking; the faculty to grasp also in thought what is expressed in words develops, gradually, out of speaking. It is some considerable time before one can truly say that a child thinks.

The ordinary conception of walking is extremely inadequate. Walking does not merely consist in the child's learning to stand

upright and propel his legs, it involves acquiring *equilibrium*, gaining complete mastery of the *balance* man has in the world. This means the child can move freely in any direction without falling over. Thus he learns to place his body into the world; he learns to control his muscles and limbs in such a way that the centre of gravity in the body, whether standing or walking, lies at the correct point. Current ideas about this faculty are, as I said, totally inadequate, for in reality something else of tremendous significance comes to pass with the learning to walk, namely differentiation of the functions of legs and arms. As a rule—and where modifications occur there is a sound explanation for them—animals make uniform use of their four limbs, whereas in the human being there is differentiation. For the purposes of equilibrium and of walking, man uses his legs, whereas his arms and hands are wonderful instruments for the expression of his life of soul, vehicles of the work he is to accomplish in the world. This differentiation between feet and hands, arms and legs, is one of the features that are ignored in the usual one-sided conception of the faculty of learning to walk. The differentiation testifies, in the physical world, to the fact that the human being has to *acquire* certain faculties during his physical life on Earth.

The second faculty, that of *speaking*, is also acquired by imitation; the little child tries to imitate—just as he does with walking, standing, equilibration, differentiation between hands and feet. It can be said with truth that speaking is not unconnected with walking,—above all, with the use of the hand in its differentiation. It is well known that speaking is connected with the specific development of an organ situated at the left side of the brain. This however only applies to people who use their right hand for the most important activities of life; in left-handed people the organ of speech lies at the right side of the brain. These facts indicate that what comes to expression in speech is connected with the search for equilibrium. Then, out of speaking, *thinking* develops. A person who is born dumb can only be brought to think by artificial means; in all those who are not born dumb, thinking is a faculty that develops out of speech.

Now, the characteristic development I have just described is not really to be understood until we can follow how, in later life, the human being passes over from the waking to the sleeping state. During sleep, the physical and etheric bodies lie resting in the physical sense; the Ego and astral body have separated, in essentials,

from the physical and etheric bodies. But if, with the methods of Spiritual Science, we examine the astral body of man which has separated from the physical and etheric bodies during sleep, we find that this astral body contains within it the forces that are connected with *learning to speak*. It is extraordinarily interesting to watch the human being falling asleep and waking, during the time when, as a child, he is learning to speak; and it is also very interesting, in the case of some grown-up person who is learning to speak for the first time, to observe the intensity with which the astral body participates in the process. For when the human being is learning to speak, and even later on, too, when he is using speech in everyday life, the astral body carries with it, out of the physical and etheric bodies, the element of soul and spirit that is inherent in words and in speech.

If you can perceive how a human being speaks, how he forms his words, how he imparts to the words his own characteristic tone of voice, how he pours into words the force of his inner convictions, the experiences of his own soul—then you can also perceive how, when he falls asleep, the astral body carries this element of soul and spirit out of the physical and etheric bodies and during the period of sleep holds within itself, in the world of soul and spirit, as a kind of echoing wave, the after-workings of the psycho-spiritual qualities of speech. The forming of the words, the nuances of tone, the force of conviction which a man is able to bring into his words—all this can be perceived in the astral body during the sleeping state. There is, of course, no force of vibration such as is communicated to the physical air, and thus naturally no physical tone of voice is produced. The element of spirit and soul however, that proceeds from the human mouth on the waves of the words and is heard by the human ear, what the soul communicates in the flow of speech—all this is carried forth into the spiritual world by the astral body while the human being sleeps. It can be perceived more clearly when a child, or even a grown-up, is exerting himself to learn to speak a language. But through the whole of life, the element of spirit and soul inherent in speech during the day is taken out into the spiritual world by the astral body during the night. Thus we can say: the nuances of feeling in the spoken word—these it is above all that are carried out of the human being by the astral body during the night. This is a characteristic function of the astral body.

And now let us consider the Ego during the hours of sleep. The Ego is related, as it were, by nature to the limb-system. Just as the astral body is connected with the breast from which speech proceeds, so is the Ego involved in what the human being performs with his limbs, what he does between waking and falling asleep as he walks about or uses his arms and hands. The astral body flows into every word, carries forth the soul-quality of the word during sleep; the Ego is bound up with every *movement* we make as we go about the world in waking consciousness. The Ego is involved in every movement of the hands, in every act of grasping an object. Whereas, in connexion with the astral body, too little attention is paid to the specific soul-element that pours into speech (speech being in itself so obviously a matter of the life of soul), when we come to the connexion between the Ego and the limbs, we find an inclination to ignore altogether the working of the soul and spirit. Walking, grasping with the hands, are regarded as processes which happen entirely within a kind of physical mechanism,—for such the human organism is thought to be. But it is by no means so.

In every movement of the fingers that we make during the day, in every step we take as we go about, spirit and soul are contained, just as truly as they are contained in words. What is connected with our limbs and our movements is taken by the Ego out of our physical and etheric bodies into the spiritual world when we fall asleep; and in the process inheres a psycho-spiritual element of a very special nature. At every moment during the period of sleep, the Ego is unconsciously satisfied or dissatisfied. (You will understand this better presently, when I have explained it more fully). Although the words sound trivial, the Ego is satisfied with the legs having moved towards some place or other, or with something that has been accomplished by the arms. Not only is an aftermath of leg and arm movements carried out into sleep, but satisfaction or dissatisfaction as well. Part of the experience of the Ego during the hours of sleep is as follows: You should really not have gone to such and such a place! Or: It was very good to go there! It was good, too, that some particular thing was done with the arms! Or again: Such and such an action was not good! This is an expression of the element of soul and spirit that is added by the Ego to what it bears outwards from the limbs of man into sleep.

What underlies this? In accordance with the World Order the astral body of man is destined to come into inner contact between

sleeping and waking with the Beings described in the book *Occult Science* as belonging to the Hierarchy of the Archangeloi—the Archangels. The Archangel Beings feel an affinity with what is carried out into sleep as an echo sounding on from human speech. It is something they need, something they long to experience.

I will put it like this.—Just as human beings in their physical life on Earth have to breathe, have to be surrounded with oxygen, and consequently feel oxygen to be something beneficial, so do the Archangeloi, who are connected with the inner nature of the Earth, experience a need that the souls of men who are asleep shall bring to them the echo of what is contained in their speech.

Human speech is in this way connected, inherently and fundamentally, via the sleeping state, with the Hierarchy of the Archangeloi. You will remember what I have said in earlier lecture courses, namely, that the Archangeloi are the Leaders, the Guiding Spirits, of the folk-languages. This is connected with what has now been given. The Archangeloi are the Guiding Spirits of folk-languages because they *breathe in* what the human being, as he sleeps, brings to them from his speech. And a certain human failing is revealed—it is one that is particularly observable in modern cultural life—when, with his speech, a man does not carry out into sleep the right quality.

There is in the culture of the present day very little of what we call idealism. Our words relate entirely to things of the outer, material world. The voicing of ideals—which presupposes belief in the Spiritual, for the ideal is a spiritual thing—is becoming rarer and rarer. Since in their waking life men do not unfold inner enthusiasm for ideals, they speak, in reality, of nothing but what is actually present in the physical world. More and more do their words apply and refer only to things of the physical world.

In our days it is often so that people who claim to believe fanatically in the Spirit are the very ones who refute the Spirit. I refer to such as engage in spiritualistic experiments with the object of producing manifestations of the Spirit. This is because, fundamentally, they are only willing to believe in a Spirit which can manifest in the material world. But it is no Spirit that reveals itself in glimmering material light and other such phenomena! Spiritualism is veritably the most extreme form of materialism. It is really an attempt to deny the Spirit, inasmuch as these people will only acknowledge as Spirit that which enters into the world of matter.

We are living in an age when words, as they emerge from the soul, lack the wings of idealism. But if this quality is absent, if, in other words, man is unable in waking life to speak of his ideals as well as of physical things, unable to turn to the ideal which imparts real aim to life and transcends physical existence, if in his daily speech he produces no words to express ideals, so that language itself lacks idealism, then it is exceedingly difficult, during sleep, for the connexion—which is so necessary for the human being—to be made with the Archangeloi; in such circumstances no order prevails during sleep in the intercourse which should be established between the human soul and the Hierarchy of the Archangeloi. Yes, it is indeed the case that every night man loses the opportunity, if I may so express it, of union with the Archangel Beings. And it is difficult for him, then, to have the inner connexion with the spiritual world which enables his life between death and a new birth to be full of strong and vital experiences. The life of a man between death and a new birth is weakened when no idealism is expressed in his speech.

To understand these things constitutes an integral part of the knowledge of life. Those who realise what lack of idealism in speech signifies will ultimately develop the power to make it once again an integral quality of human speech. Even during earthly life it can be observed that a man who, during sleep, fails to draw the right power from the Archangel, does not unfold the strength he should really possess. With regard to what speech should accomplish during sleep for the human being, we can therefore say: In order that speech may produce something that is beneficial to life, we must make a real effort to develop idealism of such a kind that our words do not merely voice an understanding of everyday affairs, but are also imbued with the Spiritual, in the form of idealism.

We are confronted with something even more striking when we observe the Ego in the sleeping state. The Ego carries out into sleep satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the activities of the limbs. Just as the astral body, as a result of the after-working of speech, is carried towards the Hierarchy of the Archangeloi, so is the Ego carried towards the Hierarchy of the Archai—the Powers of the Primal Beginnings—by virtue of what it takes out into the sleeping state as an echo of what has been performed by arms and legs in the daily round of life. From these Archai, the power flows to us, firstly, so to permeate the physical body that we do not only desire the Good, but are also able to exercise upon the urges and instincts

of the physical body the measure of control which ensures that the physical body shall present no insuperable obstacle to the fulfilment of the duty or aim we have set ourselves in freedom of thought. In our thoughts we are free beings; but the power to use the freedom in actual life arises only when we carry out into sleep the basis for a true connexion with the Archai. How can this be done? Idealism brings the astral body into right connexion with the Archangeloi. And what enables the Ego to be united with the Archai? Although we ourselves, to begin with, are unconscious during sleep, the Being from the Hierarchy of the Archai is fully conscious, receives what is unconscious in us and elaborates it into a definite thought of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with what we have done during the day. But what is it that enables us to be connected rightly with these Archai, in the same way as idealism in speech leads us into right connexion with Archangeloi?

One quality alone brings the Ego, during sleep, into right connexion with the Archai, namely true human love, universal and unselfish love for human beings, sincere interest in every fellow man with whom life brings us into contact. I do not mean sympathy or antipathy, which are merely the outcome of something we are not willing to overcome. True and genuine love for human beings during the waking state leads us, during sleep, to the bosom of the Archai. And there, while the Ego is resting in the bosom of these Beings, karma or destiny is shaped. A verdict is passed: 'I am satisfied with what I have performed with my arms and legs.' And out of the satisfaction or dissatisfaction is born a power that not only plays a part in the period immediately following death, but continues on to the next earthly life—the power to shape destiny aright, so that true balance and adjustment are brought about in all those things which in one earthly life we have experienced in the Ego during sleep, in communion with the Archai.

Reflection on these things will develop insight into the mysterious connexion between the Ego and the karma, or destiny. Just as the astral body of a man who is an idealist can hand over his speech to the Archangeloi as an offering that then enables the Archangeloi to guide him aright between death and a new birth, so does the Ego weave and work at the texture of destiny. Karma is elaborated in conjunction with the Archai. It is moreover in the power of the Archai to bestow upon us what we need in order that we may not only live through the period between death and a new birth, but,

at our next descent to the earthly world, possess already a power which in earliest childhood, enables us, each in his own way, to learn to walk, to find equilibrium, to differentiate the functions of feet and hands, arms and legs.

It is wonderful to be able to perceive how the efforts made by a child when it stops crawling and begins to walk, when it first learns to achieve equilibrium—how these efforts represent the after-effects of the way in which, during the previous earth-life, the Ego was able, because of a universal love for human beings, to make a connexion, during sleep, with the Archai. This fact manifests now in the process of learning to walk and can be observed in the very details of the process.

Suppose, for instance, a little child continually stumbles and falls. This means that in a previous life feelings of strong antipathy or even hatred were harboured. No more than an approach was made to the Archai and the effect of the absence of any real connexion is expressed in the constant falls during the process of learning to walk. One who develops insight into such matters and sets himself the aim, let us say, of fitting himself to be an educator in the true sense by making close and careful observations of the way in which little children learn to walk, can indeed come to realise what a great and far-reaching task lies before him in the karmic adjustment of something brought over into the present life through the fact that in the previous life there was too little human love, or perhaps enough, but of a misdirected kind.

We have here an example of how the materialistic outlook remains altogether within the realm of the physical. It describes how the human organism raises itself like a machine to the upright position, how it learns to walk, and so on; but behind every physical phenomenon is something spiritual and those who can survey the whole process learn to recognise that the previous earthly life works over into learning to walk. For learning to walk is one expression of how the human being, at the beginning of a new earthly life, learns to control his physical body. Those who understand it fully, know that there is a great deal more in the process of learning to walk than the capacity to lift the legs and raise the body upright; they know that, in truth, this phenomenon is connected also with deeply inward processes, it has to do with the whole manner in which the human being is becoming master of his glandular activity and the like. For when a child is learning to walk, and even before, it is not a matter

only of walking, but of gaining—or failing to gain—control of the glandular activities, a factor in the process being whether the child's temperament is phlegmatic or choleric, or whether certain emotions in him are too intense. This, again, is connected with the relationship established with the Archai during sleep in a previous earthly life, as the outcome of universal human love, or lack of it. Materialistic thought says that the human being rests during sleep. But he is not merely resting. When the right kind of idealism is present in a man's waking life, then the astral body will be enabled, while he sleeps, to rise to the Hierarchy of the Archangeloi, that is to say, to be connected with the spiritual world during sleep in such a way that the period leading over from death to a new birth can be lived through in the right manner. If this period is not rightly spent, it means that weaknesses are carried over into another earthly life. How the next life is framed and built, depends upon the nature of the connexion established with the Archai. Universal human love carries with it creative power. To have strength to place the body wholly in the service of the soul, to have mastery and control of the physical body—upon what does this depend? It depends upon whether the human being, in the previous life, unfolded love for his fellow men—a faculty that belongs entirely to the soul.

You will remember what I have said in previous lectures: The soul-element of one earthly incarnation manifests in the physical of the next; the spiritual of one incarnation in the soul of the next. These connexions are as I have just described them.

It will not do to generalise, saying merely that destiny and karma exist. What can be said, and with truth, is that we behold how the human being works at the formation of his own karma. He weaves it during sleep; but it is during waking life that he gathers what he needs for its texture. He weaves the threads that are formed out of universal human love—or he weaves threads which perpetually tear asunder and make bad karma for the next life, threads that are woven out of feelings of hatred for our fellowmen. Love and hatred—these are creative forces in the forming and shaping of karma.

Such truths must be viewed in their true light. It is but a slipshod and easy-going conception of karma which prompts us to say: 'I am ill—it is my karma!' 'A misfortune has befallen me—it is my karma.' To make karma responsible for everything in this fatalistic way does not, it is true, afford any real peace of mind,

it is merely a convenient theoretical conception; it is, however, quite incorrect.

Imagine you are considering, not this present life, but the third subsequent life, then in that life you will be able to look back to the present one, and when you say: 'It is my karma,' your karma, as it will be then, is to be traced back to this present earthly life where it was actually born. In other words, karma is all the time *coming into being*.

It is not right to throw everything back to the past. The right attitude to karma leads us to say: An illness which befalls me now, need not necessarily be the consequence of earlier weaknesses of soul; it is possible that an illness may constitute a first beginning. Karma holds good, nevertheless. If an illness, a misfortune befalls me in this present earthly life, the compensation will quite surely come,—or again the illness, the misfortune, may itself be the compensation.

In other words: the future, too, must be reckoned with, when we are speaking about karma. The right attitude towards karma is to have an unshakeable conviction of *justice* reigning through all the worlds, a knowledge that for everything there is compensation. But the present earthly life must not be considered as breaking the on-flowing sequence of incarnations so that we relegate everything to the past. The healthy and positive attitude to the karmic flow of life's happenings rests on the sure knowledge that there is justice. What really matters most of all is the mood of soul that is born from this understanding of karma.

The whole feeling and attitude of soul that must emerge from a true understanding of karma, is one which makes us realise when, perhaps some misfortune befalls us as consequence of an earlier weakness in the life of soul—that if this misfortune had not come about, the weakness would have persisted. Looking into the depths of our soul, we must realise: It is good and right that this misfortune has come upon me, because it has enabled a weakness to be eliminated.

A man who bewails a misfortune which is really the consequence of a preceding weakness or failing, is not adopting the standpoint of true manhood, for the inference is that it matters not to him whether he remains weak or achieves some measure of strength. That man alone faces misfortune aright who says to himself: 'If it has occurred because of an earlier weakness, it is to be welcomed, for it will make me conscious of the weakness (which expressed

itself perhaps in some definite failing); I will now eradicate the weakness, I will be strong again.'

In a case, on the other hand, where a misfortune befalls one as the first step in karma, the right attitude is to say to oneself: If we were always only to encounter what we wish for ourselves, such a life would make us out and out weaklings! One or two earthly lives might continue to be comfortable and easy through the fact that only that would befall us that we desired for ourselves—but in the third or fourth life a kind of paralysis of soul and spirit would supervene, and no effort to overcome obstacles would arise in us. For, after all, obstacles would not be there for us to overcome unless the un hoped-for, the undesired came upon us. But if the right kind of strength is developed vis-a-vis the obstacles, if enough human love is carried over into sleep, then the karma that is woven by the Ego in communion with the Archai is such that the true compensation takes place in the next earthly life.

The truths of Anthroposophy need not remain in the realm of cognition; their very nature is such that they affect a man's attitude and temper of mind and heart. A man who is not thus affected has not grasped them fully; for him indeed they remain abstract and theoretical. The effect which a true understanding of karma has upon a man is to make him *more* sensitive to happiness and misfortune than he would otherwise be; happiness and misfortune are experienced with great intensity; but he is also able to induce in his soul an attitude to the spiritual world which arises, not out of any belief or creed but out of a perception of what the Ego and astral body are doing while they are withdrawn from the bodily life of day. Recognition of this promotes an unshakeable conviction of world-justice. Understanding of karma means that a man has a true perception of world-justice. It does not mean that he becomes phlegmatic towards happiness or unhappiness, joy or pain; it means that joy and pain, happiness and misfortune are for him allotted to their proper place in life.

Observing the human being during the life of day, we can see how the Ego and astral body are working in the physical body. This means that we know something of their activity in the physical body. But we know nothing about the workings of the soul and spirit within the Ego and astral body. If, as a materialist, I am speaking to a human being, listening to his words, I say to myself: Lungs, larynx are at work as he speaks; vibrations are set up in the air

and they strike on my ear. But if I see the process truly, I perceive in the words and speech the man's astral body in which his kinship with the Divine-Spiritual world is expressed. I say to myself: When, during the life of day, the astral body is within the physical body, it conceals itself in the man's speech and similar activities; during the night, however, the astral body participates in the life of the higher Hierarchies. And it is the same with the Ego.

When the human being sleeps he is not merely resting from the fatigues of his daily life. Here in the physical world, man sleeps, works and speaks with his physical body; but he is active too in the *spiritual* world, while he is asleep. Since materialism denies that Ego and astral body exist and operate in full reality of being during sleep, materialism cannot possibly understand the world in its entirety. What is the 'moral world' to materialism? To materialism the 'moral world' is something the human being formulates in thought—something that has nothing to do with the actively creative powers of the world. But those who have true and penetrating perception of human life know that man lives within the moral world-order during sleep just as truly as during waking life he lives in air and light. This again leads us to something more that it is essential we should understand.

The workings of speech (and the same holds good for karma, too) accompany us when we die. Through the course of our life we have been connected—rightly, or perhaps inadequately—with the world of the Archangeloi. This relationship has repeated itself in every period of sleep, and we bear with us through the Gate of Death into the spiritual world what has been given us by the Archangeloi during sleep. We can then find the way rightly into the spiritual world which is, indeed, the Logos, the world consisting of cosmic principles which have their images in the words of speech; we can find our way into the spiritual world to live out there our life between death and a new birth.

But the matter is not so simple. After death we have no physical body; we are able to turn to good account what the Archangeloi have conferred upon us from our periods of sleep. But when as physical human beings on the Earth, we *wake from sleep*, we have again to descend into a physical body. The Archangeloi cannot bestow upon us the power to do this. Still higher Hierarchies must add their work, namely, the Beings designated in Occult Science the Exusiai and the Kyriotetes. Into the urges, instincts and



1. Ah (as in 'father')
Movement (dress)
Feeling (veil)
Character (muscular tension)

reddish-lilac
greenish-blueish
red
red




Plate 1.8. Uran row. 4. this section

desires of the physical body—which offer resistance to us—these higher Beings must introduce the fruits of what we have achieved in communion with the Archangeloi through the spirituality of speech; and this now flames up within us, as the *voice of conscience*. When that which we bring out of sleep into the body lights up as the voice of conscience, there is working, in this voice, all that has been bestowed by the Hierarchy of the Exusiai and Kyriotetes—a Hierarchy more sublime than that of the Archangeloi.

Thus when we discover in the physical world a man whose conscience is so strong that instincts of a higher order arise in his physical body, we realise that as a result of idealism in his speech, Kyriotetes and Exusiai have worked upon him.

Again, when through universal human love a man forms a real link with the Archai, the results of the work that he himself does on his karma appear in the body of the next earth-life when, in early childhood, while he is sleeping his way into life, he learns to walk, acquires balance, skill in the use of his arms, control of the glandular system, and so on. All this is possible because he has been able, between death and a new birth, to work in communion with the Archai. But in order that in his life on Earth a man may develop delicate sensitivity, a quick and clear consciousness in regard to his own deeds, it is necessary for the still higher Beings referred to in the book *Occult Science* as the *Dynamis* to work together with the Archai.

When a man lacks wide-hearted love for his fellowmen, lacks interest in his human environment, he does not find a true link with the Archai. The result is that he prevents himself from weaving his karma rightly for the next earth-life, and the compensation has to wait for later incarnations. In the present earth-life such a man suffers from increasing lack of power to carry into the physical body the judgments that he forms—satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the actions performed by legs and hands. This cannot be achieved by ourselves alone; through intensified human love we need to have entered into a true relationship with the *Dynamis*. These Beings then bear into our physical body the requisite power; otherwise we come to grief, although we may perceive quite clearly what is right.

In thought we can be free. But in order to use this freedom aright in the physical body, the proper equilibrium must be established in waking and sleeping life because we must be united not only with the Archai but also with the *Dynamis*.

The highest Hierarchy of all—*Seraphim, Cherabim and Thrones*—

bear our deeds out into the universe. From out of sleep, Exusiai, Dynamis, Kyriotetes bear as moral power into our bodily nature what we grasp in thoughts: Seraphim, Cherubim and Thrones bear this out into the universe, so that our own moral forces become *world-creative forces*.

When the time comes for the Earth to pass over to the Jupiter condition and for our moral forces to perform their true functions in this great process of transformation, Seraphim, Cherubim and Thrones can only play their part if we are able to offer them the necessary foundations. If, because of feebleness, we have only forces of destruction to offer them, then we are working for the destruction of the Earth, not for the upbuilding of Jupiter.

When Anthroposophy speaks of the manifoldness of the spiritual world, this is by no means a mere naming of particular stages, but we are enabled gradually to behold the whole warp and woof of the world and to perceive the connexion of the human being with the spiritual world as clearly as we perceive his connexions with the physical world. The power to promote and upbuild life arises in men who acquire in this way a true insight into their connexion with the spiritual world, who realise that the purpose of sleep is not merely repose but that the after-workings of the physical body may bring the human being into a right connexion with the spiritual world.

It is quite possible for a man to deny the spiritual and moral world because, to begin with, at his present stage of Earth evolution, he is not aware of its reality. He is asleep in this respect. A true science must evoke into the realm of consciousness, realisation of the heavenly existence which reaches into earthly life. Sleep comes over man for this very purpose—that he may, himself, draw out of the spiritual world the power he needs for his physical life.

And now, from this point of view, study the connexion of what I have sketched today in outline with my "Philosophy of Spiritual Activity". As I have stated with emphasis there, it is not a matter of establishing the theory that the *will* must be free, but that the *thought* must be free. The thought must control the will if man is to be a free being. But a man's life must be suitably directed and ordered if the will is not to present insuperable hindrance to the thought that is free. As men in the physical world we can make our thought free. Feeling* becomes free only when we have established

a true relationship with the Archangeloi; will becomes free when we have established a true relationship with the Archai.

The living content of speech, as well as all that lives in our limbs, passes out, during sleep, together with the soul and spirit. Astral body and Ego go forth, but the ether-body remains with the physical body. The thinking that is bound up with the ether body continues within the ether-body; but we know nothing in ordinary consciousness of how this ether body *thinks* from the time of falling asleep to that of waking, because we are outside it. It is not true that thinking ceases during sleep; we think from the moment of falling asleep until we wake. Man's thoughts are in perpetual flow in his ether-body, only he is unaware of it. Not until the moment when he returns to the body do the thoughts light up in his consciousness. Man can become free in his life of thought because his thoughts are bound, through the ether-body, with the physical life of Earth; for he has been placed upon the Earth in order that he may become free. From the spiritual world alone can he draw the *power* of freedom—the power that leads to freedom in feeling and in will.

It will be clear that throughout the whole of his life on Earth the human being retains the real foundation for his thinking—the ether-body. Astral body and Ego pass out into a cosmic world during earthly life; not so, the ether-body. The ether-body emerges only at death. Then comes the backward review, lasting one, two, three days, of the life that has just ended; the human being sees his whole life as a panorama. Always, without exception, the human being looks back, after death, upon his earthly life which has now run its course. The whole ocean of the thoughts that have arisen in him between birth and death, both in sleeping and waking life—a great sea of inter-weaving thoughts—is present before him during these three days after death, but immediately thereafter the thoughts are claimed by the Cosmos; the thoughts dissolve, and after two or three days the whole panorama has passed away—into the Cosmos. We are accustomed to say that the ether-body has been detached and has dispersed, but in actual fact the Cosmos has absorbed it into itself. The ether-body has continued to expand, until finally it is completely absorbed into the Cosmos. Then, as Ego and astral body, the human being is received into the bosom of the Higher Hierarchies. Only when an ether-body is again bestowed upon him, can he descend to a new earthly life and continue the work which will make him a free human being. For it is the goal of earthly

* The German word here is 'Gemüt'—a word that means more than "feeling," for it includes also the perception and understanding that belong to the heart.

life that man shall become free. The foundation for freedom lies in the activity of pure thinking—a faculty that is bestowed upon man *on Earth*. Therefore is the ether-body bound to the physical body for the whole course of earthly life, releasing itself only at death in worlds where freedom is not to be acquired. Freedom is acquired during life on Earth, and moreover, as you know, during certain epochs only of Earth life.

We can thus understand that there is a true relationship between freedom and karma, for freedom is connected with those members of man's being (physical body and ether-body) which remain behind during sleep. Karma is woven by the Ego during the period of sleep,—that is to say, in a realm beyond and apart from those members wherein freedom has its foundations. Karma does not weave the texture of free or unfree thoughts; karma weaves at feeling and will. Karma emerges from the depths of human nature, out of the 'dreaming' feeling and the 'sleeping' will. Into this we can pour, or rather over against this we can place, the power that lives in the free activity of thoughts, in pure thinking, in the ethical and moral impulses as I described them in the book *Philosophy of Spiritual Activity*; for these impulses must have their root in pure thinking.

Everything, you see, fits into a whole. It is essential to realise that the further we progress in Anthroposophy, the more completely do we find the details uniting and forming one whole. Contradictions may well be found in what is said concerning one particular domain or another; this is inevitable, because before arriving at any real insight in one domain we need, in reality, to study this domain in connexion with the whole. Otherwise our conclusions are like that of a man who makes statements about a planet and is unable to understand the causes of its specific movements. In such a case it is of course necessary to reckon with the whole planetary system. Thus, if we wish really to know something about the world and about life, we must try to fathom all the connexions, all the details of actual realities, both in the physical world and in the worlds of soul and spirit.

This was what I wanted to say to you today, my dear friends, when it has been possible for us to be together again in a Group Meeting. My desire has been to help you to develop that attitude to karma—that is, to universal justice—which arises in a man when he finds his true bearings in Anthroposophy. More important than the mere comprehension of theories is the feeling, the attitude of soul which

we carry over into life itself. May you succeed, in ever greater and greater measure, in making the gifts of Anthroposophy the very substance of your soul, receiving them verily not into your thoughts alone, but into your heart and soul. The more Anthroposophy becomes the heart-substance of those who desire to understand it truly, the more will it be possible to introduce Anthroposophy into cultural spiritual life in the wide sense. This is a deep and urgent need, for with antiquated traditions mankind will be incapable of progress. Try to tread the path of Anthroposophy which leads from the head to the heart, for in your hearts Anthroposophy will be secure.

LANGUAGE AND DISCOVERY

By OWEN BARFIELD

THE last forty or fifty years have witnessed a rapid and accelerating growth of interest in philosophical problems connected with the nature of language. When I was a boy, people turned and stared if they saw an automobile; when I was a young man, they stared at anyone who used the epithet "semantic". They don't stare any longer.

It is noticeable that this attention paid to language, which has expanded so rapidly, has done so in two sharply divergent directions. There is the analytical school, for whom the study of language is a department of symbolic logic or of information theory, and sometimes also of physiology. On the other hand there is a more nebulous body of thinkers, for whom the word "symbolic" has quite a different meaning and for whom, if it is a department of anything, the study of language is a department of psychology, mythology, ontology—or of poetics.

As far as I can see, intercommunication between these two schools is very slight, if not non-existent, though they are occasionally heard abusing each other. Nevertheless a bird's-eye view of both of them (if such a thing were possible) would, I believe, reveal *one* tendency they have had in common. Logical Positivism and its successor in title, Linguistic Analysis, have both stressed the dubious propriety, if not the impossibility, of distinguishing the "meaning" of language from language itself. And, from the opposite direction, the other school—those who (like myself) are mainly interested in the *figurative* aspect of language—have, rather more lately, been showing a pronounced tendency towards reaching a similar conclusion, although on different grounds.

The people I have in mind as constituting this second group are those who, with all sorts of internecine differences of approach and emphasis, share a common concern with such matters as metaphor and simile, and thus of parabolic utterance in general—all those rhetorical practices, or more purely linguistic phenomena, by virtue of which "more is meant than meets the ear." It is a wide field.

Even if we exclude such extensions as myth and confine ourselves to poetry or literature, it is a wide field. One has only to think of the different ways it has been handled by such writers as the French Symbolists or the Anglo-Saxon Imagists—Valéry, Mallarmé, Amy Lowell, T. E. Hulme, Ezra Pound—and later by such critics as I. A. Richards or William Empson, apart from a host of less well-known writers, to be reminded just how wide it is. And I ought not to omit the striking figure of Susanne Langer, with a foot in both camps, inasmuch as her first publication was a primer of symbolic logic, while her later work has given us *Philosophy in a New Key*, *Feeling and Form* and *Problems of Art*. They remind us that the field is by no means limited to literature. The issue of, for instance, the true function of metaphor in poetry raises the whole question of image and symbol in general and the part they play at almost all levels of human consciousness. Such names as Eliseo Vivas, Merleau Ponty, Joseph Campbell come to mind, and there are many others. And again we are led through the wider question into that vast structure of imagery and symbols, the traditional myths; and thus into the history of human consciousness itself: Ernst Cassirer, C. G. Jung, Mircea Éliade will serve for examples.

It is not less obvious that the topic of symbolism, and particularly of symbolism in language, will be felt to have an important bearing on the interpretation of religious documents including the Old and New Testaments. This has in fact been the case. For example, we have seen, over the same period, a rather novel view of the nature and function of parable in the New Testament and in Christian experience; a view very different from the older allegorical definition of "an earthly story with a heavenly meaning." The names of Fuchs, Ebeling, Van Buren will come to the minds of any who have concerned themselves with it, and the field was very fully explored and expanded by Dr. Robert O. Funk in 1966 in his book *Language Hermeneutic and the Word of God*.

Last but not least there has been the distinctively philosophical approach: those non-analytical philosophies of language, in which I suppose the outstanding names are Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein.

Now there are two observations I want to make about the subject-matter of this hurried survey. The first concerns a *tendency* and the second a *difficulty*. As to the first, I have already suggested that the tendency all these developments have in common has been

an increasing endeavour to find the meaning of language confined within language itself; without, that is to say, looking beyond it to something other than language, to which its words are to be taken as "referring." More technically expressed, there is evidence of a strong desire to integrate meaning with the linguistic structures by which the meaning is revealed, to treat language as an end in itself rather than as a means to an end—to classify it as an *event*, rather than as a means of reference, or of imparting information. Thus, just as the Imagists told us that in our poetry "the object is the image," and as we hear of "symbols without meaning," so the parables in the Gospels are to be received, not as allegories pointing beyond themselves, but as veritable happenings. Whether Marshal McLuhan's doctrine that "the medium is the message" is to be regarded as the culmination, or the *reductio ad absurdum*, of the tendency will depend on how formidable we feel to be the *difficulty*, to which I now turn.

I suspect the difficulty is already obvious enough to all who are not deeply habituated to the line of thought I have been trying to advocate. It is that language, by definition (that is to say, by virtue of its very nature *as* language) *does* point beyond itself. When a man talks, we are affected by what he says precisely because we assume that he is talking about *something*—and that that something is *not* simply the effect he hopes his talking is going to have on us. He may want to get at our ganglia, but he will succeed in doing so only as long as we are convinced that he is not talking *about* our ganglia. Thus, when I. A. Richards long ago distinguished the "emotive" language of poetry from the "referential" language of science, and insisted that the semantic function of emotive language is not to make statements but to arouse emotion, he overlooked the fact that emotive language arouses emotion precisely *because* it is taken to refer to something; and to something other than the emotion. For talking about an emotion will neither express nor arouse it; rather the opposite. Lovers do not intend to talk about the emotion of love; they intend to talk qualitatively about each other, and a speaker's intention *is* his meaning; indeed it is another word for it.

This difficulty is, for me, so fatal that I cannot find any more profundity in the proposition that "a poem must not mean, but be" than I could in the proposition, say, that "a satellite must not orbit, but stop still." Alas, it is by virtue of orbiting that it *is* a satellite

at all. In the same way, it is by virtue, not of orbiting but of leading, or pointing, or hinting, or referring—what you will, but certainly of relating in *some way*—to what is other than its own syllables that a word is a word at all. Words are only themselves by being more than themselves. Perhaps the same thing is true of human beings.

This, then, is the difficulty which the operators within the tendency are always up against, and which they seek to evade by inventing various new and cautious formulations of a depressingly self-contradictory nature. We hear them fastidiously manipulating such terms of art as "non-objectifying language," "symbols without meaning," "self-reference" and so forth. But it is a difficulty which, as far as my understanding goes, not even Heidegger or Wittgenstein ever really surmounted or even faced, and I become painfully aware of it the moment I get around to reading their works or those of their exponents and commentators.

Perhaps all this may have suggested that I consider I have simply refuted all the distinguished people I have been talking about and proved that they have nothing important to tell us. On the contrary I have a strong feeling that they are trying to tell us something very important indeed, and even that the tendency I have outlined may one day prove to have evinced a sort of turning-point in the history of ideas; or (which I think more important and a more likely place for turning-points) in the history of consciousness. That is just why I feel so uncomfortable. I am *impressed* by the tendency and *oppressed* by the difficulty; and I oscillate uneasily between the one feeling and the other—rather as those who go along with the tendency seem to oscillate between a somehow pregnant conviction that language does not "refer" and the necessity, which arises as soon as they open their mouths, of assuming that it does.

When you find yourself caught in a tangled and frustrating situation, so that the mind seems to be grinding to a stop from the friction generated by the rapid motions of its attempts to escape, it is sometimes a good thing to step clean off the particular track, on which you have been shuttling to and fro between one horn of a dilemma and the other, and approach the situation from a different direction altogether. On that principle I want to cease now from looking at the approaches to the problem of language made from an initial standpoint of poetry, etymology, semantics, psychology, theology, philosophy, and look at another one altogether: an

approach from the initial standpoint of natural science. I emphasize the term "*initial standpoint*," because the relation between language and science has, of course, also received consideration from those other standpoints. One recalls, for example, Max Black's *Models and Metaphors* or Colin Turbayne's *The Myth of Metaphor*. But these authors, and others like them, approached language from *within* the language tradition itself, or certainly from within the humanities. As against this it is interesting, and it might be helpful, to watch someone approaching language from within the scientific tradition. And in this context science means, above all, physics. Not only do we see most of the other sciences busy trying to resolve themselves into physics, but physics alone is the fundamentally epistemological science, because only physics today seeks to investigate, not just the *behaviour* of matter or of nature, but the *nature* of nature. A physicist may for that reason be less out of sympathy than the rest with a topic so ontological as the nature of language.

We should however expect a scientist, trained as such, by virtue of his whole habit of thought, to start with an even heavier bias in favour of "reference" than the ordinary user of language, let alone poets, theologians and philosophers. When he makes a discovery, he certainly does not consider he has made a discovery about language. How could there be anything in common between his intellectual adventures and those of a Wittgenstein or a Heidegger?

Apparently it is not so impossible, since it was a physicist who remarked a few years ago that:

One of the most remarkable characteristics common to the developments in modern physics is the revolutionary change in fundamental notions which has been brought about by the recognition of *new forms* of language in physics rather than by the introduction of new physical *content* into previous language forms.

Professor David Bohm, the physicist to whom I am referring, on one occasion illustrated this contention with the examples of Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr, the principal exponents respectively of Relativity and Quantum Theory. Thus, Einstein resolved the confused situation concerning the relation between mechanics and electrodynamics, which prevailed towards the close of the nineteenth century, but he did so by showing that the old language had become irrelevant:

His insight was based on the perception that it was no longer

fruitful to continue with efforts to change the content of physics, as described in terms of the older language forms (for example, by making new assumptions about the properties of the ether). Thus, room was made for thinking in terms of a different language form, one that allowed a new kind of description of space and time as mutually related and dependent on general physical conditions, such as velocity, acceleration, gravitational fields, etc.

Similarly Niels Bohr

perceived the uselessness of the efforts to change only the *content* of these classical laws (for instance, by looking for mechanical explanations of the "quantum"). And, as happened with Einstein in a different context, room was then made for a new kind of language from that allowed for novel modes of description (which for example did not continue the traditional description in terms of separation of the observer from the observed).

Out of such initial considerations Bohm has been developing an interesting critique of the co-existence, among modern physicists, of what he terms "formal language forms" on the one hand and "informal language forms" on the other. Formal language forms comprise mathematical formulae; informal language forms comprise the language of ordinary discourse—which however is always required for the general *description* of any subject of scientific enquiry. Total diremption of the informal from the formal language would reduce physics to mathematics.

The system of mental constructs called mathematics is, I suppose, about as "self-referring" a language form as could well be imagined—and yet it is also effective outside itself, effective both in discovery and in operation. So much so, that it has given birth to our present technological civilization. But it is only by returning from time to time from the informal language to the formal language of description that this connection with natural process can be maintained. Bohm maintains moreover that the unresolved duality between the two language forms has been operating to *conceal* the revolutionary change in language form which has, in fact been taking place. There has been a steadily increasing tendency to assume that informal language forms no longer matter much, and that all the real business of physics is transacted in formal language—its informal brother being confined to those invented "models," whose sole function is to give to the poor layman with no mathematics some sort of fanciful picture of what is being (or perhaps is not being)

talked about. He denies this and insists that the presumed sharp distinction between formal and informal language cannot be maintained. The reason for this is not that their edges overlap, so that there are borderline cases. The formal language is *born from the womb* of the informal. The distinction between the two is contained only in the latter.

In the same way one could perhaps point out that the very term "self-referring" owes any significance it could possibly have to the fact that language is *not* merely self-referring. Or will it be suggested that the term "self-referring" is itself self-referent? Such reflections, we are sometimes assured, usher the speaking soul of man into an ultimate resort of "Silence." They may indeed do so, but if there is a silence of sublimity, there is also a silence of idiocy.

It was because Einstein introduced new *informal* terms of description, such as "signal" and "field" that he also became able to develop new formal laws, laws which gave effective content to his notions. Niels Bohr, in the same way, perceived the irrelevance to his message of a presumed existential disjunction between the observer and what he observes—which presupposition is built so firmly into the present structure of our informal language. By contrast, the "quantum description" is a form of unanalyzable wholeness: and this entails that the description of experimental results is not separable from the general experimental conditions which provide their context.

This last needs emphasising, and I shall be returning to it. Meanwhile I remark that the bringing into account of *experiment* is naturally one of the features that mark off a scientist's approach to language from that of all the others we have looked at. And I find this especially interesting because, in other respects, his approach need not, as we have seen, be so very different. When he starts talking about "unanalysable wholeness," when he undercuts, or undermines, any absolute distinction between observer and observed, the physicist comes up against a problem, which is clearly recognisable as the problem of linguistic reference in another costume. If the linguistic theorist sometimes feels forced to conclude that his language has nothing to refer to outside of itself—and if that raises a difficulty, because, as I have sought to emphasize, it is the very nature of language to refer—correspondingly, when the physicist feels forced to conclude that there is no absolute distinction between observer and observed, and thus nothing to be observed

outside of his immeasurable self, then his science has nothing to *measure*. And *that* raises a difficulty, because it is the very nature of science (at least as we have it up to now) to measure. This difficulty is now recognised, and is sometimes referred to as "the measurement problem."

Bohm himself relates the two problems by tracing the provenance of this measurement problem to the fact of our being *imprisoned in our own language*. But, unlike Wittgenstein (for whom it was apparently co-extensive with eternity), he finds that that imprisonment arose from a particular disjunction, which became built into the languages of the West at about the time of Descartes and was made explicit in Descartes' adoption of two reciprocally isolated descriptions of the world: one in terms of "matter," or extended substance, and the other in terms of "mind," or thinking substance. The disjunction was of course modified and elaborated by Kant; but by him and his followers it was not removed; it was rather rivetted more firmly; and it has remained with us to become at once the basic maxim of natural science and the central problem of philosophy.

Seen in this light, Quantum Theory is one instance of an attempt to organise an escape from imprisonment in language, instead of sitting still and contemplating the inside of the prison wall. For it is fairly clear that Quantum Theory, since language-games do not launch rockets, is more than just one more language-game. Yet at the same time it really is "non-objectifying language." For "the description of Quantum Theory is Quantum Theory." It is the discourse itself rather than the object of discourse; and if you raise the question "whether the theory fits the facts," you are already assuming a disjunction which the theory itself denies or supersedes. You are really only asking whether one description fits another description. This difficulty is inescapable, because the *form* of your theory (its language) connotes a disjunction between observer and observed; while its *content* is the *wholeness* of observer and observed. Thus, the form in which Quantum Theory is described is Quantum Theory. In this case at least the form in which knowledge is communicated is knowledge.

There is that in men's minds to which the abandonment of a distinction between form and content is intensely repugnant. It is to this obstacle that Bohm attributes the difficulty Einstein and Bohr experienced in understanding one another's language. And, it was

this which brought about that regrettable feature of modern physics—the adoption of two distinct language forms—which has been previously referred to. This device however has concealed the confusion without disposing of it; for, if formal language has given up the attempt to “describe,” yet the formalising itself is still treated as a kind of “content,” which is capable of being talked about in the informal language of description. “The only way out of such confusion,” says Bohm, very wisely as I think, “is, at a certain point, just to drop the issue altogether and go on to something new.” The fashionable distinction between two language forms will have to be abandoned, if any further progress is to be made in physical discovery. We need a new concept of theory itself, a new definition such as, let us say, “A language form that gives insight.” From now on real scientific discovery (not just the hardware improvements we call “technology,” but any radical advance analogous to the advance from classical to modern physics) will be inseparable from the development of new forms of language. It is on this development that Bohm himself is at present working.

One reason why such new developments are needed is that “the informal language of physics plays just as important a role with regard to experiment as it does with regard to formal theories . . . our present way of doing experiments in itself constitutes a very strong commitment to continue the *current* informal language of physics (and of science in general) into the indefinite future.” Physics had to develop a new language when Copernicanism replaced the Ptolemaic system; and the consequential experiments ensued. So too, when the underlying presupposition of mechanism was replaced by that of the electrodynamic field; and so, again, now that physics has begun dealing with subject matters in which the velocity of light is a consideration. The *selection* of the experiments to be made, and of the machines to be constructed to make them possible, is imbedded in the language form. Indeed the machines themselves are “an extension of the current language forms of physics,” and they provide us accordingly only with “the kinds of data which can readily be described in terms of those very forms.” Only a full *realisation* of this intimate relation of experiment to language forms will lead both to new forms of language and to new forms of experiment. As it is now, experiment and theory are treated as quite separate and “the ball is tossed to and fro from theory to experiment and from experiment back again to theory”


as in a kind of game. But the *fact* of its being a kind of game has not been recognised, and therein lies the tragedy. Why was the concept of “game” so attractive to Wittgenstein? In a game the rules are known to have been voluntarily adopted by the player himself; there is thus “a wholeness of form and content, so that in each new move the *form* of the game is a whole with the content of each transaction.” To recognise the relation between experiment and theory as being *in that sense* a “game” would be a first step towards escape from the prison of our fragmented language and our fragmented science—and ultimately from the fragmented civilisation they have produced.

But only a first step. Penetration of the categorical barrier between theory and experiment is not in itself so novel an idea as it may sound. Goethe’s scientific writings, for example, include a brief essay entitled “Experiment as Mediator Between Subject and Object”; and it was Coleridge’s view that “an idea is an experiment proposed; an experiment is an idea realised.” But Professor Bohm adds: “To see the wholeness of theory and experiment as extension of common language is not only to open up the possibility of changing *science* in a fundamental way, but it also opens up the possibility of corresponding changes in the scientist.” And I find it very significant that, just within this practical issue of experiment, a finger is laid upon a truth of which I for one have long been firmly convinced: namely that, although one may learn to *talk* eloquently enough about it, he cannot really and seriously adopt a different view from the conventional Cartesian one of the relation between mind and matter, without at the same time beginning to become a different kind of human being. To renounce the heterogeneity of observed from observer involves, if it is taken seriously, abandoning the whole “onlooker” stance, upon which both the pursuit of science and modern language-use in general are based; it means advancing to awareness of another relation altogether between mind and matter. If we had actually made the advance, we should have become naturally, unforcedly and unremittingly aware that the mind *cannot* refer to a natural object without at the same time referring to its own activity. And this in turn would require an equally unforced awareness not only that scientific discovery is always a discovery about language, but also that it is always a discovery about the self which uses language. Or, putting it another way, “the measurement problem” is also

the general problem of objectivity in science.

Here I shall allow myself a brief digression. When natural scientists are called upon, as spokesmen, to address the world on the topic of themselves and their discipline, they commonly spend part of the time orating, if not boasting, about their objectivity. And it is quite true that science does demand objectivity first and foremost, and that the good ones among them endeavour to eliminate all personal bias from their judgments of fact. But I sometimes wonder: is there any need to make quite such a song and dance about it? After all, it is not so very difficult to eliminate all personal considerations, all subconscious bias, when the matter or process you are investigating is, by definition, one in which you could not possibly have a direct personal concern; when from beginning to end it is assumed to be absolutely other than yourself. To put it rudely, any reasonably honest fool can be objective about objects. It must be a different matter altogether, should we be called on to attend, not alone to matter, but to spirit; when a man would have to practise distinguishing what *in* himself comes solely from his private personality—memories, for instance, and all the horseplay, of the Freudian subconscious—from what comes also from elsewhere. Then indeed objectivity is not something that was handed us on a plate once and for all by Descartes, but something that would really have to be *achieved*, and which must require for its achievement, not only exceptional mental concentration but other efforts and qualities, including moral ones, as well. The self which uses language is indeed the personal self; but the self which *utters* it—which has made utterance possible at all—is a something more *within* the personal self; and this is a distinction about which it is not so easy to become objective.

Moral qualities have hitherto been regarded as the province of the humanities rather than as a department of scientific training. But to my mind the most promising developments both in science and in the humanities are to be looked for there, where there are signs of a new interpenetration between the two. If so, it is no bad thing that they should both be concerning themselves with language. We have heard it suggested that the most satisfactory definition of a scientific theory is "a language form that gives insight." The language philosophers and oracles, to whom I began by referring, are also concerned with language forms that give insight; and in their case the notion that a new insight involves a change of charac-



U

5 U (as in rune)
Movement
Feeling
Character

blue
yellow
lilac




6 B
Movement
Feeling
Character

yellow
blue
red



7 Ch
Movement
Feeling
Character

orange
green-blue
dark violet



- a) ^{grün} Bewegung orange
- b) ^{blau} das bedeutet an, wie man das
Anwesenheit fühlen soll z. B. hier, dann ein
Lächeln an den linken Arm heraus, das
wird die Bewegung nicht zu übersehen
- c) ^{rot} das bedeutet an, dass man sich aus den
Stellen immer auf und herausbewegt
fühlt, das geht Charakter
- blau

ter is probably not so unpalatable. As against this however, they seem little concerned with knowledge in any accepted sense; and certainly not with the new knowledge that is called discovery. Perhaps that is why they give the impression—at least they give *me* the impression—of operating each in his own island of subjectivity (real, if you like, and whatever that means, but still *mere* subjectivity), while science is left respectfully alone to go on altering, and incidentally polluting, the outward face of nature, as it thinks fit. They talk of language existing in its own right, and tell us that we must not think of a word as “standing for” something. But in fact it soon becomes apparent that they themselves mostly do think of language as “standing for” something, and that what it stands for in their view is the feelings, or other internal responses to external stimuli, of a physically isolated psyche: Richards and Langer, for example, explicitly so, the others implicitly by the very texture of their diction.

Here, it seems to me, the opposite approach from the standpoint of science may come as a useful corrective. A scientist also may tell us that we must not think of a word as standing for something, but must look instead for language forms that give insight. But he will differ from the language philosopher, because he *is* interested primarily in knowledge, and particularly in the new knowledge which is discovery. The insight in which he is interested is going to be primarily a heuristic insight; while those islands of subjective feeling will be precisely what he is *not* much interested in. Perhaps each needs the clasp and support of the other in his half-blinded staggering towards the light. Perhaps there is not one prison cell, but two: the “non-objectifying” subjectivity, in which the humanities are immured, and the adjoining cell of subjectless objectivity, where science is locked and bolted; and maybe the first step towards escape for the two prisoners of language is to establish communication with one another.

SOME USES OF LANGUAGE IN MODERN POETRY

By PAUL MATTHEWS

TWENTIETH-CENTURY poetry often seems meaningless and formless. Or do we look for meaning and form in the wrong places? The attitudes acquired from the reading of C18th and C19th poetry tend to get in the way of an appreciation of modern poetry. Certainly much has been reduced to chaos, but the Ancient Greeks held chaos to be a holy state from which new growth could spring. I take literary form to be an expression of the poet's relationship to himself and to the world, and secondarily an expression of the consciousness of the age in which he lives. If this is the case then it is to be expected that literary forms should have changed radically this century, the closed metrical forms and rhyme schemes proving unable to contain the new consciousness. I wish to trace some of the emerging forms and experimental techniques, giving examples where possible and indicating sources for further study. I shall consider in turn the use of imagery, word "music" and rhythm.

1. Use of Imagery

(a) *The Imagists*

About 1913 Ezra Pound in America became very interested in Chinese and Japanese poetic forms after reading an essay by Ernest Fenollosa entitled 'The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry,' an essential text for the understanding of modern poetry. As a result of this Pound, William Carlos Williams, H.D. and others formed the Imagist Movement and for a time were writing short poems containing perhaps as few as two images, no explanation given.

Apparition of these faces in a crowd—
Petals on a wet black bough.

This poem by Ezra Pound, called 'In a Station of the Metro,' uses the Japanese 17-syllable Haiku form. Two impressions are

compared, contrasted, and if there is any meaning in it the reader must use his own imagination to find it. Or, as Williams states it, 'no ideas but in things.' The Imagists did not want their poems torn apart in order to extract a meaning. Pound in his essay 'A Retrospect' defines the image as 'that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time.' The communication takes place on more than one level. The thing itself is permitted to speak its own qualities, not as a symbol (still an intellectual act—this = that), not as a metaphor, but as a real object in the world having real relationships. Jack Spicer, yet another American, says in his book 'After Lorca,' 'I would like the moon in my poems to be a real moon, one which could be suddenly covered by a cloud which had nothing to do with the poem.' Fenollosa states his belief in a universe of relationships—'Poetic language is always vibrant with fold on fold of overtones and natural affinities.'

In recent poetry, particularly in 'free verse' forms, the explicit metaphor is found to be clumsy, impeding the flow, but if image is used carefully the metaphors are present but working secretly. No need to say "love like fire"; "fire" itself should be enough to contain that meaning and yet not be limited by it. When this is understood it becomes clear that adjectives must be used with extreme caution. Once we recognise that objects themselves contain qualities, have *being* in fact, there is no need to qualify them with abstractions. Imagism as a movement did not last long, for the poets became dissatisfied with the somewhat static nature of their imagery; it tended to destroy rhythm. Nevertheless it was a vital poetic experience and one which continues to inform poetry.

(b) *Dada and Surrealism*

In Zürich, shortly after the start of the First World War, Tristan Tzara, Hans Arp and others formed the Dadaist Movement with the conscious aim of destroying the old aesthetic based on reason, the kind of reason which they felt had, by suppressing other aspects of man, led to such frightful catastrophe in the shape of the war then raging. The Dadaists organised 'happenings' at which some members read their poems while others blew whistles, and the audience was invited to participate by throwing spaghetti, potato-salad, etc., at the performers (perhaps they would have whether invited or not). The Dadaists did not bring forward any new order. Theirs was a mission of destruction. Their poetry was often totally

illogical—'Who now will eat with the phosphorescent rat at the lonely barefooted table?' (Hans Arp)—random images coming together, not claiming to have any hidden meaning. The movement represented a bursting through of the previously unrecognised forces of the unconscious. It is easy to say "this is not art," but the C19th view that man was a logic machine made the Dadaists inevitable.

Later the movement was transformed, mainly in France, into Surrealism. André Breton, the leading Surrealist, based his poetry for a time on the teachings of Freud and reached beyond the mere destructiveness of Dadaism, seeking a new order. Freud himself did not appreciate their attempts. The Surrealists used dream material, automatic writing, free association, drugs, various chance techniques, usually drawing their imagery from the personal subconscious where the image finds no objective connections. Salvador Dali's paintings, for instance, based on Freudian symbolism, often seem intellectually contrived. Or in David Gascoyne's early poetry (he was perhaps the only considerable English Surrealist)—'the piano-tuner with a basket of prawns on his shoulder'—often a clever juxtaposing of two objects which do not belong together, sometimes funny, sinister, disturbing to our ordinary associations, but such imagery is not often moving, not usually based on the imagination where images find true connections. The poem remains a series of disjointed images, lacking resonance. It is still an expression of the chaos, not a re-ordering. "Surrealism," writes Wallace Stevens, "invents without discovering." It is noticeable in many Surrealist poems that in order to achieve such juxtapositions, strong verbs are sacrificed and replaced by "have," "be," etc. This amounts to an admission that the images they juxtapose do not interact in any real way.

In 'The Sullen Art,' the poet Robert Bly is quoted as saying that English poetry has been dead recently because it did not pass through the Purgatory of Surrealism, mainly a Continental phenomenon. He recognises it as a necessary chaos out of which the word can be born anew. One or two English poets did take an interest in Surrealist techniques—David Gascoyne, and perhaps Dylan Thomas (though he denied it)—but during the fifties and sixties the established poets were mainly connected with universities, strongholds of linguistic philosophy. This resulted in clever but extremely tame verses completely lacking the Surrealist exuberance of language.

The later sixties, however, saw Surrealism reach England via America. It did not come with the violence of Continental Surrealism. Its influence can be seen in pop art and in the poems of the Liverpool poets Brian Patten and Adrian Henri. Though their poetry is not particularly profound it shows a willingness to play with language. It is at least enjoyable.

(c) *Deep Image*

Surrealism with its non-logical imagery, and Imagism with its emphasis on the real qualities of things, come together in what Jerome Rothenberg has tentatively referred to as the 'Deep Image.' By this he means an image which, perhaps seemingly illogical, finds intuitive connections. An example from his poetry might be 'blue coins of disaster are ringing in the night.' It is an imagery based not merely on the personal subconscious but (I think Rothenberg would claim) on what Jung called the 'Collective Unconscious,' or what Yeats called 'Spiritus Mundi.' It is an archetypal, though not a static, language of imagery such as speaks to us from our deeper dreams, from myth and fairytale, and any attempt to interpret it is liable to limit its meaning. Its use in the poetry of D. H. Lawrence, of Lorca, of Trakl, to mention a few, represents a re-discovery of the imagination a stage beyond Surrealism; imagination as an organ of perception rather than a weaver of fanciful language.

Rothenberg has edited a very interesting anthology called 'Technicians of the Sacred' in which primitive texts are compared with modern experimental writings. He is aware that 'deep image' goes back to earliest times, to the sources of language itself, but that in the C18th and C19th such an understanding of imagery was mislaid. He believes that it is now to be re-explored, and he points out that modern psychology is beginning to take an interest in such areas. Jung's theory of Synchronicity, for instance, is very pertinent to some modern writing. Jung suggested that in some cases coincidence might be meaningful; not ordered by cause and effect but nevertheless an ordered event. Thus in a poem two images might come together meaningfully, not as a result of some logical thought structure but through some natural affinity. If the poet dares to abandon logical structure in his poem, leaving it open to seemingly random influence, correspondences might be arrived at which the logical mind could not have allowed. Thus poetry becomes self-discovery rather than self-expression. To abandon

logic does not necessarily mean to abandon meaning, but it is necessary to tread warily. The great French poet Rimbaud, who gave up poetry at the age of 19 to go and smuggle rifles in Abyssinia, attempted to arrive at 'seership' by a disordering of the senses. Perhaps it might also be arrived at by a development of new senses, the imaginative and intuitive faculties, capable of perceiving these 'natural affinities.'

It is the nature of such poetry that the imagery not merely startles but also evokes a certain recognition, even though the logical mind cannot grasp the meaning. 'No one eats oranges under the full moon. One must eat green and icy fruit.' (Lorca).

(d) *Concrete poetry*

One of the most interesting developments in England has been the appearance of 'Concrete poetry' in which the arrangement of words on the page becomes important; a word picture, an ikon, Imagism taken to its extreme—'A poem should not mean, but be' (Macleish). This too is a return towards earlier modes of writing, to hieroglyphics, to Celtic illuminated manuscripts where words and pictures are not separate. A useful though not very profound example of concrete poetry is 'Advice to a Corkscrew' by Edwin Morgan:

GET
NI
IT

Arguments have raged about whether this use of language is poetry or not. The label does not matter. It seems to me only a partial poetry, but one which more traditional poets can learn from. The emphasis laid on single words by concrete poets teaches us to cut out superfluous wordage and to take more trouble over every word.

(e) *Found poetry*

Another recent experiment has been with 'Found' art. Marcel Duchamp turned a normal hatstand upside down and displayed it as a found work of art. Likewise people have been finding poems. A list of English bird names read out certainly approaches poetry. So does the B.B.C.'s shipping forecast with its marvellous place names. I remember hearing horse-racing results on the radio years ago for the first time and, not knowing what it was, considered

it a weird variety of poetry. Here again it is not finished poetry perhaps, but its meaning is that there is poetry everywhere and in the commonest words if we can hear properly.

(f) *Urban imagery*

When T. S. Eliot first wrote about London smogs and city gutters his readers objected that the words he used, the subjects he wrote about, were unpoetic. Some held that nothing ugly should enter into poetry. But if poetry is to retain any relevance it must face the contemporary situation. The poet must transform what he finds, not deny its existence. It is easy to write nice poems about lesser celandines, but perhaps not so easy when the flower grows beside the factory wall—'the grey sunflower poised against the sunset, crackly bleak and dusty with the smut and smog and smoke of olden locomotives in its eye.' Allen Ginsberg wrote that in his 'Sunflower Sutra,' and he does in fact come later in the poem to an affirmation of the flower—'we're not our skin of grime, we're not your dread bleak imageless locomotive, we're all beautiful golden sunflowers inside.' He can affirm it in spite of what seems to deny it—'the guts and inwards of the weeping coughing car,'—the ugly being transformed in the total context of the poem.

Thus poetry has been thrown wide open. This renewed consciousness of the nature and the power of imagery has many dangers. We can see its corrupt use in advertising techniques where subconscious associations are manipulated to control us, to make us believe lies. This is an example of the Black Art hardly less than sticking pins in a wax effigy. It is an example of the same conscious use of imagery. To defend oneself against such methods it is necessary to become conscious of how imagery works. Modern poetry is, I believe, part of that coming to consciousness.

2. *Use of musical qualities*

Since G. M. Hopkins wrote his poetry at the end of the last century, there has been a renewal of interest in the musical effects of poetry. In the case of Hopkins it was a reaching back to Anglo-Saxon techniques, a pronounced use of alliteration and assonance, and in his poetry the initial communication takes place on the auditory level. He does, however, hold the sounds firmly on the leash of his meaning, suiting them to what is to be expressed:

'Generations have trod have trod have trod

And all is seared with trade bleared smeared with toil. . .'

Dylan Thomas is another poet who has used musical qualities to good effect. When reading his own poetry (on gramophone record)

the words almost force him into song. Unlike Hopkins, however, he often abandons the meaning for the sake of the music, introducing images not necessary to the content and which even destroy tension. Sometimes he is aware of this and writes playfully, as in 'A Child's Christmas in Wales'—

'Years and years and years ago when I was a boy when there were wolves in Wales and birds the colour of red-flannel petticoats whisked past the harp-shaped hills. . . .'

The sheer exuberance of such language saves him sometimes, an exuberance flowing directly from the Celtic speech. It is interesting that many of the greatest poets writing in English this century have not been speakers of King's English, e.g., Yeats, Hopkins, Thomas, MacDiarmid—all from Celtic fringes—or more recently the American poets and the Liverpool poets. It is perhaps an indication that King's English has been deadened by too much gentility and learning. Hopkins and Thomas succeeded in breaking up this deadness somewhat with their music, but how to follow them without seeming hopelessly derivative? The logical next step from Dylan Thomas is poetry of pure sound detached from meaning, or improvising on words simply for their music. This has occurred recently, particularly in England, although the American Gertrude Stein with her 'Pigeons on the grass alas,' etc., is a forerunner. 'Sound poems' are very difficult to quote, being essentially performed pieces. Bob Cobbing in England has done interesting work in this manner, and the Austrian Ernst Jandl had considerable success a few years ago in England because he was a good performer and maybe also because he used unfamiliar foreign sounds. It is a common experience that poetry in a foreign language can communicate through its music and inflections. The American Michael McClure intermingles ordinary language with what he calls 'Beast Sound'—

'Grahnthooooor the streaked dust upon glass!
Charrgrooor the marks of the blurred rain!'

Concerning this he says 'A goddess lies coiled at the base of man's body, and pure Tantric sound might awaken her.' Sound poetry cannot claim to be a modern invention. It is rather a rediscovery or bringing to consciousness of primitive knowledge of the power of sounds, Indian Mantras, rain chants, magic charms.

None of this new poetry would have been possible without the revival of poetry as a spoken art, starting with Dylan Thomas

touring America. In the fifties Kenneth Patchen and then the beat poets began to read poetry to jazz. Michael Horovitz and Pete Brown did the same in England. Other poets, like Bob Dylan, made use of the pop media, but transcended it. From there it has spread, and there are now numerous poetry readings all over the country. Much of the poetry is terrible, of course, but poetry is no longer something shut away in classrooms.

3. Use of rhythm

Rudolf Steiner, in his lecture entitled 'Signs and Symbols of the Christmas Festival,' says

'Rhythm holds sway in the whole of nature, up to the level of man. Then, and then only is there a change. The rhythm which through the course of the year holds sway in the forces of growth, of propagation and so forth, ceases when we come to man. For man is to have his roots in freedom; and the more civilised he is, the more does this rhythm decline. As the light disappears at Christmas time, so has rhythm apparently departed from the life of man: chaos prevails. But man must give birth again to rhythm out of his innermost being, his own initiative.'

What Steiner says in this passage about the civilised man's relationship to the rhythms of nature can, I think, also be applied to the modern poet's relationship to the rhythms of language. Outer nature, also breath and blood, work by rhythm, and in the past these cosmic rhythms entered into the creation of poetry. Until recently the rhythmic unit in English poetry has been the syllable arranged in various regular patterns, in fixed metre. Modern poets however have started to reject this; the rhythmic unit no longer being the syllable—rather it has become 'the musical phrase,' according to Pound. In the passage quoted above Steiner seems to be saying that the Ego, the part which distinguishes man from the rest of nature, is non-rhythmic. It is a still point. With the development of Ego-consciousness in modern times in a non-rhythmic urban environment the old cosmic rhythms of poetry have become inadequate as a vehicle. Regular rhythm is ideal for nature poetry, but for dealing with city life and with modern domestic scenes it is not (see Eliot's attempt in his play 'The Family Reunion'). The polluted urban environment we live in is certainly an expression of the fact that man no longer lives by natural rhythm and law, and that as yet he has not found the inner rhythms, the laws of art. This is not to say that modern life lacks poetry; it

means that we are required to find new forms in which its poetry can come to expression.

When the Royal Society of Science was founded in the C17th, Bishop Spratt forbade all use of metaphor in society proceedings. A split was made between art and science. The reason for this is clear. Spratt saw the necessity of developing a prose language suitable for expressing pure concepts and scientific particulars uncoloured by emotive use of image/music/rhythm as had been used in poetry. These had to be sacrificed, and an unrhythmic prose developed. Some people reading modern 'free verse' dismiss it as prose, but true free verse is not so. Free verse written properly has a rhythmic quality which prose lacks. I take free verse to be an attempt to transform prose. It is a poetry of particulars and is suited to the expression of modern life with its cigarette ends and newspapers. It starts with the personal, can admit the ugly, though obviously it fails if it remains merely personal. I want to say that metrical poetry expressed a divine order, that prose was an expression of man cut off from the gods, and that free verse is the attempt by man to relate to the divine once more. Free verse is the modern form. It has a tension that regular metre lacks, an Ego directed rhythm continually being reshaped and given a new impulse. It demands alertness first on the part of the poet, then of the audience. It does not have the lulling effect that regular metre sometimes has, e.g.,

What shall I say, because talk I must?
that I have found a cure
for the sick?
I have found no cure
for the sick
but this crooked flower
which only to look upon
all men
are cured.

William Carlos Williams in this passage creates a tension and rhythm by use of line breaks, by use of pause and silence. These are very important in modern poetry. The poet uses the words on the page as a musical score, space and linebreak indicating pause and length of silence. Williams also claimed to be using the rhythms of normal speech. None of this means that regular metre can never be appropriate, but modern poets have objected to it as a

rigid external law. Charles Olson in his essay 'On Projective Verse' says 'form is never more than an extension of content.' It is no good imposing old laws on to the modern content. Modern content necessarily finds its own form, because form and content are one. Olson talks much about poetry coming from the whole man—'head, by way of the ear, to the syllable; heart, by way of the breath, to the line,' as he puts it. Poetry is not merely a head activity of squeezing what you want to say into a regular metre and rhyme scheme. A truly imaginative content *is* shapely and finds its own form. Allen Ginsberg says that each man's breath is different; there are individual rhythms. This is the modern idea, that each poet should find his individual voice.

4. The future

There are two obvious extremes in contemporary English poetry.

First there is poetry so bound up with words and forms and rules and cleverness that it is utterly remote from life. This includes Concrete poetry which at times comes dangerously close to meaninglessness—form stifling content. At the other extreme there is poetry intent on giving a straightforward social, political, spiritual message, often clever and entertaining or momentarily moving, but after the message has been delivered the language drops away, the form being unimportant. I can only see a future for poetry in the uniting of these two approaches. Form and content must become one.

The desire to change the world through poetry is understandable, but it rarely results in good poetry. It is too easy to give out messages. Such writing speaks only to the intellect. Intellectually, we may agree with the message, but the whole man has to answer for it. That is the trouble with words like "soul" and "spirit" in poetry; they are fixed labels for a reality which must be continuously re-interpreted. It is the poet's job to express "spirit" rather than to state it. The Word must become flesh and dwell among us, not remain in abstractions. All of which is easily said, but in fact it requires a completely new relationship to language.

A child experiences language quite differently from the adult. "Snow snow faster ally ally blaster" is much closer to the magical beliefs of primitive tribes with their rain chants, love charms, than to the abstractions of modern language. Even the nonsensical "Iney meney macka acka er I domen acka stickeracka roomeracka om pom poosh" has an underlying seriousness; for the child it is

a sacred language. Children have an amazing code of honour connected with language—to say a word makes you immune in a game of “He.” Give your word, and it is as good as a deed. The ancient Egyptian practice of beheading scribes who copied hieroglyphics wrong must have arisen from a similar belief. Young children also believe that the name of something or someone is inseparable from the thing named, again a primitive belief, but I suggest it is arrogant to dismiss it as such. I know that poetry springs as much from jabbering nonsense in the bath as from forcing language to express some lofty pre-meditated truth. There is a genius behind language which we ignore at peril. You can be as clever as you like and have the most amazing views about life and the nature of poetry but unless you can abandon all that and enter into the play of language as a child can, then all attempts at poetry are hopeless stutterings. This seems to suggest that the future of poetry lies in the past, or in a return to childhood. But not quite. I noted earlier that many of the great modern poets were Celts. I am certain the Celtic speech retains much of the old experience of language. The question that concerns me here, however, is how such an experience of language may be regained once it has been lost? Can King’s English, deadened by its use as a vehicle for contemporary science, renew itself? Dylan Thomas retained something of the old experience but he lost himself eventually in floweriness. It is not enough to return to the past. The precision of language gained through the scientific method must be retained, but transformed.

* * * *

If instead of forcing language to express ourselves, we took language as our material (like a sculptor) and tried to remain true to its inner laws, we might arrive at something new. If language were just a human invention, i.e., naming things with arbitrary noises, then all this is nonsense and poetry has no future. But if name and object are genuinely related (as the child thinks), then our material is a living organism, and the act of writing and imagining are means of attaining self-knowledge and world-knowledge. Similarly, the act of reading becomes an experience of language through which one’s consciousness is changed, not merely the extracting of an intellectual meaning. In the following poem by the American poet Robert Duncan, language is explored in such a fashion. Language itself becomes the subject of many of his poems. The poems are aware of themselves.

THE NATURAL DOCTRINE
(from Robert Duncan’s book “Opening of the Field”)

As I came needing wonder as the new shoots need water
to the letter A that sounds its mystery in wave and in wain,
trembling I bent as if there were a weight in words
like that old man bends under his age towards Death—

But it is the sun that sounds Day from the first brink,
it is the sea that in its dazzling holds my eye.
How under the low roof of desolate grey
a language not of words lies waiting!
There’s depth, weight, force at the horizon
that levels all images.

Rabbi Aaron of Bagdad meditating upon the Word
and the letters Yod and He
came upon the Name of God and achieved a pure rapture
in which a creature of his ecstasy that was once dumb clay,
the Golem,
danced and sang and had being.

Reading of this devout jew I thought
there may be such power in a certain passage of a poem
that eternal joy may leap therefrom.

But it was for a clearing of the sky,
for a blue radiance, my thought cried.
Sublime Turner who dying said to Ruskin, “The Sun is God my
dear,” knew
the actual language is written in rainbows.

Here, in conclusion, are some examples from the various schools of poetry mentioned above. First, a simple imagist poem by William Carlos Williams:

THIS IS JUST TO SAY

I have eaten
the plums
that were in
the icebox

and which
you were probably
saving
for breakfast

Forgive me
they were delicious
so sweet
and so cold

Next, a poem by Derek Telling, arising out of pop culture:

THE ROCKETMAN

Spacerocker! Newdance
flip out beyond the blue
gape, rocking it out
about the constellations,
it's you it's you
with your hunchback
pack of earthdreams,
and our tomorrows
stitched into your seams.

Starlust! Brightshoe
they can't tell you no more
lies, you're the biggest
size preacher
be so free be so free
dancing a new tune,
with your very first truth,
alone in the gloom.

Earthwomb! Metalgod
busted out of us
and our thin doggerel and pale
dour dances
O you you
with your hero's hair
streaming in a wind of revelation,
shaking out the earth dust snare.

Nighthawk! Young-gleam
screaming into the morning
beat up, an early comet bird
with the spaceway eye
song thrust song rush
you go madly, madly heating
the tempo with your vision
till it burns up
our shallow horizon.

Concrete poetry may be illustrated with these two poems by Edwin Morgan:

SUMMER HAIKU

Pool.
Peopl
e plop!
Cool.

SIESTA OF A HUNGARIAN SNAKE


s sz sz SZ sz SZ sz ZS zs ZS zs zs z

Here is one example of an attempt by Federico Garcia Lorca to go beyond surrealism and find 'deep image':

CASIDA OF THE DARK PIGEONS

In the branches of the bay-tree
I saw two dark pigeons.
One was the sun,
the other the moon.
"Little neighbours," I said to them,
"where is my grave?"
"In my tail," said the sun.
"In my throat," said the moon.
And I who was walking
with the earth round my waist,
saw two eagles of snow
and a naked girl.
One was the other
and the girl was neither.
"Little eagles," I said to them,
"Where is my grave?"
"In my tail," said the sun.
"In my throat," said the moon.
In the branches of the bay-tree
I saw two naked pigeons.
One was the other
and both were neither.

(translated from the Spanish by J. L. Gili).



9 F
Movement
Feeling
Character

white
orange
reddish

Finally, a good example of a surrealist poem by David Gascoyne:

THE VERY IMAGE
to Rene Magritte

An image of my grandmother
her head appearing upside-down upon a cloud
the cloud transfixed on a steeple
of a deserted railway-station
far away


An image of an aqueduct
with a dead crow hanging from the first arch
a modern-style chair from the second
a fir-tree lodged in the third
and the whole scene sprinkled with snow

An image of the piano-tuner
with a basket of prawns on his shoulder
and a firescreen under his arm
his moustache made of clay-clotted twigs
and his cheeks daubed with wine

An image of an aeroplane
the propellor is rashers of bacon
the wings are reinforced lard
the tail is made of paper-clips
the pilot is a wasp

An image of the painter
with his left hand in a bucket
and his right hand stroking a cat
he lies in bed
with a stone beneath his head

And all these images
and many others
are arranged like waxworks
in model bird-cages
about six inches high.



Some references

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Technicians of the Sacred—ed. Jerome Rothenberg (Double Day Anchor Books).

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The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry—Ernest Fenollosa (New Directions).

A.B.C. of Reading—Ezra Pound.

Acknowledgements:

This is just to say, by William Carlos Williams is reprinted from 'The collected earlier poems of William Carlos Williams' (MacGibbon and Kee).

The Rocketman, by Derek Telling, is reprinted from 'Come On Everybody' (a Corgi Books Anthology).

Summer Haiku and *Siesta of a Hungarian Snake* are reprinted from 'The Second Life' by Edwin Morgan (Edinburgh University Press).

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The Very Image is reprinted from 'David Gascoyne: Collected Poems' (Oxford University Press)

Permission to reproduce these poems is gratefully acknowledged.

EURYTHMY AND THE WORD

CECIL HARWOOD

ONE of the many aspects of the mind of Coleridge which make him the great forerunner in England of Anthroposophy is his feeling for the inter-relation and inter-dependence of all things. He dreaded the thought of losing this wholeness of vision, and of being compelled to view the universe merely as 'an immense heap of little things.' 'My mind,' he wrote, 'feels as if it ached to behold and know something great, something one and indivisible.'

It was this feeling for wholeness which led him to make the distinction between fancy and imagination which he found an indispensable criterion in the sphere of poetry. Fancy, he said, merely assembles externally related images. Imagination fuses them into a whole and in so doing it overcomes also the division of subject and object, so that the two find again their primal unity.

Moreover, Coleridge could never detach one sphere of experience from another. What he had the temerity to call the 'esemplastic' function of Imagination in poetry he found also in the distinction between pure 'Reason' (in which head and heart are united) and 'Understanding' which merely arranges the phenomena of sense-perception. Through concentrating on 'understanding' 'we have purchased a few brilliant inventions at the loss of all communion with life and spirit in nature.' We need the faculty of Imagination-Reason, in which man is united with universe in a wholeness, to bring about a resurrection.

It was in the spirit of such a wholeness that Rudolf Steiner approached the question of the origin and nature of language. First, he said, comes a time when a man still feels himself as part of the universe, when as speaker he can only echo the sounding of the divine creative Word; then in successive stages of division man becomes a separated individual and his speech degenerates almost into mere symbol, in which the sounds have no significance; finally we reach the miraculous event that through this ultimate separateness man wins the power to unite himself again with the universe, and to restore to his speech some quality of its primal origin. What are the great steps in this long process of division?

The origin of speech has been debated ever since man became philosophically inquisitive. The rival theories of *phusis* (nature) and *thesis* (convention) had their supporters in the Greek world and really form the basis of all later thought. Historically *thesis* has more and more overcome *phusis* as speech has developed, but

Steiner's account of the primal origin of speech is certainly on the side of *phusis*, though on a view of *phusis* fundamentally different from that generally accepted today. In this view the nature of primal man was not more earthly but more spiritual than that of man today. Man was then sensitive to the spiritually creative forces underlying nature and not merely—indeed very little—to the outer appearances of the sense-world. Steiner was the only modern philologist to take seriously the tradition to be found in all ancient religions that it is the Divine Word, the speaking of the Gods, which is the creative force behind the infinite variety of the forms of the visible world. Man, being made in the divine image, also possesses a corresponding creative power, but it reaches only as far as the element of air, not into physical substance. It is the power of speech which is born not out of physical needs, but out of an overwhelming desire for a creative response to the spiritual in the world. The gesture in created things must needs find its echo in the gesture of the spoken word. It is therefore entirely appropriate that in the Biblical story of creation it is not the creator who gives the names to the creatures, but they are brought before Adam for him to name them, and with a splendid directness the Bible adds 'And whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof.' Adam could make no mistake, because he echoed in his speech-sounds the formative power working in the creatures he named.

The child today learns to speak (without knowing he is learning) by pure imitation of the speech forms that surround him; primal man learnt his speech by imitating the formative sounds of the divine speech. This is why in ancient tradition speech was always a vehicle of magic. The Egyptian priests regarded language not as a mere means of communication, the 'common drudge' 'tween man and man', but as the 'audible expression of the deepest essence of things . . . a divine act which gives life to matter.' For them 'to pronounce a name is to act on the thing named, to repeat the initial act of the creator.'*

At this stage man did not seek a union with the universe through the meaning of the words he used; he experienced that union in the very sounds he uttered. In fact, words could not be said to have a meaning in the modern sense, and certainly not a conceptual meaning. Music and speech were still one, and in this unity it was the musical element which prevailed. We are still conscious

* George Sauneron, *The Priests of Ancient Egypt*.

of a musical element in speech, we still feel the truth in Milton's invocation:—

'Sphere-born harmonious sisters, voice and verse.'

But the first great breach in wholeness occurred when speech separated from music and began its long march to the character of symbol which it so largely possesses today.

In this progress speech suffers both outer and inner divisions. Outwardly, it becomes separated into different languages. It was one of the arguments in favour of the *thesis* view of the origin of language that the same sounds have different meaning in different languages, and sometimes even in the same language. In modern times the choice, or creation, of a word may be quite arbitrary. I know of no deep reason for choosing one or other of the synonyms: gas and petrol, pavement and sidewalk, underground and subway. But when language was still nearer its creative source the sound differences undoubtedly expressed a different relation to both outer and inner experience in the diverging races and peoples. When you have developed a feeling for the quality of different sounds, it can throw much light on national character to take common words like head, tree, sea, earth, and try to feel them in the sounds of their names in other languages. It will often carry back into the sounds themselves those national and racial differences which appear more largely writ in differences of expression and behaviour, as when the Englishman says 'I missed the train', but the African 'The train left me standing'.

The great division within speech itself—one which everyone knows but to which Steiner attached exceptional importance—is the division into vowels and consonants. Intrinsically we use the vowels to express our inner feelings. They may be supported by appropriate consonants, but it is the vowel which carries the feeling outward, and which specially retains the musical element. We cannot sing on the consonants except on those like M and L, which are closer to the vowel. The consonants, on the other hand, express our relation to external things. It is significant that in early forms of picture writing, or writing which has developed from pictures, the signs are used only for consonants, not for vowels. No external picture could correspond to the inner experience of the vowel. Everyone will feel that we could express our fear, disgust, admiration or astonishment before some living creature with a *vowel*, but the vowel could not be the *name* of the creature itself.

A further and later division is that between verse (rhythmical speech) and (a-rhythmical) prose. I have been told by someone present on the occasion that once, when William Morris was writing poetry in the corner of some room, Bernard Shaw went up to him and remarked 'I don't know how you get on with all this rhyming, Morris. If I wrote my plays in rhyme and one line happened to end with 'toil' I should have to talk about 'spoil' in the next line or so, and I might not want to.'* Morris looked up in surprise and said: 'Do you meant to say the rhymes don't come first?' In the history of mankind (if we take rhyme as a modern synonym for verse) the rhymes emphatically came first. Verse was the natural means of communication for both imaginative and practical themes. Hesiod (and even Vergil) wrote their farming manuals in verse. Herodotus still named each of his nine books of prose history after the nine Muses. But fundamentally prose diverged in the direction of thoughts represented by symbols, while poetry still kept the feeling for communication at a deeper level through picture, rhythm and sound—a level of communication which seems to be unknown to the linguistic analysts.

It is on these three last elements that Steiner based his work for the revival of the artistic element in speech. It may be accidental that he had far more to say about speech than about music. But it may be that speech has fallen much farther from its divine origin than music, and is more in need of a rescue operation.

In his lectures on speech and drama he has much to say about sound and rhythm—and to these he added the world of gesture, always an essential part of the old schools of rhetoric or eloquence. But it is in the creation of the art of eurythmy that he penetrates to another level of gesture—the gesture contained in the sounds themselves.

Speech, he said, is really arrested gesture. We have an instinct to accompany speech with gesture—some nations more than others—but the gesture is commonly more nearly related to dramatic gesture than to the gesture of the actual sounds. It is through our poetic feeling that we can begin to discover the latter form of gesture. Everyone will feel that the same gesture could not possibly express the rolling quality of R, the quiet meditative quality of M, or the sharp and definite quality of T. Each sound lives out its own gesture, and when we express this in actual movement of the hands

* The exact word escapes my memory.

and arms we are only realising the objective invisible in the objective visible. Of course it takes great perceptive power and long meditation to determine the essential character of each gesture, and a common initial objection to eurythmy is that everyone must be free to express the sounds as he experiences them. Such an objection is typical of an age where art is often identified with self-expression. But the true artist must understand and work with the laws of his material. His freedom depends upon his discovery of that law. Of course any given gesture may be realised in a hundred varied ways and moods, but the distinctions must be related to a norm—that is to a whole. The infinite variety of the human face depends on the norm of two eyes, one nose, one mouth, etc. If the number could be varied there would be no variety—only unrelated differences.

The best way to enter the field of sound-gesture is to meditate on some individual sounds and try to find the true way of expressing them in movement. Because they are more directly related to feeling it may be well to begin with the vowels. A combination of sounds which give sound-experience without meaning can be an excellent approach, and Steiner himself has described one in connection with the Eastern holy word OM, or more fully AOUM. Physically speaking the sound A (ah) opens the mouth to the widest possible extent, but it also opens the soul to the widest of all experiences—the experience of wonder. It is our natural ejaculation before the marvellous, the far away; it forms the stream on which the breath carries our consciousness outward. 'Hark, hark the lark,' has a force and meaning which disappears if we say instead 'Just listen to the lark.' Carried to its extreme we can say we go to sleep; we die in the Ah. U (oo) forces us to narrow the mouth and gives a strong experience of inner feeling, feeling which we consciously direct outwards, sometimes in antipathy as when we say 'Ugh, you beast.' O, both in the formation of the mouth and in the feeling experience, stands about midway between A and U. It is the natural ejaculation for surprise rather than wonder, or for the wish to obtain something outside ourselves and unite ourselves with it. The A takes you toward the state of sleep, of self-surrender: the U makes you awake and aware. There is a twilight state between sleeping and waking where much that is otherwise hidden can be perceived. It is the state which the Indian sage wished to induce with the meditation word OM or AOUM—the O standing

between the states of sleeping and waking, and held in inner meditation with the closing of the lips by the sound M. In Greek the M (muo) meant to close both the eyes and the lips—the condition of the inner experience of the mysteries. The M is the padlock of Papageno, we can only hum when we wear it.

We need not go to the East, however, for this feeling for the quality of the vowels. When Coleridge looked back in nostalgia to his lost youth, he wrote:

When I was young, Ah, woeful when,
Ah, for the days twixt now and then.

If he had written 'O, for the days' he would have expressed a desire to have them back,—and he was wise enough to know he could only watch them receding. O is commonly used in poetry for a wish. 'O for a muse of fire,' 'O for a beaker full of the warm south,' 'O shrive me, shrive me, holy man.' Shakespeare makes his lover sing 'O mistress mine, where are you roaming' and the repeated sound O gives its character to the whole stanza. If the lover had said 'Ah, mistress mine,' you feel she would be too far away—he would never get her. And you can hardly imagine him saying 'U, mistress mine'—he would then be thinking only of his own sensations. But when Keats poured out the yearning of his heart in his last sonnet he dwells on the sound A.

Bright star, would I were steadfast as thou art.

The vowels are all individual, but it is possible to think of the consonants also in groups. Everyone will feel that D, G, B are relatively dark and heavy sounds, while S, F, H, W, on the contrary, are light in both senses of that word. They belong to the two somewhat larger groups which Steiner calls force sounds and breath sounds. There are two lines in *Paradise Lost* of which Chesterton said that their sound was so beautiful that you could repeat them almost all day long and never tire of them. They have no profound meaning, but refer to the practice at the end of the Middle Ages by which dying people would sometimes dress as monks, in the hope that the disguise would get them through the gates of Paradise. The lines are:—

Dying put on the weeds of Dominic
Or in Franciscan think to pass disguised.

I think that these two lines make their impact not merely because the sounds are beautiful, but because they are so suited to the experience described. The first line is dominated by the heavy D

—it is, so to speak, in the key of D. The dark hand of death lives in the sounds themselves. Then comes the hope to escape, and we pass over to the light sounds, F, S, TH. But the hope is vain. Just as we believe we can get through, the doors close with the two Ds of the final word 'disguised', shutting us out for ever. Shakespeare uses the same sequence of sounds in the passage where Macbeth is speaking of the vain hopes of the fools of this world.

And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death.

The verdict of the two Ds after the light S F W sounds is final—there is no appeal against it.

Of course, however much we may group them, every consonant has also its individual character. F, for instance, has not the calming quality of S, which Shakespeare uses again and again to create a mood of quiet peace. The calm of the moonlight scene in *The Merchant of Venice*—so peaceful that we almost hear the music of the spheres—is full of the sound S.

How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank

Soft stillness and the night becomes the touches of sweet harmony,
Sit Jessica.

What is perhaps the most meditative of all Shakespeare's sonnets begins:

When to the sessions of sweet silent thought
I summon up remembrance of things past. . . .

The S creates the inner silence—after which other sounds can then build their own content. But Ariel reveals to Ferdinand the death of his father on a sound well calculated to convey a mystery—the sound of F, of which Steiner tells us that it was of great significance in the Mysteries of Isis:

Full fathom five thy father lies.

Or consider Tennyson's

The horns of elfland faintly blowing.

It is the Fs which give the horns their magic.

There are some poems which dwell so strongly on a special sound that they may well be called meditations on that sound. Take, for example, the two poems central to Blake's *Songs of Innocence* and *Songs of Experience*. Most of the poems in the former have their counterpart in the latter, but the two worlds find their essential contrast in the figures of the lamb and tiger. Blake's problem was how to reconcile the two worlds—'Did He who made the lamb make

thee?' he asks of the tiger. Read the poem of the lamb, and you will find how it takes its tone and colour from the sound L. It is written in the key of L. Here are some characteristic lines:

Little Lamb, who made thee . . .
 Little Lamb, I'll tell thee:
 He is called by thy name,
 For he calls Himself a Lamb . . .
 Little Lamb, God bless thee.

And all this wealth of Ls is supported chiefly by light or breath sounds, S, F, W and by the meditative sound of M.

It is not difficult to feel something very special in the sound L—one of the most beautiful of all our speech sounds. It is said that when Wycliffe sent his preachers abroad he told them they must make their sermons appealing by paying special attention to this sound, and that through the way they dwelt on their Ls they got the nickname of Lol-lards. It is a life-giving sound, you can almost taste it in your mouth—children actually do when they say the word 'lollypop'. In L you live in the world of pure creative force, you breathe the air of the garden of Eden. There are few things more reviving than to enact the eurythmy gestures for the sacred word alleluia.

The movement of R is entirely different: it is like a wheel rolling uncontrollably down a hill. The ragged rascals who ran round the rugged rocks were surely turning cart-wheels as they ran. Energy and power accompany the sound. It is essentially the sound for experience. Thus it resounds through Blake's Tiger; but the rs should not disappear into the vowels, but should surely be rolled as the Scotch still roll them.

Tyger, Tyger, burning bright
 In the forests of the night,
 What immortal hand or eye
 Dare frame thy fearful symmetry?

Read the poem with rolling Rs and notice how many 'force' sounds come to the support of their fierce movement, especially Bs and Ds.

In what distant deeps or skies
 Burnt the fire of thine eyes . . .
 And when thy heart began to beat
 What dread hand? And what dread feet? . . .
 What the anvil? What dread grasp
 Dare its deadly terrors clasp?

When Lewis Carroll gave the witty advice to poets 'Take care of the sense and the sounds will take care of themselves' he was making a false distinction. In a true poem the sounds and the sense are one. Put the sense into other words, change even a single sound and the very meaning is gone. Carroll was speaking to the makers of verse. Coleridge was addressing poets when he said that 'Imagination invests words with their meaning' and in a true poem 'the movement of the verse becomes the movement of the meaning'.

When all this is said and done, however, it must be admitted that the sounds are experienced by most people today by the inner ear alone. Fundamentally the speech of poetry has died on to the printed page. We are seeing today many heroic attempts to revive it, but few, if any, of them take their start, as does Steiner in his speech course, from the study of the sounds themselves. In the production of the sounds they are concerned with the physical organism, palate, tongue, larynx, etc.: in the communication of feeling, they are mostly concerned with the inner feeling awakened by the ideas expressed. Steiner, on the other hand, believed that the pure forming of sound should work back on to the organism, and that the feeling should be born out of the sounds themselves objectively. He wanted to recover the magic of speech, not to use it for private ends.

That is why in this process of recovery he wanted, in eurythmy, to make the gesture-forms of speech visible in the movement of the whole man. These gestures cannot really be illustrated, or even described, because their essential quality is movement. You may say that the gesture for Ah involves the stretching of the arms out widely before the universe, that O involves the enclosing of space before one, or U the forming of a narrow direction between arms held parallel: that in L you express something like the growing and flowering of a plant, in R the rolling motion of the sound, etc. But in this you are only making a picture, not experiencing the quality of the movement. It is because it lives so essentially in movement that eurythmy cannot really be photographed. Ballet loves the static moment of the exciting pose, and is by nature photogenic. There are no such static moments in eurythmy. Ballet wishes to reveal the physical possibilities of the body. In eurythmy the physical body should disappear into the movement created around it.

But eurythmy depends not only on the making and blending of the gestures, however artistically this may be done. On the way

back to a living speech something else is required. The eurythmist must himself experience the divine quality in every sound. He must feel that he is giving back to the Word the divine quality with which the Word originally endowed him, that he is only able to create the gesture because the gesture first created him.

Eurythmy is on the one hand an interpretative art, and as such it demands a high degree of discipline and technique. On the other hand it is a creative art, using the sounds of language and music as the painter uses his colours. For this it needs dedication and inspiration. All true dancing, said Steiner, had its origin in the movement of the heavenly bodies which the dancer brought down to the earth. The task of eurythmy is to lift movement back once more into the heavens. It is the first step from the word to the Word.

THE EURYTHMY FIGURES

TEN years after he began his work on the new art of eurythmy, Rudolf Steiner designed small wooden figures, painted in three colours, to represent the way the sounds of the alphabet are interpreted in the gesture and movement of the whole body.

He brought these figures, which had been made in the workshop of the Goetheanum, to the education conference at Oxford in 1922—just fifty years ago—and it was there that they were first publicly shown. His explanation of them is to be found in the eighth of the Oxford lectures, which go under the title *The Spiritual Ground of Education*.

The figures were designed to show what Steiner described as the three basic qualities in the eurythmic interpretation of sounds, 'by means of which qualities everything in eurythmy has to be achieved.' If they appear at first somewhat stark, it is because they represent the eurythmist stripped of all unessential elements and showing these three qualities alone.

First comes the expression of the *movement* of the sound, represented in the colour of the dress, which is to be imagined as enveloping the whole figure. It is not difficult to feel that the movement of every sound should have its own special colour if one realises how much movement is inherent in colour itself.

Then, in making the gesture of the sound, the eurythmist experiences and reveals the *feeling* of it as well. He feels in the movement itself 'something of the nature of tangible air, as if something were twined round the arm, something he has to carry.' This feeling is represented by the veil, which through its colour and movement enables the audience to *see* what the eurythmist *feels*.

Added to these two is the third element, that of will, the *character*. This shows the intensity with which the movement is made. It depends on such subtle differences as whether the hand is relaxed, or the muscles are kept taut, whether there is tension in the upper arm, whether the foot is placed firmly and deliberately on the ground. The colour of the character in the figures represents the parts of the

body where such tensions and relaxations are experienced. In actual performances the eurythmist reveals them through the quality of the movement, colour being confined to dress and veil.

The eurythmist has to learn to experience each sound in the rich and varied relation of these three basic qualities in each single sound. His art will affect the audience in the degree he does so, even though they may be quite unaware of why they are moved.

In the interpretation of a complete poem naturally many other elements enter in; but behind them must always lie the deep experience of, and devotion to, the three elements of movement, feeling and character.

A.C.H.

INNER LANGUAGE AND OUTER LANGUAGE

By JOHN DAVY

RED Indians used to teach their children never to speak out their own names—for if someone uttered his own name, a devil could steal it, leaving the poor person nameless. A nameless human being had lost his identity, and became, literally, a nonentity.

Today we have a somewhat firmer grip on our identity, and speak our own names without hesitation when introducing ourselves to a stranger. But we are gradually acquiring a different anxiety, that our names could be annihilated by numbers. Soldiers have long been accustomed to being numbers, but civilians are now numbers to their insurance companies, their bank managers, the Ministry of Health, and to many other large organisations with which they deal. You can do what you like with your name—the trouble comes when an organisation loses your number. Then, for the computer behind the scenes, you cease to exist.

This contrast has to do with our changing relationship to language. For the Red Indian, language could still be magical, because words were part of the things and people they denoted. To know the true name of something was to have power over it. But we have come to regard words as mere labels of convenience which we attach to things. As labels, they are often inefficient and inaccurate, and are better replaced with numbers. There are a great many Charles Browns in the telephone books of the world, but the number 03407621 is unique, and if attached to a man, labels him unmistakably.


Magical language and label-language imply quite different relationships between a speaker and the world around him. Magical language entails not only that a word is part of the inner nature of the thing it denotes, but that the speaker who forms this word

inwardly and then utters it is also part of the world around him: his inner life must participate in the inner life of nature, or else he could not hope to be a magician.

Label language implies the opposite, namely that the things of nature exist quite separate from, and indifferent to, the inner life of human beings and the sounds which they generate to label them. The latter are mere conventions, which take different forms around the world and might be replaced more conveniently by a universal code. Human beings also modulate these noises with others which indicate private emotions—language may be used for ‘expression’ as well as ‘communication’¹. But what is expressed has to do with the private internal state of the individual, and has no objective significance for the surrounding world.

This view of language reflects faithfully not only the beliefs, but the actual experience of many—perhaps most—adults in the modern Western world. For nature does seem to be quite separate from the private inner world of thoughts and emotions; and while language is used for referring to the surrounding world, it does not seem to be in any way part of it. This experience was enshrined philosophically by Kant (for whom the “things-in-themselves” which constitute outer nature were separated from human thinking by an uncrossable gulf), and more recently, in terms of language, by linguistic philosophy.

In the study of language itself, until very recently, the label theory of language has dominated the field in various forms. It has therefore been assumed that when a child learns a language, it simply ‘picks up’ the sounds it hears, gradually assembling a kit of linguistic labels and tools for its own use. This view, while denying any objective relation between language and nature (by reducing it to human convention) still allows it some real connection with the inner life of human thought and feeling. Most people, however ‘alienated’, still assume that language allows one human being to enter into the real inner world of thought and feeling of another. It may be felt increasingly that this entry is problematic—there would not otherwise be so much discussion of the ‘problem’ of communication. Nevertheless, as long as we recognise that the problem exists, we imply that there is a possibility of resolving it—human beings still recognise each other’s existence, even if a gulf separates man from man, and language provides only a rather shaky bridge across it.



11 H
Movement
Feeling
Character

yellow
pale-reddish
blue-ish



12 K
Movement
Feeling
Character

carmine red
yellow
vermillion

The really chilling situation would be if this bridge were to vanish, and human beings came to regard each other as Kant came to view the things-in-themselves of nature, as fundamentally inaccessible and unknowable. Other people would then become for us, not beings, but things, objects among other objects with which we find ourselves surrounded.

During this century, the behaviourist school of psychology has been developing a view, not only of human nature, but of language itself, which implies just this (not surprisingly, for this psychology explicitly bans all consideration of any 'inwardness', not only for nature, but for man himself, on the grounds that what we call man's 'inner life' is not scientifically observable or measurable, so that even its existence is at best speculative).

In 1957, Professor B. F. Skinner, of Harvard, the leading exponent of this approach, published his book *Verbal Behaviour*.² There he argued that language is learned through selective 'reinforcement' of random items of behaviour—movements of larynx, lips, lungs, etc.—which are the basis of speech. Thus one day, by chance, a baby may say 'ma-ma' when its mother is nearby. She thereupon smothers it with kisses, for she believes that the child has begun to talk to her. The behaviourist, though, sees merely coincidence; but the kisses 'reward' the child and thus 'reinforce' the actions entailed in uttering 'ma-ma'. The result is that when the mother-stimulus is again near the child, it is more likely to emit the response 'ma-ma' again, and this behaviour will be further reinforced by kisses.

On this principle, which I have only slightly caricatured in this description, the whole of human speech is supposed to be built up. All adult conversation then represents behavioural responses—complex motions of tongue, larynx and lungs—which have been selectively reinforced by reward in the past. But to ask the 'meaning' of this behaviour would be to put into it some 'inner' content inaccessible to scientific observation and measurement, and would therefore be a waste of time.

When Skinner's book appeared, it was reviewed by Noam Chomsky, now Professor of Linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in an article³ which became famous not only for the way it demolished Skinner's book, but for its formidable attack on the whole behaviourist position. But equally important, a wider

public began to become aware of a new movement in the study of language in which Chomsky has played a formative part.

It is too soon to know where this movement will lead, but it has had already one important effect: it has re-awakened a sense of wonder for human language. People have begun to recognise afresh how extraordinary it is that we can speak and understand, and to be deeply astonished at the way in which little children all over the world acquire, without much apparent effort, such a very complex skill.

This work is showing unmistakably that it is insufficient to study merely the 'surface' of language, the sounds and forms of speech regarded merely as labels or conventional signals, for language is deeply bound up with the whole function of the human mind: it leads us through a speaker's speech into his meaning, and thus into his inner world of thought and feeling. We cannot therefore account for language unless we recognise it as the end product of a complex and still rather mysterious *process*, by which the speaker's inner world is shaped, transformed and uttered as spoken sentences. In understanding speech, this process is reversed: when listening, we are barely aware of the sounds and structure of the speech itself, unless we give it special attention. But as we listen, we become inwardly aware of the thoughts and feelings which live in the speaker.

All this may seem commonsense. But it has new force in contrast to half a century of linguistic studies which have concentrated almost entirely on the end product—on the surface structure and forms of the world's languages. These have been dissected and catalogued in great detail, rather as Linnaeus and later generations of naturalists dissected and classified plants and animals. But the process which gives rise to speech—the translation of thought into words—has been too easily forgotten.

The naturalists easily fell into the same trap. Botany books usually illustrate plants in full bloom, without roots, perhaps with drawings of fruit and seed as an extra. They do not, and cannot show directly the very obvious fact that every living plant is not a finished object in space, but a *process in time*, only part of which is visible at any one moment. To know the plant itself, therefore, we must discover how this process is ordered, and look for both the archetypal and specific capacities of each plant.

Modern science is now hunting for this 'time-form' of the plant in its inherited genes, which are regarded as a kind of blue-print to

guide growth and development. This exploration is encountering fundamental difficulties, to which I will return. But linguistics is now following a remarkable parallel course. Chomsky and others have recognised that as well as its surface structure, language also has a 'deep structure'. The surface structure embodies those rules for building orderly sentences which are recorded in conventional grammar books and give us such trouble at school. Yet every child, in speaking its native language, is unconsciously observing these rules. This grammar gives us an adequate account of the structure of the finished product, rather as a botanical flora depicts the anatomy of a plant. But to understand the *process* of speaking, we must discover how what a speaker means is translated into speech.

Here we come upon Chomsky's 'deep structure'. This is revealed, for example, by the fact that sentences with different surface structures can have the same meaning: 'The tiger ate the lady' and 'the lady was eaten by the tiger'. To the grammarian, the surface structure of the two sentences is quite different. But both have a common 'deep structure' which has to do with their meaning, for both embody the speaker's intention to express a particular relation between the tiger and the lady.

A converse example is the ambiguous sentence, where one surface structure may point to two quite different deep structures: "These men may not shoot tigers" could mean, for example, that they are likely to miss because they are bad shots, or alternatively that they are not permitted to shoot tigers because they do not possess licences. Two entirely different relationships between the men and the tigers, hingeing on the ambiguity of the words "may not" are contained in one surface structure. The appropriate deep structure can only be discovered from a wider context.

These are small, simple examples of what are developing into very elaborate studies. But they may help to illustrate the contrast between deep and surface structures of language which Chomsky emphasises. The 'rules' of surface structure—conventional grammar—define how orderly sentences are constructed in a given language. The 'rules' of deep structure, in contrast, describe how we organise thoughts in an orderly way so that they can be translated into sentences. The attempt to understand deep structure is thus more like the task of understanding the organising principles of a living plant. The speaker must first organise his thoughts

of ladies and tigers into a particular form and then know how to transform this relationship into an utterance. This deep ordering according to Chomsky, brings ladies and tigers into an archetypal relationship which is expressed in all languages, and which embodies one of the fundamental ways in which we think about the world, namely the relationship of a subject acting on an object. The speaker may then have a choice of how to translate this relationship into surface structure (in this case he may choose the active or the passive mood). But he cannot organise the surface structure except in relation to the particular deep structure he has chosen.

This outlook has some remarkable consequences, which have begun to link linguistics with child development and human psychology in general. The 'rules'* of surface language are given: we find them already built into the language which surrounds us from birth. But what about the 'rules' of deep structure? These are not the rules of orderly utterance, but are more like the rules of orderly thought.

This question acquires quite new dimensions when we begin to look at how children actually learn to speak. Such studies have been greatly reinforced by the invention of the tape recorder, which has made it easy to gather large samples of what young children actually say, and what they actually hear from adults, during normal life at home. From such surveys it quickly becomes obvious that children do not and could not learn to speak simply by 'picking up' what they hear around them. First, the surface structure of adult speech—even of educated adults—is commonly fragmented, incomplete and often ungrammatical. Secondly, the majority of the sentences we utter each day are *new*—they are modified in some way, even if only in small details, from anything we have said before. This may seem surprising, but the tape recorder shows clearly that we repeat ourselves exactly less often than we think. How, then, in this fairly unpredictable language environment does the child discover the principles on which his mother tongue is organised at all?

But there is a further problem: If children learned by simple imitation, why should they at first speak such characteristic 'baby-talk'? It is much more common to hear mothers imitating their

* Strictly speaking, the word "rules" is misleading—but only in the same sense that it is misleading to call certain findings of science 'laws'. What is meant at this stage, are simply the empirically-determined regularities discovered in the forms and order of the parts of a language as used by its native speakers.

child's language than the other way round. One little boy called Adam, whose language development was recorded over a long period by two American workers, was in the habit of saying "Allgone lettuce", "Allgone shoe," etc. The *meaning* of these phrases was perfectly clear to Adam and his parents. It is fairly clear to you and me. But it can hardly be argued that Adam picked up this construction from his parents. It is much more likely that his parents will have adopted it from Adam. (Most families have private words and phrases originally coined by one of its members in infancy. We have a collapsible bed familiar to all of us as the "Oh-what-happened?" Readers will easily deduce the genesis of this phrase).

Young children, in fact, select words and phrases from the language they hear around them, but often use these in a highly idiosyncratic, yet systematic, fashion. The surface structure of such infant language is often ungrammatical—but *not because it resembles the slipshod construction of much adult speech*. It is in fact very orderly. There are unmistakeable 'rules'. As one investigator put it, we are beginning to realise that the child is not so much an incompetent speaker of adult language as a competent speaker of an exotic language. His utterances, however fragmentary, are full of organised meaning if we can learn to recognise it (mothers achieve this long before anyone else: The child says "car bang Daddy". Mother can instantly interpret: "Oh she means that she heard the car door bang in the garage, so Daddy is back from work and will be here in a minute").

The remarkable consequence of these studies is a growing body of evidence that children embody in their speech many of Chomsky's "deep structures" long before they have mastered the full surface structure of adult language. The two-word phrases of early child language, or even the earlier one word 'holophrases' (single utterances like 'allgone' which attentive parents often recognise as embodying a whole sentence which the child has not yet the skill to form), contain just those fundamental structures of orderly thinking, such as relations of subject and object, which lie behind all speaking.

This raises a difficult question: Children hear around them only the surface structure of language—and a fragmentary and ill-organised sample of the language at that. How could they possibly extract from this evidence the knowledge of deep structure they reveal in

very early speech, the rules they evidently embody in baby-talk? There is only one possible answer: in every human baby, an unconscious "knowledge" of deep structure must be *inborn*. This conclusion, now upheld by the modern school of psycholinguistics with fair unanimity, is in stark contrast to many decades of psychology and sociology which have held that we are born as *tabula rasa*, and are shaped from birth wholly by our environment.

If we are born with 'innate ideas' of language, then learning a language is not a matter of imitation in the simple sense, but means learning to relate the inborn deep structure to the surface structure of the particular language which surrounds a child. The child then stands, as it were, between two 'givens': the structure of the language in its environment, and the inborn deep structure. His 'competence' then develops as he learns to relate the one to the other, to practice what Chomsky calls "generative grammar" so that thoughts are related in an orderly way to what is spoken.

The parallel to the problems concerning biologists is clear: The surface structures of adult speech are very different all over the world; but all human beings speak. In the diversity there is a deeper unity. This unity is manifest in the very fact that languages can be translated, although often imperfectly, one into another. The unity is at the level of meaning, and Chomsky's "deep structure" appears to be connected with an inborn capacity in every human being to transmute thought into speech and *vice versa*.

In plants, the surface structure is diversely shaped by the environment—weather, soil, other plants. But a rose also retains its rose-ness wherever it grows. The 'deep structure' of a plant is its 'time-form' which guides its orderly development. Yet the nature of this body of organising forces still eludes biology. The issues are complex and there is not space to describe them here in any detail.⁴ But the attempt to locate the 'deep structure' of organisms in their genes is in effect to ignore the very nature of the problem. For genes are conceived as parts, while the problem is to comprehend an organised whole; and the genes are sought as things in three-dimensional space, whereas the aim is to find organising *processes* working in time. If one sees the problem at all, it is not very difficult to realise that progress will demand not merely new ideas, but a *new way of thinking*. I suspect something similar will apply to Chomsky's deep structure. It is obviously tempting to try to locate this structure in brain structure, but the difficulties are then similar

to those of locating life-structure in genes. Chomsky himself has recognised this, and remarks that we are facing problems which are *qualitatively* different from those which have interested science hitherto.⁵

* * * *

Those familiar with the work of Rudolf Steiner will by now have recognised how these problems need some understanding of what he called the "formative" or "etheric" forces in nature and man. Steiner sometimes called the sum of these forces in living organisms the "etheric body", and sometimes the "time body", and he was emphatic that science would not make real progress in understanding life without learning to know these forces.

Now it seems to me that in Chomsky's "deep structure," and in the "inborn knowledge" of this aspect of language which children seem to have, modern linguistics is beginning to recognise something like a time-body of language itself, a kind of organic vehicle for language which must clearly be deeply involved in the time-bodies of human beings.

We find Steiner describing how the living formative forces of our organism are used in two ways: They are in part bound to the organism itself, and enable the spiritual form or idea of man to be 'translated' into a living physical form which develops, grows, and is maintained in an orderly way. But there is a part of our organism—the head and the associated nervous system—where growth is completed quite soon, and living processes almost cease. Here, Steiner says, a part of our life-body is freed from the physical organism, and its forces become available to the human soul for the activity of thinking.

When we say 'I must get my thoughts organised', or 'that is a well-formed argument', we are recognising our own experience of the living, formative activity which we use to shape thoughts into a form in which they can be born into the world through speech and shared with others. In practising 'generative grammar', therefore, we are drawing on our own life forces to build a time-body for the speech which will bear our meaning into the world.

The wisdom which we can then find in the earliest speech of a child thus points to the organising wisdom in his whole etheric body a part of which is beginning to be free for his own thinking activity. Childish speech conveys meaning long before the surface structure of his language is complete. This means that we must locate

'deep structure', not in the physical brain, but in the life body.

How does this bear on the problem, not of speaking one's own thoughts but of understanding another's? It is very remarkable that children should begin to understand the meaning of quite complex adult speech when their own speech is still rudimentary. Here Steiner says that we must learn to know a still unrecognised mode of *sense perception*: as well as senses of smell, colour, sound, etc., we have, he says, a *sense of thought*. With this sense, we actually *perceive the thoughts of others*. Then Steiner goes on to describe, in a surprising way, the *organ* for this sense: "... If you reflect that you have life in your whole organism, and that this life is a unity, then this life, which you carry within you, to the extent that it is expressed in the physical, is the organ for the thoughts which come to you from without. ... If we were not endowed with life, we could not perceive the thoughts of others. ..."⁶

To understand this fully will be a task for research for a long time to come.⁷ But it provides a clue to the capacity for the communication and reception of meaning which awakens in a certain way very early in childhood. We owe this capacity to the wisdom in our life bodies which enables us to organise our own meanings into speech, and to apprehend, through the often ill-organised surface of their speech, the living meaning of others.

* * * *

It might seem that this is to treat language as primarily to do with thought and meaning, and to neglect 'surface structure', the actual forms and sounds of spoken languages. What is it, then, which a child meets in the language which surrounds him where he is born?

He meets, inevitably, a kind of tragedy, for he finds himself drawn into an aspect of language which does not unite, but divides him from others born into a different language. He becomes, as it were, a specialist in his speaking. Furthermore, the forms and structure of each language to some extent limit the meanings it is possible to convey: "I know what I want to say but I can't say it". Or "you can say it in Japanese, but it is impossible to express in English". Why should communication be crippled in this way? And why not resolve the problem by adopting a clear, precise, universal language, like mathematics?

Yet as we listen to the world's languages, we become aware that they bring us something else, a gift as well as a limitation: We hear

in their sounds and forms a kind of music, a music connected not so much with our thoughts as with our *feelings*. There could be no poetry without the music of words, and this music can 'mean' a great deal to us. Yet it is part of the tragedy that this meaning is not universal, like that of thoughts, but appears subjective, private, personal.

We are returning here to the tension between label-language and magical-language with which I began this essay. Poetry is a kind of descendant of magical language: in magical spells and incantations, the forms, rhythm and sounds of the words are as important as their meanings. Perhaps fortunately, we can no longer shape words of such rhythm and power that they work on the life of surrounding nature. But the poet can stir and change with words the inner life of other human beings. That is his magic.

We are stirred by these sounds—as the word 'emotion' implies—to inner movement. (We may, especially if we are born into a Latin language, be stirred to a good deal of outer movement as well). In the sounds, rhythm and shape of spoken language, therefore, we meet a 'surface structure' which is very far from superficial: We meet, in fact, not the 'life-body' of language, but its 'body of feeling', which is also its 'body of movement'.

Steiner spoke of the human being's 'body of feeling' as his 'sentient body', and also as his 'astral body'. Here again, he described a kind of body of forces, bound at first to the living and growing organism. Where the life-body manifests at first in organised physical growth and development, the astral body manifests in the wisdom of movement. It is miraculous to watch small babies gradually develop movements wisely related to the world around them. Each act of drinking, grasping, and later of standing and walking, demands the finest co-ordination of tens of thousands of muscles, fibres, joints, ligaments, etc. But the most astounding co-ordination of all takes place in the fine control of breath, lips, tongue and larynx, which enables the child to take hold and utter the organised sounds of the language around him. In his speech organs, the child becomes a master-conductor of a symphony of movement long before he has fully mastered his limbs and hands.

He learns this speech symphony from the sounds and rhythms of the language around him. But to do so, according to Steiner, he makes use of a further 'sense', the *sense of word* (or perhaps,

more precisely, the *sense of speech sounds*.*) Here again, he describes the 'sense organ' which mediates these perceptions. He refers to 'the physical organisation for the faculty of movement' and continues: "This (organism of the faculty of movement) is at the same time the organ for the perception of language, for the words which are addressed to us by others. We could not understand words if we did not have in us this physical apparatus for movement. . . ."

In learning his 'mother tongue', therefore, the child is truly imitating; he is learning the movements of a kind of local dance—his "native" language—a dance performed only with tiny gestures of the speech organs.

He is learning to move in speech with the language of his surroundings, as his own body of feeling and movement draws in the movement-body of his mother tongue with the help of his sense of speech sounds.

In the development of the child, the movement—or sentient—body is at first involved in the development of the physical body, and particularly in laying the basis both for wise movement, and for sentience (the nerves and brain). But at puberty, part of the sentient forces are freed and become available for shaping an independent life of feeling and emotion. As we know, though, our life of feeling is strongly coloured by the movement and music, by the 'emotion' inherent in the sounds, gestures and forms, in the 'dance' of the mother tongue absorbed in infancy. Through learning to talk like Englishmen, we are also taught by our language to *feel* like Englishmen!

And now we must come again to the tragic element in these events. Why, nowadays, should 'deep structure' and 'surface structure' be distinct? Why are meaning and speech sounds separate, with a corresponding gulf between thought and emotion? Why do we separate poetry and prose, expression and communication, magical language and label language? We are contemplating here some consequences of those events we know as the Fall of Man, which Steiner illuminated from so many aspects. Through eating of the Tree of Knowledge—by succumbing to self-seeking—man was expelled from Paradise. In his soul life he began to feel separated from the world of creative spiritual reality in which he had lived.

* In German, Steiner uses both 'Wort-Sinn' (sense of word) and 'Laut-Sinn' (sense of speech sounds). In so far as a complete word already embodies a thought (which is perceived by the sense of thought), 'Laut-Sinn' or 'sense of speech sound' distinguishes more precisely the perception of the way speech itself is organised.

Every child as he grows up re-lives this process of separation, and with particular force during puberty.

Steiner describes how the fall affected first our sentient or astral being, drawing some of our desires and appetites into egotism which ties us to the earth. Yet there are 'two souls' in each one of us, for with part of our sentient being we are idealists: our 'appetites' are selfless, and lead us to strive to find again our un-fallen natures. In our own bodies, we find one expression of the Tree of Knowledge in the great tree of our nervous system, which however, is always on the verge of death. It gives us sentience, but also tends to lead us to think, not in living ideals, but in dead logical structures. So we have developed, especially in modern science, a death-bringing intellect.

In language, the drama of the fall is being played out in a special form. We have almost lost the sense for the heavenly music, the un-fallen 'astral body' of language, which still sounds, though distorted and out of tune, through the rhythms and forms of the fallen languages of the earth today. These languages carry an egotistic impulse, isolating their users behind 'language barriers'. We know, too, how to exploit language to play on emotions, rouse crowds, inflame nationalistic feelings. Yet through each language, especially in its poetry, there can still sound a characteristic feeling which is one facet of the archetypal Word which shines into it. It will be the task of poets, or of the poet in each one of us, into a far-distant future, to rediscover the heavenly dance in the sounds of speech, to redeem language and make it selfless once again.*

Perhaps I should add that this is a task for parents as well as poets. Part of every child's soul life, his movement of feeling and the life of his ideals, is shaped by what he hears of his mother tongue. It is a fortunate child who is surrounded by musical, well-formed speech filled with warmth and idealism, whose mother sings to him in infancy and who meets at school some of the great poetry and literature both of his own and of other languages (irrespective of whether he fully understands what he hears).

* * * * *

The Book of Genesis says, rather mysteriously, that man had to leave Paradise in order to protect another Tree, the Tree of Life (Genesis 4, verses 22-24). In our life-bodies, which guide the life processes of our organism, there is still an almost untouched har-

* Editor's note: See also *Eurythmy and the Word* by A. C. Harwood, p. 67

mony and wisdom, a wisdom which is kept inaccessible to our waking consciousness with its tendencies to death-bringing thoughts and destructive feelings. At the same time, those life forces which serve our thinking activity lead us into a selfless relation to truth—for this is what the world of meaning is: we may possess, or be possessed by, an emotion; but a meaning, a concept, in its living reality, does not belong to any one person: the creative idea which organises the plant belongs to the plant, not to us. And when we share a concept, we do not each fondle a separate copy of it; we stand in the presence of the same concept, we participate in a creative meaning of the universe.⁹

Yet just in this century we must realise that the Tree of Life, both in our bodies and in our souls, has begun to be vulnerable. In biology, we are beginning to recognise the possibility that we could learn to control and manipulate the organising forces of life itself. When we think of 'genetic engineering', we are aiming to take hold of and manipulate the formative forces themselves.

We face something similar in language: Label-language is leading us to treat speech as mere "behaviour", and to regard the acquisition of language as mere shaping of behaviour from without. We are beginning to discover possibilities of shaping behaviour by conditioning, of shaping not only language but thought itself: In propaganda, and in brain-washing, the aim is to reach right into the 'deep-structure' of a person's thinking, to give him not merely new feelings, but new reactions, habits, instincts. One part of such techniques is to instil by repetition certain words, phrases and slogans until they become part of his habits of thought. George Orwell in *1984* and *Animal Farm* foresaw with terrible clarity the direction in which such an attack on meaning itself could lead.

So here, too, we have a protective and redemptive task. All routine, machine-like use of language, fixation in cliché, 'empty phrases', all 'dead' language (except insofar as we need precise communication for dealing legitimately with dead things, the machines and technology of our civilisation) weaken and harden the Tree of Life in our language and thinking. But it is strengthened and vitalised when we fill our speech with the fresh life of *imagination*.

When human consciousness was united with the life of nature, language lived in man as an echo of the creative utterances of the gods which shaped the plants, the animals, the earth, and man

himself as a microcosm of the macrocosm. And human utterance was therefore magical—an event in nature as well as in the human soul. But language has separated from nature, as the human soul has awakened to independent self-consciousness. In achieving self-consciousness, language has been brought close to death. And indeed it will surely die unless human beings now learn to pour their own creative life into it.

We lay a basis for this in childhood, and especially in the first school years, when nature frees life forces for the first independent imaginative life. Here Steiner schools nourish this life with the great imaginative truths embodied in fairy tales, myths and legends. Without such nourishment, we grow up starved and ill-equipped for a great spiritual and social task of our time—to find a path to true imagination, to a living thinking in which we form from our own life forces a life-body to receive the truths of the spiritual world.

The new linguistics is a long way from seeing the full dimensions of this task, as it emerges from the work of Rudolf Steiner. But I hope in this essay to have shown that it is not unrelated. Chomsky and his associates have awakened a new wonder for language, and wonder is the essential starting point for the search for imaginative truth. Chomsky has also held back the advance of behaviourism into language, and sees that this is not only an academic matter, but a struggle to rescue the creative intelligence of man. In this, followers of Steiner's work can recognise a true service to our times.

References

- ¹ See O. Barfield, *Speaker's Meaning* (Rudolf Steiner Press).
- ² Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc., New York.
- ³ *Language*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1959.
- ⁴ For much fuller discussions of the problem of 'organisation' in biology, see *Beyond Reductionism*, edited Arthur Koestler (Hutchinson 1969). Also *Towards a Theoretical Biology*, edited Waddington (Edinburgh University Press).
- ⁵ Noam Chomsky, *Language and Mind* (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968).
- ⁶ *Das Rätsel des Menschen*, lecture 14, given at Dornach on September 2, 1916 (Rudolf Steiner Nachlassverwaltung).
- ⁷ The late Dr. Karl König made an important contribution to this problem in *The First Three Years of the Child*, chapter 4 (Anthroposophic Press, New York, 1969).
- ⁸ Rudolf Steiner, *op. cit.*
- ⁹ I realise that this is a scandalously brief assertion of the position which Steiner developed in great detail in his *Philosophy of Freedom* and elsewhere. Readers are referred to this, and also to O. Barfield *op. cit.*

AUS "WAHRSPRUCHWORTE"

RUDOLF STEINER

I

Es bedarf der Mensch der innern Treue,
 Der Treue zu der Führung der geistigen Wesen
 Er kann auf dieser Treue aufbauen
 Sein ewiges Sein und Wesen,
 Und das Sinnensein dadurch
 Mit ewigem Licht
 Durchströmen und durchkrafen.

(12 April 1923)

II

Wer der Sprache Sinn versteht,
 Dem enthüllt die Welt im Bilde sich.
 Wer der Sprache Seele hört,
 Dem erschliesst die Welt als Weisheit sich.
 Wer der Sprache Geist erlebt,
 Den beschenkt die Welt mit Weisheitskraft.
 Wer die Sprache lieben kann,
 Dem verleiht sie selbst die eigne Macht.
 So will ich Herz und Sinn
 Nach Geist und Seele
 Der Worte wenden,
 Und in der Liebe
 Zu ihnen mich selbst
 Erst ganz empfinden.

(März 1921)

III

Die Sprache ist zum Teil Traum,
 zum Teil Vorstellung.
 Wahrheit würde man erhalten,
 wenn man den Atemrhythmus
 der Welt aufnähme.
 In der Vorstellung
 ist der Inhalt zu klein,
 im Wollen zu gross.

(Aus einem Notizbuch)

SAYINGS FROM VARIOUS TIMES

RUDOLF STEINER

I

The human being needs inner loyalty,
 Loyalty to leadership by spiritual beings.
 He can build on this loyalty
 His eternal existence and being
 And thus let flow and let work
 Eternal light
 Through sense-existence.

(12 April 1923)

II

For him who understands the sense of speech
 The world reveals itself in picture.
 On him who hears the soul of speech
 The world unlocks itself as wisdom.
 To him who lives into the spirit of speech
 The world bestows the strength and power of wisdom.
 To him who can love speech
 It grants its own creative might.
 Thus I will turn my heart, my sense,
 Towards the spirit and the soul of words,
 And in the love for them begin to feel
 My self entire.

(March 1921)

III

Speech is part dream
 Part the mind's image.
 Truth would be achieved
 By taking up the rhythm
 Of the world's breath.
 In the mind's image
 Too little is contained—
 In willing, too much.

(From a note-book)

IV

Ich suche im Innern
 Der schaffenden Kräfte Wirken,
 Der schaffenden Mächte Leben.
 Es sagt mir
 Der Erde Schweremacht
 Durch meiner Füße Wort,
 Es sagt mir
 Der Lüfte Formgewalt
 Durch meiner Hände Singen,
 Es sagt mir
 Des Himmels Lichteskraft
 Durch meines Hauptes Sinnen,
 Wie die Welt im Menschen
 Spricht, singt, sinnt.

(Den Schülern der Eurythmie)

V


Es keimen der Seele Wünsche,
 Es wachsen des Willens Taten,
 Es reifen des Lebens Früchte.

Ich fühle mein Schicksal,
 Mein Schicksal findet mich.
 Ich fühle meinen Stern,
 Mein Stern findet mich.
 Ich fühle meine Ziele,
 Meine Ziele finden mich.

Meine Seele und die Welt sind eines nur.


Das Leben, es wird heller um mich,
 Das Leben, es wird schwerer für mich,
 Das Leben, es wird reicher in mir.

(Eurythmische Uebung)



13 L
 Movement
 Feeling
 Character


silver-grey
 lilac
 orange



grün / Bewegung
 blau / Gefühl
 violett / Charakter

14 M
 Movement
 Feeling
 Character

green
 blue
 violet



gelbgrün / Bewegung
 blauviolett / Gefühl
 lilac / Charakter

15 N
 Movement
 Feeling
 Character

yellow-green
 blue-violet
 lilac

IV

I seek within me
 Creative forces working
 Creative powers living.
 There speaks in me
 The might of earth's weight
 By the word of my feet;—
 There speaks in me
 Air's forming strength
 By the song of my hands;—
 There speaks in me
 The power of heaven's light
 Through my head's conceiving;—
 Of how the world in man
 Speaks, sings, conceives.

(For students of Eurythmy)

V


The wishes of the soul spring up
 The actions of the will grow strong
 The harvest of man's life grows ripe.

I feel my life's fate,
 My fate finds me.
 I feel my life's star,
 My star finds me.
 I feel my life's aims,
 My aims find me.

My soul and the world are one.

Life becomes clearer about me,
 Life becomes harder for me,
 Life becomes richer in me.

(Eurythmy exercise)



Plates 13-20 wrap round this section

EQUALITY AND JUSTICE

CHARLES DAVY

EQUALITY and justice: they are powerful words standing for potent ideals, often fought for and fought over, not least in our time. Men have always desired justice, though in the past their concept of it was different from ours. The desire for equality is fairly modern: it came to the fore in Europe only with the breakdown of the old type of hierarchical society, in which everyone had his place and knew it.

Having left that well-ordered society behind, we have not yet found a satisfactory alternative. There is a wide demand for social justice, and many would say we cannot have it while gross inequalities of wealth and privilege persist. But what are justice and equality going to mean? We all know roughly what they mean; they have a common element in fairness. But what would they mean in social practice? Can we take them as social ideals which can and should be realised? These are the questions I want to ask. They continue to be argued and written about in controversial tones, with no agreement yet in sight.*

Equality applied to human beings is a difficult concept, for human beings are manifestly unequal, mentally and physically, in all sorts of ways. Is there *any* context, then, in which the idea of human equality makes sense? I believe there is, but it has to be a spiritual context, wherein one may think of all human beings as the children of one Father and of equal value in his eyes; or that in every human being there is a spark from the divine fire and that this is something to which external inequalities are irrelevant. I will come back to this aspect of the subject.

The most famous and probably the most influential words ever written on equality are in the American Declaration of Independence (1776): 'We hold these truths to be self-evident—that all men are

created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.'

What was 'created equal' intended to mean? The authors of the Declaration may have wished to indicate something like 'equal in the sight of God', but probably they had their eyes chiefly on the building of a new society, free from British control. They wanted a democratic society in which the old British traditions of hereditary privilege and aristocratic rank would have no place. There would be equal opportunity for all.

This equal opportunity ideal has had great influence, and there is some rightness in it, but it is deceptive on two fairly obvious grounds.

First, even normally healthy children cannot all be given a fair and equal start in life: some will be severely handicapped by bad parents, broken homes, grinding poverty. A child may overcome these handicaps; may even gain strength from reacting against them: there are many examples of eminent men and women whose childhood was unhappy or in some way deprived. But they are exceptions; far more often a bad family background will inflict lasting harm.

Secondly, because if we want a fair race, we shall not line up all the competitors level at the start and let them go. We shall introduce some form of handicap which will help the weaker runners.

In education, this means giving special help and encouragement to the less gifted ones, so that they will not feel altogether inferior to the clever ones. It may not be true that 'every child is a genius at something', but every educable child can probably learn to do something well, if his talent for it is sought out and fostered.

There is thus a paradox in equal opportunity: in itself it does not lead to social equality but rather the reverse. The runners soon string out, with the slow runners left stumbling along behind. A society that gave equal opportunity free rein, and did nothing to counterbalance its results, would be a new kind of hierarchical society, more cruel than the old.* For when social status was determined largely by birth, a man low on the ladder could always believe that those above him were not really his 'betters'; they were born to positions they had done nothing to earn. But if status and incomes were to depend solely on individual achievement in a

* 'The conviction remains very strong in the Labour Movement that once Socialism ceases to be "about equality", it ceases to be about anything.' Daniel Jenkins, *Equality and Excellence* (SCM Press, 1961).

* See Michael Young, *The Rise of the Meritocracy*, 1958; Penguin, 1961.

ruthlessly competitive society, then a man who lagged behind would feel that he had nothing but his own deficiencies to blame.

Yet there is something right in equal opportunity. It must be right to remove, as far as possible, any obstacles that deprive some children of a good education; and right also to encourage the flowering of individual talent, wherever it may arise. Can we find in society a place for equal opportunity where its rightness, but not its cruelty, will emerge, and at the same time an intelligible place for equality itself?

Here I must invoke Rudolf Steiner's conception of the Threefold Social Order, for a basic feature of it might be called, in the proverbial phrase, 'a place for everything and everything in its place.'

If you look at any modern society, Steiner said, you can distinguish in it three main spheres of activity: the spiritual or cultural sphere, embracing religion, science and the arts; the political sphere, embracing government, administration and the enactment of laws; and the economic sphere, embracing the production, distribution and consumption of commodities.* He related these three spheres to the famous slogan of the French Revolution—Liberty, Equality, Fraternity—so often vaguely applauded but seldom clearly understood. The slogan proclaims three social ideals, but at first sight they must seem incompatible with one another. 'The passion for equality', Lord Acton wrote, 'made vain the hope for freedom'—for how can you have equality without crippling the freedom to be unequal? And fraternity, brotherhood, what can it mean? One might hope, in vain, to find it pervading society; it could be anywhere or nowhere.

The way out of this confusion is to discern, as Steiner did, that each ideal has its natural home, so to speak, in one of three spheres. The home of liberty is the spiritual sphere; of equality, the political sphere; of fraternity, the economic sphere.

We must take care, however, to picture the three spheres not as separate but as interpenetrating, somewhat as, say, the nerve system and the blood system interpenetrate in the human organism. Thus the rule of law extends into all three spheres; spiritual activities are found wherever human beings are, e.g. in politics and industry as well as in the spiritual sphere itself; and all three spheres depend on and consume the products of the economic sphere.

* 'The political problem of mankind,' J. M. Keynes wrote in 1926, 'is to combine three things: economic efficiency, social justice and individual liberty.'

But if the three spheres interpenetrate in this way, what is the point of distinguishing them?

The point is that each sphere has a keynote which must be allowed to sound out clearly if the three spheres are to be related in harmony and health. If we say that the keynote of the spiritual sphere is freedom, we are saying that the human spirit needs freedom if it is to realise its full potentialities as a creative source. "The wind bloweth where it listeth," and the spiritual energies which flow into society through human beings cannot be directed or confined without losing some of their creative power.

In simple terms, if we want new spiritual insights, new scientific ideas and inventions, original works of art, we must leave gifted individuals free to bring them forth.

A further reason why freedom should be the keynote of the spiritual sphere is that freedom here implies freedom to give. The achievements of the human spirit are endowments for the community: they enrich many and impoverish none.

The social value of this freedom seems hardly open to dispute, yet it can be and often is feared and opposed. In some countries it is regarded as dangerous and disruptive, a threat to the established regime or the official ideology; and there are good grounds for this anxiety. Spiritual freedom is no respecter of persons, traditions or orthodoxies. It destroys in order to create anew; it seeks to let the wind of the future blow into the present. But the effect of trying to put it in chains is to impoverish any society where this is done; to block its inflow of creative energies and to incline the most gifted individuals to emigrate, if they can.

In our own country, to-day, spiritual freedom is not under serious threat, but it could be threatened in a limited field by a Government bent on bringing all schools into the State system and preventing the start of any new schools on unorthodox, pioneering lines—although the State schools have themselves learnt and profited much from independent schools of this kind.

However, if spiritual freedom in our country is not widely threatened, it is quite widely resented: on the one hand by advocates of restrictive censorship (which is not to say that censorship is never justified), and on the other by those egalitarians, the levellers-down, who regard as pretentious, or 'undemocratic', any claims to superiority or excellence above the average norm.*

* In 1903 Chekhov wrote: 'The whole idea of a "people's" theatre and "people's" literature is foolishness and lollipops for the people. We mustn't bring Gogol down to the people but raise the people up to Gogol.' See his *Letters*, translated by Constance Garnett, Chatto and Windus, 1920, p. 4408.

Obviously, the freedom of the spiritual sphere cannot be absolute. It remains subject to the law, and dependent for sustenance on the economic sphere. But egalitarianism is alien to it. For it is here that human inequalities emerge most strongly and should be allowed, even encouraged, to do so. It is here that aristocracy, not of birth but of talent and accomplishment, has its right place. One could turn Lord Acton's aphorism round and say with truth of the spiritual sphere: The passion for freedom makes vain the hope of equality. But if we value both freedom and equality, what then?

The answer that can be given in the context of a Threefold Social Order is that the right place for equality is not the spiritual sphere but the political sphere, the sphere of democracy. It is here that equality can exist not merely as an aspiration, but embodied in institutions and guaranteed—at least in principle—by laws. Thus we have parliamentary and local elections based on universal adult suffrage—one man, one vote—and the concept of equality before the law. Certainly, this concept has not yet been carried fully into practice anywhere. In England we have the Legal Aid and Legal Advice schemes, and they are valuable, but a poor man is still at a disadvantage in going to law. A rich man will not be able to bribe the judge, but he can spend more money on preparing his case, finding witnesses, obtaining the best legal advice and advocacy. But the principle of equality before the law is recognised, and it covers not only the courts but any tribunal or semi-judicial body which is concerned with legal rights. And this recognition, however imperfectly applied, is an advance both on legal corruption, under which justice is bought and sold, and on political justice, where verdicts conform to political doctrine or expediency.

In broader terms, we have the concept of equal human rights, implying that every human being has certain rights which accrue to him irrespective of his birth, talents or circumstances, simply because he is a human person living in a human society. They all derive from the fundamental right of a person to be treated as a person, not as a tool; or, in Kant's phrase, as an end, not as a means.

But why should he have this right? He has not always had it: a slave had no rights and a serf very few. Obviously, he does not "have" it in the sense of possessing it like a suit of clothes. He has it in so far as it is recognised by public opinion—i.e., by the great majority of people in the society to which he belongs. And it is

thus recognised in the Western democratic countries with which we are dealing here. This, I believe, is because human beings in most Western countries have in fact come to be more selfconsciously aware of themselves as individuals than they were in former times. They think of themselves, and want to be thought of by others, as individual persons, no longer clothed in the perpetual uniform of a particular class or avocation, as people had been in the hierarchical societies of the past.*

This enhancement of individual self-consciousness is a mark of the epoch that Rudolf Steiner called the epoch of the consciousness soul; it has occurred as the latest phase in the evolution of human consciousness and signifies much more than a mere change, possibly transient, in the climate of opinion. It has come to stay.

Where this fundamental human right is recognised, the equality of all human beings will be recognised in the sense that they all have an equal right to be treated as persons. But this implies also an equal right to be unequal, within certain limits, for if an individual is not free to develop his particular talents and to pursue his chosen aims, he will be only half a person, crippled and confined. The limits are set by the rights of others: that is, a person must not use his freedom to exploit—i.e., to treat as a tool or means—any other person. Your right is my duty; another way of saying, Do unto others

As we have seen, the sphere in which human rights are recognised in terms of law is, and must be, the political sphere, for it is here that laws are made. But the protection of human rights extends into all spheres; it goes with human beings wherever and whatever they are. Hence the political sphere was often called by Steiner the Rights sphere: the sphere from which human rights derive a legal guarantee.

In the spiritual sphere, this guarantee will counterbalance the freedom to be unequal which here finds its widest scope. This freedom calls for equality of opportunity, but it soon leads (as we have seen) to the fastest runners racing ahead; hence it needs to be accompanied by a concern for equal rights, which should prevent

* all Relation:

Prince, Subject, Father, Sonne, are things forgot,
For every man alone thinkes he hath got
To be a Phoenix.

John Donne, 'The First Anniversary'.

the slow runners from feeling that they are inferior human beings on all counts. The laws and rules drawn from the Rights sphere will also act in the spiritual sphere as a check on abuses of authority, on intolerance, on exploitation of any kind. A tendency towards anarchy is natural and healthy in the spiritual sphere, and to balance it there must be a rule of law drawn from an independent source.

Now we must look at the role of equality in the economic sphere, and its relation to fraternity. This latter word sounds ironic nowadays, although 'brother' is a traditional form of address in trade unionism, and a strong feeling of brotherhood inspired the early struggles to set up the trade union movement. But to-day, in economic life as a whole, the fraternity that prevails is often more like the fraternity of Cain and Abel than the fraternity of brotherly love. Yet the economic sphere is inescapably a fraternity in the sense that here people are dependent on one another for livelihood and for getting work done. The work of many is generally necessary to meet the needs of one.

These needs vary widely, but on the basic level they are similar for everyone. Most people need much the same minimum of food, clothing and shelter to keep alive. On this level, equality prevails, and I think it is a corollary of equal human rights that the community should be responsible for seeing that basic needs are met, as in most modern countries they are now met in principle—though very far from adequately in practice—through social insurance and welfare benefits.

This is a simple example of the Rights State acting to protect human rights in the economic sphere. But in what other ways, if any, should the Rights State intervene in economic affairs? A difficult question, for here equality comes up against two powerful adversaries—unequal earnings and executive authority.

No-one except Bernard Shaw, as far as I know, has publicly advocated equal pay for everyone,* though the idea is appealing. No more competition for money rewards, no more wage-bargaining or insistence on differentials, no more keeping up with the Joneses, no one either proud or ashamed of being much better off than his neighbour. People would look for satisfaction in work, not in the size of the pay-packet . . . I need not discuss all the problems

* In *The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism, Capitalism, Sovietism and Fascism*, Pelican, 1937.

that would arise. A system of equal pay may come in some future epoch, but I think it would need a change in human consciousness, not yet in sight.

For the present we have to reckon with a widely unequal range of earnings and incomes. The range could and probably should be reduced,* but during the foreseeable future it will remain wide under any regime (it is very wide in Russia). The question of how earnings should be determined—by the criterion of needs, supply and demand, productivity, or simple bargaining power—must be left aside here. For our purpose the relevant point is whether equality can exist at all in the harshly competitive atmosphere of economic life, once basic needs have been met; and in particular whether it can be reconciled with the claims of executive authority in industry.

In any economic enterprise there must be executive authority. This holds good whatever may (and should) be done by works councils, etc., to promote participation by the workers, through their representatives, in the process of management. Whence does the executive who gives orders derive his authority to give them? The obvious answer, true in one sense, is that his authority is conferred on him by the board of directors, representing the shareholders, who hold the purse-strings and can dismiss anyone who refuses to obey orders by cutting off his pay. But there is another sense in which all the people in a firm, from the directors downwards, are under an impersonal authority, the authority of the work. From this point of view a manager is an interpreter: he interprets the demands of the work to those who by following his instructions will help to get it efficiently done.†

This kind of authority may be called *functional*: it derives not from the manager himself but from the function he is appointed to per-

* There is truth in Tawney's remark that 'individual differences, which are a source of social energy, are more likely to ripen and find expression if social inequalities are, as far as practicable, diminished' (R. H. Tawney, *Equality*, 1931; revised paperback edition, Unwin Books, 1964). But it depends on the measures taken to diminish inequalities: they could be levelling-down measures which would restrict the free expression of individual talents.

† The manager to-day gives orders and controls his people. He carries the full responsibility for their work. It's time to change his role to that of the teacher, acting as a consultant to his own people, helping them to evaluate their own progress.' Dr. Saul Gellerman, American management consultant, quoted in *New Scientist*, 15.6.72.

Marx compared a factory manager, whose 'commanding will' is properly used to co-ordinate the processes of production, with the conductor of an orchestra (*Das Kapital*, vol. III, chap. 23).

form. Of course he will often add to it through his personal qualities; but if he regards his authority as functional he will exercise it in such a way that his subordinates will not feel that he is coming it over them and treating them as human inferiors. He will make them feel that he and they are equally servants of the work.

The opposite of functional authority is authority vested in someone not because he is specially well qualified for the job, but for some other reason (influence, graft, seniority), and is then used by him to inflate his ego or to buttress his status. Authority used in this way will be felt by those under it as imposition, compelling them to bow the knee or risk the sack. They will feel that they are being treated not as persons but as tools.

Of course this will go on. There will be appointments and promotions for the wrong reasons, power-conflicts, envies, resentments, unfairnesses in economic life. They cannot be eliminated but they can be reduced: by organisation reforms, by education for management, by example.

A promising trend of reform may be towards vesting the ownership of a company, not nominally in the shareholders, as now, but actually and collectively in the people who work for it at all levels. Investors might be offered fixed-interest terms, with special terms for risk-capital required by new enterprises. It would be for the Rights State to promote this kind of reform through changes in company law.

Education for management: there is plenty of it already, but the usual emphasis seems to be on making management more efficient; the idea of functional authority may be familiar in these circles under one or other name, but one does not hear much of it publicly.

Example: Among the best-known examples of co-partnership in this country are the Scott Bader Commonwealth, the John Lewis Partnership and Rowen Engineering (Glasgow).^{*} But the co-partnership idea (favoured ineffectually by the Liberals, mistrusted for different reasons by Labour and the Tories) seems unlikely to make much headway until some leading firms take the risk of trying it out on a large scale.

^{*} Further information on this subject may be had from the Industrial Common Ownership Movement (formerly Demintry), 8 Churton Street, London, S.W.1. The object of ICOM is 'to achieve democratic control of their own work by the people at work. . . . The common ownership economy at which we aim will be one in which there will be a limited return on capital and the sharing of all the wealth created by any enterprise will be under the control of its co-owners.'

However, it would be misleading to imply that while radical changes in ownership and company law hang fire, no changes are occurring on the factory floor. Two encouraging developments, now gradually making headway, are job enrichment and the setting up of autonomous work groups. Job enrichment 'seeks to reverse the historical trend towards breaking work down into its simplest components and sets out rather to build up jobs to raise the skill and conceptual levels they demand. In response to problems of recruitment, turnover and absenteeism, Saab has designed the lay-out of its new plant at Soedertalje in Sweden to take human as well as technical and financial considerations into account. Saab has abandoned the assembly line and structured the work flow to provide self-contained jobs rather than meaningless fragmented tasks carried out in isolation on the line. A team of four fitters will assemble a complete engine, tackling the job in the way they consider best.*

I first heard of the work-group idea from a book by a Frenchman, Hyacinthe Dubreuil, called in its English translation *A Chance for Everybody*, and published here, with a foreword by Aldous Huxley, in 1939. Based on Dubreuil's own factory experience as a skilled die-maker, it went thoroughly into the idea and made out a strong practical case for it, insisting that no industrial reforms will meet the human needs of the workers unless the reforms are carried right down 'to the site of the work,' but the book was soon overtaken by the war and never had wide influence.

Now at last, it seems, the work-group idea is being taken up by some of the largest firms, but not so much through management initiative as in response to a situation in which some workers, having acquired a wider outlook and a correspondingly sharpened discontent, are strong enough to turn effectively against the dehumanising assembly line.

The work-group system may not be applicable to all manufacturing processes, but it is a good example of fraternity in practice; it also tends to undermine the pervasive inequality of a strictly hierarchical discipline that extends from the summit right down to the factory floor.

Much more could of course be said about the complicated subject

^{*} W. W. Daniel, 'Changing Hierarchies at Work,' *The Listener*, 7.9.72. Mr. Daniel gives similar examples from Fiat in Italy, Philips in Holland and I.C.I. in Britain.

of industrial organisation, but it would be out of place to go further into details here.* I have been trying only to suggest what equality could mean in the economic sphere, an environment generally hostile to it. In summary, it could mean (a) that all members of the community have an equal right to basic maintenance; and (b) that functional authority in industry can allow those who give orders and those who take them to meet on a footing of equality as human beings.

Thus one might say that the concept of equality, originating and given direct expression in the political sphere, extends as a humanising influence into the spiritual and economic spheres. It checks the aristocratic arrogance which tends to occur in the spiritual sphere; while in the economic sphere it checks the abuse of executive authority and recognises the obligation of the community to sustain its weaker and poorer members, for they are all equally members of one another.

The conflict between equality and freedom is not then abolished, but it becomes a tension, a state of balance, in which the feeling for equality corrects the passion for freedom, while the passion for freedom prevents the pursuit of equality from perversion into an envious endeavour to flatten excellence into mediocrity.

If now we turn from equality to justice, we shall not have to turn very far. The two subjects are obviously related, and yet different in character, as are the two words themselves.

Equality, for me, is a cool, clear, rippling word, somehow akin to a flow of clear water. Justice is dark crimson, a colour no doubt suggested by a judge's robe, but darker, in a sombre setting of massive pillars and a floor of stone. But justice has another, quite different aspect, which links it with equality.

From my office window in London I can see the gilded figure of justice standing high above the Old Bailey and sometimes shining in the rays of early morning sun. The figure is of a woman in classical drapery; her right hand carries a sword; her left, a pair of scales. Thus she symbolises the two aspects of justice, the penal and the equitable, corresponding roughly with criminal and civil law.

In early times these two aspects were not as clearly distinguished as they are now. The decrees and rulings of justice came from

* See Folkert Wilken, *The Liberation of Work* (Routledge, 1969).

on high; they were interpreted by priests and administered by kings. The king had both criminal and civil justice in his hands. If he pronounced sentence on a criminal, he will have felt that divine justice was acting through him; he may have believed that the whole community would suffer if the criminal were not compelled by punishment to expiate his offence, for breaking the law was an offence against its author, God. When the king gave a verdict in a civil case, he used his own discernment as to which witness to believe, and so on, but he will still have felt that the code of law he administered was not man-made.

As time went on, justice came down to earth. The thunder-voice on the mountain-top was heard only in echoes from the past. Some echoes can still be heard in criminal law to-day, but civil law has developed gradually into a secular system for maintaining public order and regulating the relationships between man and man. And in this last respect it has changed fairly recently (as Maitland showed) 'from status to contract'—i.e., the legal rights of an individual ceased to reflect his status in a social hierarchy and came to depend on his contractual obligations as a citizen and on those of others towards him, including the general contract with society he has tacitly entered into by living in the society as a citizen.

But how are legal systems related to the concept of justice? They derive from it and are intended to embody it, but the idea of justice exists in its own realm and can be appealed to against the system, as when we say, 'That may be the law, but it's not just'.

Here we are appealing to justice in the name of fairness; we are invoking the hand that holds the scales. If we invoke the hand that holds the sword, some different considerations arise.

Originally, criminal justice was concerned almost wholly with punishment and deterrence, not with reforming the criminal, and this remains a prevalent attitude, as when we say, 'He's done wrong—he ought to be punished.'

The motives that lead a person to take this attitude will usually be mixed. There may be an unconscious feeling that by approving the punishment of an offender he will be getting rid of some guilt of his own. There may also be a rational (though not always valid)

* A recognition that some real personal grievances could not be remedied by the common law led in the 13th century to the emergence of the still important branch of the civil law known as Equity. See Owen Barfield, 'Equity between Man and Man,' *Golden Blade*, 1961.

belief in deterrence. I think there is often also a feeling that the offender has inflicted a kind of stain on the community and that by suffering punishment he will expiate it and wipe it out.

This may be the oldest of all the feelings connected with crime and punishment; but in early times it took the rather different form of a fear that unless the offender were duly punished the whole community would incur the anger of God. Nowadays we omit God and say that the perpetrator of any vicious or brutal crime has outraged the community's moral sense. This argument has often been used—generally with the support of judges—to justify capital punishment: it is said to be necessary and right that the outraged moral feeling of the community should be thus assuaged.

These feelings and attitudes indicate that criminal justice, unlike the civil law, is not yet completely secularised; not treated as a field in which the rules are wholly man-made. The criminal law still bears some marks of its origin in divinely-given ordinances.

However, a quite different and purely secular attitude towards crime and criminals has recently begun to gain influence. The criminal is regarded as a sick man who requires, not punishment, but remedial treatment. Some extreme advocates of this view would say that the criminal is what heredity, upbringing and social environment have made him; he is no more responsible for his crime than a sick man is responsible for his illness. Others would not altogether deny moral responsibility, but they would say that the degree of it, compared with the deterministic effect of other factors, can never be exactly assessed, and that anyway remedial treatment is not only more humane than punishment, but more sensible, for it has a much better chance of rehabilitating the offender, so that he will never come back to prison.

This therapeutic view has been strongly attacked, notably by C. S. Lewis, who argues that to divest a man of moral responsibility and then hand him over to the psychiatrists is to degrade him as a human being. Far better let him pay for his crime by serving a sentence—which he will often recognise as just—and then send him out as a free man, a responsible individual, with whom no-one has meddled.

I believe we ought to move away from the idea of judicial punishment, while recognising that some dangerous persons, whether or not they rank as strictly insane, will have to be kept in custody for long periods, or for a life-time. But they should be detained

under conditions which will enable them, as far as possible, to lead useful lives, with opportunities for work of their own choice, recreation, social activities, etc., subject only to security precautions. They will be deprived of liberty and family life, and will need all that can be safely done to respect and nurture their humanity.

We must recognise also that some men and women may wish to be punished, in some cases because they are neurotic masochists, in others because of a need to relieve a conscience burdened by guilt. And this guilt may have been incurred, consciously, in their present lives, or in a previous life, in which latter case they will be impelled by an unconscious wish to expiate a karmic debt.

Here we enter deep waters, but I think we cannot find the right approach to questions of human justice unless we allow for the karmic justice that may be at work in individual lives. If all debts have to be paid and all crimes expiated within the brief period of a single life on earth, then many people will continue to feel that justice calls for the punishment of criminals. Private revenge, too, getting your own back, may seem justified. But if we suppose that every person has eventually to pay all his debts and will indeed choose to do so, we shall no longer wish to punish him ourselves.*

How, then, should a judge deal with offenders? How is he to distinguish between those who may seek the penalty of prison and those who will resent any punishment and be hardened by it? A judge is well qualified to conduct a fair trial, but he is usually not well qualified to decide on the right sentence for an individual. This is a task not for the legal but for the spiritual sphere. An offender might come before a sentencing board whose members, chosen for discernment, experience of human nature and common sense, would have to balance two often conflicting demands—what would be best for the offender and what the protection of society requires. If the offender goes to prison he should be *offered* some form of advisory treatment: it could embrace psychiatry, education and training in some skill. The Lewis argument is valid against any compulsory treatment, but not, I think, against treatment that would enlist the offender's voluntary co-operation, and would be

* The working out of karmic justice may be mitigated in relations between persons if one person wishes and is allowed to bear some of another's burden. On the meaning of the Christian 'forgiveness of sins', see Rudolf Steiner's lectures, *Christ and the Human Soul* (Norrköping, July, 1914); see also many other lectures on various aspects of karma.


given not by experimentally-minded scientists but by men and women qualified both to provide it and to regard the offender as a human being in need of aid and perhaps of healing.

This would be a small step towards an idea that I can only vaguely adumbrate—the idea of a *healing society*. In the past the powers of the State were concerned largely with coercion, discipline and convenience. Prison sentences were a convenient way of putting criminals out of sight and mind. The workhouse did the same for the aged poor, and lunatic asylums the same for the mentally afflicted. Respectable society was protected from disagreeable impressions by the shut-off existence of these repositories for outcasts. Since then there have been valuable reforms and improvements in these fields, but I think we should aim at ensuring that no-one is ever cast out from community concern.

In society today there are many influences which make for ill-health, physical, mental and spiritual—pollution, stress, overcrowding, noise, boredom with work, and the feeling that life is a tedious brief tale, signifying nothing. Against these influences we could try to find ways, both through attitudes and through institutions, of bringing healing influences to bear on sufferers—indeed on everyone, for we are all lacking in health of some kind—and with a resolve that no persons would be excluded or forgotten, whether they were deviants and misfits in confinement or existing in backwaters of loneliness on their own.


This may be a dream of the future, a rather distant future, perhaps. It all depends on the prevailing picture of man: on whether he is regarded and treated as a piece of animate machinery, destined sooner or later for the scrapheap—so why not sooner if he breaks down?—or as a spiritual being with a history and a future not confined to his present life on earth. How we behave towards one another, how we educate children, how we treat the misfits and the handicapped, how we look on old age—all this is bound to be influenced, in some obvious and many subtle ways, by our picture of man.

What sort of picture we have will influence also our understanding of equality. People with no belief in the spiritual part of man may wish and work for more equality and less privilege in society: they will have an ideal of fairness, a wish to give everyone a fair chance. But can this attitude come to terms with the harsh and glaring facts of human inequalities? Can it be effective in resisting the de-




17 R
Movement
Feeling
Character

red
yellow
green



18 S
Movement
Feeling
Character

grey
brown
black



19 T
Movement
Feeling
Character

orange
red
green

humanising tendencies which always aim (or claim to aim) at making society more efficient? For the policy implicit in these tendencies (whether they come from the extreme Left or the extreme Right) would be to organise rewards and incentives so as to bring the ablest people to the top and to require the less intelligent to take and stick to the humblest necessary jobs, without much striving assiduously to keep alive the useless mouths, the morons and the senile.

Against these tendencies a liberally-minded but irreligious humanist can argue that it is in some way better to aim at kindness towards inequalities, and where necessary to subordinate efficiency to this aim. But exactly why it would be better may not be entirely easy for him to explain. In some ways it would be better for the majority if not too many resources were devoted to caring for the handicapped, and it might even seem kinder not to encourage seriously deficient infants or senile old people to go on living.

Hence I think that in order to maintain an absolute and logical opposition to the dehumanising tendencies in society we have to affirm that value-differences between human beings cannot be determined by any human measuring-scale. And this is to take that spiritual view of equality to which I referred at the beginning of this article.

Are any of these reflections at all relevant to the contemporary scene? It will be a long time before a spiritual view of equality gains wide influence, and much longer, probably, before anything like a Threefold Social Order emerges anywhere in the world. But in thinking about some of the problems and conflicts in society to-day it can be helpful to disentangle liberty, equality and fraternity, and to indicate how each would find its right place and mode of expression in a Threefold society, the only setting in which they appear to me to make harmonious sense.

The future time-horizon of the world is clouded with threatening storms; if the world comes through them it will have changed, unpredictably. All we can do, in thinking or writing about the Threefold Social Order to-day, is to sow some seeds, and leave them to wait beyond our time for harvest.



SPEECH IN THE FAMILY

ADAM BITTLESTON

I

Watchfulness over Speech

WHEN a human being takes up his own spiritual development as a task, and seeks guidance about this among those who have spoken or written in a way that he can recognise as useful to him, he is likely to find before long that he is asked to attend much more watchfully than he has done in the past to the way in which he himself speaks. Quite early in his work as a spiritual teacher Rudolf Steiner gave to some of his pupils a summing-up of the Eight-fold Path, describing Right Speech in this way:

"Only what has sense and meaning should come from the lips of one striving for higher development. All talking for the sake of talking—to kill time—is in this sense harmful.

"The usual kind of conversation, a disjointed medley of remarks, should be avoided. This does not mean shutting oneself off from intercourse with one's fellows; it is precisely then that talk should gradually be led to significance. One adopts a thoughtful attitude to every speech and answer, taking all aspects into account. Never talk without cause—be gladly silent. One tries not to talk too much or too little. First listen quietly; then reflect on what has been said." (*Guidance in Esoteric Training*, p.21).

There are similar passages in *Knowledge of the Higher Worlds* and in the lecture-cycle on *The Gospel of St. Luke*. When such advice about Right Speech is taken seriously, every individual comes up against the fact that he is constantly in situations which have a strong influence on his manner of speaking; a particular tone, vocabulary, and kind of content are generally *expected* of him, in every group in which he participates. For the most part, he conforms to these expectations, and hardly notices any limitation of his freedom. When he watches his own words as a conscious task,

he will generally try to keep them still more carefully within the limit of what can be found comprehensible and acceptable among his hearers. But he may find that a conflict is developing between what he himself can find true, and what is acceptable to others round him. There may be groups of people, among whom he has to be, whose whole way of speaking—or certain elements in it—he finds increasingly unacceptable to *him*. This happens very often, and sometimes very tragically, to young people and even to children.

In Buddhist teaching, four great dangers to right speech are distinguished—untruthfulness, slanderousness, the impulse to wound and triviality. Normally, every human group possesses some barriers against these, and some habitual inclinations towards them. A group may for example constantly slander another group, while being very sensitive to any slander by its own members of each other. A pupil of spiritual teaching faces the problem—what shall I do about a prevailing untruth, or a prevailing slander, in this group to which I belong? And how shall I change, where a certain mood or content of speech, which I no longer regard as right, has come to be expected of me?

Always, for those on a spiritual path, family relationships have presented some of the deepest problems. At some moments of his life, a man may feel that he succeeds least of all in overcoming the four dangers when he is in his own family. In extreme situations, he may feel himself caught in an unbreakable net of untruths and mutual insult. And yet a family can also be a place where conversations come about that sustain human beings all through their lives; and it is nearly always the place in which speech itself is learnt, and with it far more than we ever succeed in valuing enough.

Through conception and birth, we enter a family, bringing with us qualities and purposes which can only gradually show themselves. We have lived among spiritual beings, relating ourselves to them—now we find a mother and other human beings, to whom we listen, at whom we begin to look. Deeply sleeping, through a great forgetting, we have entered a new world; but we are still the beings that we were before, and have expectations and anxieties, like anyone on earth who has made a considerable journey and intends to stay for a time. The person who can do most at the beginning to fulfil the expectations and alleviate the anxieties is generally the mother. In the West, she has not regarded it from this point of view, for many centuries; and yet she has fulfilled this

task, in response to the child's evident needs, and out of the riches of her heart.

One of the last great teachers of the West, who could speak directly and openly about our immortality *back* before birth, was Plato; then in general two thousand years of silence fell. And when Plato wrote about the great virtues of a human society, he was describing what each one of us brings through birth as a heritage from the past, and which in some way our mothers encounter in us, and can help to bring to a new flowering—the qualities of wisdom, courage, temperance and justice.* Of course, human souls have these qualities, and show them, in very different ways; but in every child they can be found, and sometimes most strikingly where we may believe them to be absent—in the flash of courage in a very timid child, or the wisdom in some saying or action by a child regarded as ineducable. The mother herself, at the moment when she knows and accepts that she will have a child, stands at varying stages in her own development of these qualities; and almost at once the need to take this in hand, more intensely and consciously, becomes in some way evident to her.

When a child is born, his mother is not new to him. He has seen his parents from the spiritual world; and in particular he looks down, not long before his entry into earthly life, from the world where he then dwells, at his future mother. Rudolf Steiner described this in a lecture at Dornach on February 2, 1915; and he said that at this time the one approaching birth is able to see the father, through what the mother bears in her soul as picture of him. This is what happens *generally*; there can be exceptions. At the time of conception, the mother is influenced by the spiritual forces of the sun, the father by earth-forces; the fact of conception is a reflection of the relationship between sun and earth.

A great deal of light is thrown by this description on the whole relationship of child and parents. Perhaps it can be said like this: the child expects of the mother the warmth and restoring power of the sun, and of the father guidance into the conditions of earthly existence, the challenge to individuality.

The way into incarnation itself demands courage; the soul has to encounter those leaving earthly life, often bearing signs of the darkening they have suffered. It enters a world where bodies are heavy, where there is a physical darkness and pain. (Children can

* See *Golden Blade*, 1969. *The Great Virtues* by Rudolf Steiner.

sometimes feel deeply the difference between artificial light, as a kind of darkness, and daylight). The reassurance of the mother supports and confirms the resolve to incarnate; a reassurance conveyed by the giving of milk, by contact, and by the sound of her voice.

This is a field of understanding where in our time spiritual knowledge on the one hand, and psychology and sociology on the other, often come very close. A remarkable book was published in 1971 in Stuttgart, *Die vorgeburtliche Entstehung der Sprache als anthropologisches Problem* (The pre-natal origin of language as anthropological problem) by Günter Clauser. Here the results of an enormous variety of studies in embryology and child development are brought together. Clauser's central theme is that the child in the womb already *listens*, above all to the mother's heart-beat, and in doing so prepares himself for speech. His argument is very complex and far-reaching, and only a specialist could hope to do justice to it; but again and again it can be seen how connections described by Rudolf Steiner sixty years or so ago are now very much nearer to recognition. Clauser himself feels that in what he is saying about the heart, larynx and tongue he is rediscovering elements of ancient Egyptian wisdom.

Listening to the heart! Each mother herself has built her heart and lungs, insofar as they are healthy, with the courage developed in her last incarnation on earth, and carried through her existence in the spiritual world. And what her heart says during pregnancy, and her voice, coming from the heart, says to the child during the first months after birth, are the encouragement most deeply needed.

II

"Confirming"

It is not only for the young child that speech has the power to encourage, as one of its essential qualities. Martin Buber wrote about this in a way that should be more widely known:

"In human society, at all its levels, persons confirm one another in a practical way, in their personal qualities and capacities, and a society may be termed human in the measure to which its members confirm one another. The basis of man's life with man is twofold, and it is one—the wish of every man to be confirmed as what he is,

even as what he can become, by men; and the innate capacity in man to confirm his fellow-man in this way. That this capacity lies so immeasurably fallow constitutes the real weakness and questionableness of the human race; actual humanity exists only when this capacity unfolds. On the other hand, of course, an empty claim for confirmation, without devotion for being and becoming, again and again mars the truth of life between man and man.

"Men need, and it is granted to them, to confirm one another in their individual being by means of genuine meetings; but beyond this they need, and it is granted to them, to see the truth, which the soul gains by its struggle, light up to the others, the brothers, in a different way, and even so be confirmed."*

In a family, every member needs confirmation by the others. Of course this is not only given by speech, and if by speech not usually in a direct, explicit way. It lives quite generally in the tone and quality of speech, even among adults. But it is not quite easy to give. Buber says that this capacity lies "immeasurably fallow"; Laing, after quoting him, indicates how often in a family the necessary confirmation is lacking, or done wrong. A mother can for example consistently praise a daughter for qualities the daughter feels she neither has, or wants to have. What is meant as encouragement can be unconvincing or irritating. And often members of a family can come into relationships where they feel themselves powerless to convey any warmth to each other, because a sense of grievance or difference has become so strong.

But the greatest hindrance to confirmation of one another is perhaps one of the enemies of speech generally, indicated in Buddhist teaching: triviality. This is not a matter of subject, but attitude of mind. Small actions—the handing of a cup of tea, the boiling of an egg, the opening of a door—need not and should not be trivial; always they touch human relationships in some way, and what is achieved or not achieved between human beings is significant for the whole universe. Triviality is to leave out the essentials, or mistake them. It springs from a mood that permeates our whole civilisation, though it is very seldom recognised; fear of the living, creative spiritual world.

The child comes from this world and needs courage for the earth; the grown human being, particularly after the age of thirty-five,

* Martin Buber, *Distance and Relation* (1957) *Psychiatry*, 20; quoted by R. D. Laing, *The Self and Others* (London, 1961).

has generally made his home on earth, and has allowed himself, without noticing it, to absorb the dragon-breath of fear, estranging him from the spirit. It is a fear not only of the spiritual world in general, but of the spiritual beings working in all that we meet—the individuality of another person, the elemental beings in nature, the powers that work in destiny. We wrap ourselves in a veil of triviality, not to see or be seen.

The child takes the world seriously. Real humour is a way of freeing ourselves from mistakes about the essentials; and the child needs it too. But in a superficial, conventionalised atmosphere of speech, avoiding real issues or deep feeling, no-one is really confirmed in his being. No single member of a family can by himself redeem the situation, where such triviality has taken hold—and it is there in some degree, almost everywhere. But each can for himself try to develop a new courage, born among the difficulties of *this* incarnation—and believe of the others, that they are trying to do the same.

III

Wisdom and Slander

In recent years John and Elizabeth Newson, joint directors of the Child Development Research Unit at Nottingham University, have studied the relationship of mother and child in a wide range of Nottingham families. Their book *Four Years Old in an Urban Community* (1968; 1970 as *Pelican*) is based on long relaxed interviews by a research team, all of them married women with young children of their own, not representing any policy in child care, with 700 Nottingham mothers of four-year-old children, as varied as possible in occupation and income of the parents. Many things in this study are very revealing about the life of speech in the family. The Newsons show how conscious parents often are of the confirming, encouraging role of speech. Particularly at bedtime, before the child is left alone (something which does not happen in all families) there are often rituals which must be precisely carried out, and have a very comforting effect; actions and words which the mother may find difficult to explain, though she performs them willingly.

"Several of these sequences include a form of words which is invariably used, either by mother or child, alone or in dialogue,

and we have many examples of phrases which seem to have an almost magical significance for the child." (Pelican ed. p. 304).

Examples given:

" . . . The most important thing is that she asks for the sun and moon, which means two pieces of apple, one circle-shaped and one crescent-shaped. I'm not sure how that started, but it stuck. . . "

Another:

" . . . You have to clap your hands and say 'The Roaring Twenties!'—and he takes a dive into the air and you have to catch him. And you have to do that *every* night—I don't know why! "

A more immediately understandable, but very characteristic example:

" As I come down the stairs, I always say 'Night-night, God bless, see you in the morning' and you know, if I don't, if I just say 'Night-night' Barry will shout down 'Mummy, you didn't say it properly,' and cry and cry."

By the age of four the child has acquired an astonishing mastery over speech, which makes him often a conversationalist very much valued by the Nottingham mother. In general, mothers have a great opportunity, before the child disappears to school for much of the day, for an encounter which may have effects for the rest of both their lives. When it is possible to frame full sentences, questions begin. And with these the child is attempting to recover its heritage of wisdom. The questions are often very surprising to the parents, who are out of their depth very soon. A Nottingham mother, who very much enjoyed conversation with her daughter, nevertheless gets irritated when the questions go on:

" . . . I don't mind *sensible* questions. But sometimes it's 'Where does so-and-so come from?' and then it goes on from there, until it gets ridiculous, and I just can't . . . you know . . . Well, she wants to know 'Where does the bath water go?' Well, I can get it to the sea, then she wants to know where it goes from *there*! She'll start getting a bit ridiculous with it, and that is where we disagree."

The Newsons point out that questions often are concerned with the time before the child was born, perhaps when the mother herself was a child—"Where was I?"—and describe parents' difficulties about this. Sometimes the child will make up answers for himself, and test the parental response.

Were a child's questions really to be answered, extraordinary things would happen. If, for example, one of the parents has much detailed knowledge on a particular subject, and is present, willing to answer and able to form his answers suitably, at the moment when relevant questions come—conditions that are not often fulfilled—a fantastically swift development is possible. Sometimes destiny provides such situations; it would not always be good to bring them about, even if we could. But most parents, looking back, may be able to see that they could have done more, and better; above all, if they had known, and remembered, that their child brought with him potential wisdom that might well be much greater than their own. So often, we all give our children answers that are no answers. A father may answer the question "What is a rainbow?" with something like "It's simply an optical illusion—your teacher will explain when you are older." With the best of goodwill, a mother may be driven to many "I don't know's". The child bears in him the feeling: here there is something important to be known. And gradually another feeling joins it: "but no one round me knows, or if they do they will not tell." In his autobiography, Rudolf Steiner describes how he had as a small child already to decide not to ask questions.

Parents can help very much, if they understand that children, particularly in the early years, are always looking for *doers*. The bath-water, when it gets to the sea, is glad to be out of the pipe, and to join the waves and fishes in their dance. . . Of course, the parent must believe what he is saying; there really are doers in what we call 'things'. The study of Anthroposophical spiritual knowledge can be an enormous help, if it leads us to feel in all that is visible the activity and experience of spiritual beings—their bold or gentle courage in the airs, their sensitivity in the waters of the world, their thoughts and purposes everywhere. The child comes from a world of beings, without things, and takes some time to adapt to thingness; the adult smiles at this, and does not realise that the child is gradually succumbing to the illusion of which he is totally a victim; the illusion, proceeding from the beings Rudolf Steiner calls "ahrimanic", that matter *is*.

Language originates in the expression of what beings do, and have done to them. In the Dornach lecture of April 13, 1923, Rudolf Steiner describes the primeval language of mankind as a "Will" language; speech expressed above all relationships of will between

man and what surrounded him; he was endangered, or protected, or stirred to all kinds of action. What we would think of as very distinct, might here be present in a single word; the divine being who inspires an action, the actor, the action, the object of the action—perhaps for instance what we would have to say in a sentence like this: "The divine being blesses through me the ground on which we stand, that we may build on it".

If we trace back the origins of words, including the most everyday and the most abstract, we can generally reach some quite concrete action (though there may be strong arguments and counter-arguments on the way). Innumerable words, for example, go back to forms of "stand" and "sit". But such actions were not just trivialities; to be able either to stand or to sit, man had to become the vessel of great spiritual powers—the ones who really knew how to stand and walk, or sit in judgement. Hearing the word "grave" in the sense "burial-place" we think of what it is, with the sadness and solemnity of death; but the word comes from the relationship of will between man and the earth, when a hollow is *dug*. When an infant "babbles", during the first year of life, the sounds are simple activities of will, in the enjoyment of movement. It has been shown that in this babbling all the sounds of human speech can occur, over a far wider range than in the 'mother tongue' the child hears and will speak; there is something universal in it. After the times of babbling there can be a pause, and then, usually in the first months of the second year, *names* are spoken. But these names have very much the character of the primeval will-language; they are of people and things as doers, related immediately to the child's needs and experiences. Dr. Karl König describes how about the thirteenth or fourteenth month the syllable "Miie" (for the German word "Milch") can mean "I want milk" or "I don't want milk" or "Give me the milk" or "Oh, how good the milk is" or "the milk-bottle" or "Mother, who brings the milk" or even "the clouds" which are sometimes as white as milk. A boy at this age, looking for the first time at the open sea, used one of the words he had recently learned, "Door!"

It makes a great difference if at this stage the mother and those round the child can understand the common activity seen by the child in apparently diverse things, and do not correct it in a pedantic way, or treat it as ridiculous. The words the mother herself speaks are as great and precious to the child as her own milk was earlier;

and she can feel herself and the child as active participants in the development of their particular language, as part of the language of humanity.

What is this particular speech? Before the child was born, he lived with the great company of the angels, who prepared him to be a thinking being on earth, as he shared in the light which weaves among them. And he looked up to their leaders, the Archangels, drawing into himself from them what prepared him to be able to speak. Living in an earthly body, he shares in the whole atmosphere of speaking and hearing around the earth, and meets again the field of activity of the archangels. To one of them, on this path of descent between sun and earth, he stood for a time specially near, the being who has worked upon that part of the one all-embracing language of mankind which will be the part he makes first his own.

Though very few people have as yet any consciousness of this, it is a task of parents and teachers, and others near to children, to lead them towards a new relationship to the Archangels, which should come about for them by adolescence; the ability to meet the Archangels during sleep. This depends on the child finding a true idealism expressed in the language he hears around him.

If the mother speaks English, she has a particular difficulty. She is really speaking two languages all the time, which have not completely united. Though she may be very little aware of it, there is always a shade of difference in feeling between words of Teutonic or Latin origin; if ideals are expressed in words from Latin sources, they tend to be remote, while original English words may feel ordinary, uninspiring. There is a gap, through which Ahriman, the denier of the reality of ideals, can enter. The original English words have to be raised, the Latin words blessed, that the wisdom hidden in both may be released.

The great enemy of wisdom in speech is the belittlement of people and things—what has earlier been called "slander". This is of very wide application; Nature can be slandered, if some animal is called "disgusting" or "useless", or even if we speak of "horrible weather". The whole attitude to which the useful word "Reductionism" has been applied—"this is only a conditioned reflex," "this is only a biological mechanism", "colours are only differences in wave-length"—is a belittlement of the world in this sense. In the family we probably begin with contemptuous remarks about individuals or groups. Mothers often have a strong feeling that

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they ought not to do this in front of small children, but it is very difficult to avoid. Perhaps nothing is so easily imitated as contempt.

Criticism of anything always implies an ideal. "He is a bad husband" implies some picture of what a husband should be. Ahriman's trick runs something like this: the failure of someone to live up to an ideal is shown, and two consequences are drawn (a) that no one lives up to ideals and (b) all ideals are unrealistic and in fact illusions. The damaging effect of human failure is retained while denying the validity of the standard by which it is failure.

Among themselves, children often express boundless contempt in many directions. In the midst of this, children in whom wisdom is pressing towards realisation may feel very much alone. And some children see a dark figure accompanying them at times, something resembling Faust's Mephistopheles; the mocker, the accuser.

Ahriman's trick has power because ideals so often come from Lucifer and are as unrealistic as he suggests. Endless damage is done in families by erecting an impossible image of the perfect mother, father, son, daughter and so on, and measuring the member of the family concerned by this standard. What lives in a family as religious life, for example in prayers before sleeping, should not be Luciferic in character, and yet contain real ideals. (The Newsons found that at least 12% of the children they asked about had prayers before sleeping). The "Prayers for Mothers and Children" by Rudolf Steiner were collected after his death, and were for the most part given by him at different times to particular families, or particular children. In these prayers the Divine is spoken of as revealed through earthly people, through animals and plants and stones, through sun and stars:

"... When I see and know God
In my father and mother
In all loving people . . ."

It may be said that if parents abstain from criticism of others before their children, then they are really fostering a dangerous illusion—that all human beings are good and reliable and wise. But the recognition of evil, and of human limitations generally, need not be contemptuous or bitter. Just as in grasping a chess problem we must come to the point when we know why every piece on the board is where it is, we begin to have real understanding for a person when we feel in him the mysterious interdependence of capacities and limitations, of good qualities, weaknesses and perhaps even

destructive impulses, as they really are. True old fairy stories, and the great classics for children, are extremely realistic about evil and folly (consider from this point of view George Macdonald, E. Nesbit, C. S. Lewis . . .) but know that the villain and the fool have their necessary places, in us and around us.

Children gain very much, if they can see that their parents, and other older people with whom they have much to do, genuinely believe that goodness and capability predominate among human beings—and that the houses they live in, the food they eat, the trains and buses and cars they travel in, the pipes bringing and taking away water, the electric wiring, everything indeed that they use, bear witness to conscientious human work, by people they can come to know and understand.

IV

Temperance and Truth

When a small group of people live together and see each other fairly regularly over a considerable period of time, they deeply influence each other's ethereal bodies, or life-bodies—in which we carry our memories, habits and temperament. Such groups develop something like an inclusive life-body, more or less strongly, in which all participate—and this applies particularly to the family. This shared ethereal body shows itself for instance in common ways of behaviour, often little realised by those concerned unless they encounter another group with strongly contrasting habits.

An ethereal body is tough but not static—always changing, but not easily changed. (A simple example is "giving up smoking"; one may well find that slow or sudden alterations in the pattern of one's habit *happen*, but it is hard work achieving them intentionally). It is a characteristic of family life-organisms that they limit and modify all extremes of temperament and behaviour. The extreme melancholic or choleric obviously make themselves impossible (though there are families which think it funny to goad small children into wild fury). But the family also imposes a certain consistency on the very sanguine, and stirs the phlegmatic into unusual response. And where the family itself tends to share a temperament—where everyone, for example, tends in some respect to be very sanguine—life itself brings evident corrections.

In the immortal being of the child there is a heritage of temperance. The word has become too narrow and too dull; Shakespeare could still use it powerfully:

"Shall I compare thee to a summer's day?

Thou art more lovely and more temperate . . ."

It should be thought of as a quality that is worthy to accompany wisdom and courage—as it did for instance in Joan of Arc or Robert Bruce; not a timid quality, but strong enough to win back human dignity threatened by every extreme, and capable of receiving with restraint every good thing life brings.

Temperance, in this wide sense, is built in to the whole structure and character of human speech; and this has been so since primeval times—since what is referred to in anthroposophical terminology as Atlantis. A cry of distress, a roar of anger, are tempered by being expressed in words. Mothers long for the moment when the baby will begin to *explain*, and understand her explanation—perhaps to find that the explaining process is just as arduous and takes quite as much time as what went before. All through life words help to quieten tempests, in the voices of those who are themselves temperate.

Even stronger in this than speech is silence, which is part of speech. An angry man may first feel—then find bitter words in his mind—then write a letter—then destroy the letter unsent. At every stage he grows calmer, more willing to see another aspect of what has happened. Not to speak, when one is strongly tempted to speak—this has always been a spiritual exercise in occult training—expressed with incomparable vividness and humour in "The Magic Flute". Not to speak when one knows—or nearly knows—that one is right; when one has thought of the perfect riposte; when . . . Every day provides plenty of occasions.

If parents and older people can really obey the injunction "be gladly silent" (in the sense in which it is meant) children are enormously helped in their development of genuine temperance. Often in families something happens with speech like the establishment of territories by animals and birds. Each member seizes as much speech-time as he can successfully defend. (I was in touch once with a family which appeared to solve the difficulty by all talking all the time, like a string quintet). A withdrawal in exhaustion or resignation may not be helpful at all. But the attempt to check one's craving to impart information, or for saying what one feels because

one feels it, or for winning arguments, can have a very healing effect. Those who are younger have a great longing to hear from the older what they have really experienced; but they meet bristling hedges of words. Just those things we who are old most easily say, the well-worn reminiscences and funny stories, may be what others need least to hear.

And in the end it is a matter of truth. What was once said truly, in a particular situation, may not be true again. Only the very greatest things can be true when much repeated, and with these too we have to wait for their right time and setting. In holy writings we have to listen to what is *not* said; the infinite silences of the Buddha, the creative mutual silences of the four Gospels.

Behind every untruth there is some kind of intemperance; perhaps an unnecessary assertiveness, perhaps an unnecessary fear. Each member of a family, if he has passed the earliest years of childhood, has much that is private to him, and on which he may fear intrusion; he may lay false trails to protect it. What seems boastfulness or hardness may also be some kind of defence. In the mood of the shared soul of the family *both* a willingness to communicate and a willingness to respect privacy are needed—and are often to be found. But this delicate balance can be seriously disturbed by influences that falsify human communication.

In our time alcohol has become entirely harmful. It works in such a way that the innermost, most essential qualities of the human being—conscience, clear judgement, genuine affection—are attacked first; self-knowledge vanishes long before the obvious signs of unsteadiness and imperfect speech appear. However balanced and discriminating a man may be—he is less so, after taking alcohol, and less able to observe any such change. A shade of untruthfulness always creeps in, where alcohol is drunk; and the effects on communication in the family are devastating.

An influence that puts the family to a difficult test in our time is television. It brings the world into the family; and seems to provide much-needed friendly contacts with all sorts of people. If the television were suddenly taken away, many families would feel themselves appallingly bereaved and isolated. And yet the world, seen through the telly, is falsified; and even the warmest apparent contact with a television personality is partly—apparent. Parents here have a task that calls for the most watchful temperance. Entire absence of television would at some stages of their children's lives

cut them off from their peers; too much at any stage can lame creativity and blur all standards. We need a power of hearing that distinguishes strongly between a reality and the reproduction of it. What works to ennoble the family ether-body is real art, above all something made by its own members—music in a group, a temporary wall-painting, the reading of poems. The art of the past, with all its greatness, is not so effective unless fresh discoveries are made about it.

All this has its effect on the quickening of the sense for truth, and the development of real temperance in the relationships of life. It can be clearly seen that those who are young today bring with them a strong and great heritage—much will depend on how it is met.

V

Justice and the Power to Wound

An experienced teacher from California said recently that of the four Platonic virtues he was most conscious, in those now in the late teens or early twenties, of the sense of justice. There is not only an immediate, very disturbing sense of the injustice in the world, but a practical effort to redress the effects of the world's injustice among themselves, for instance in matters of wealth and race.

All through human history, the encounter with problems of justice has begun already in early childhood, among the family. Parents today are very conscious of the obligation to be fair among their children, if they have more than one. Not often would a mother speak as one did to the Newsons' interviewer, of her girl aged four and boy aged three:

(p. 515)

"Well, she's really had her nose shoved out, you know, we've not had an awful lot to do with one another since Bobby came along; she was only a year old, you see, and with him being a *boy*, you know, —the only boy! She's been more or less the outcast, you know—he's had it all. It's changing a *little* bit now, since I've noticed she's jealous, she's been crying a lot; but she really has been the odd one out, the outcast of the family."

And yet a mother may find that she has stubborn differences of feeling about her children, and that with all her efforts she cannot conceal this from them entirely; even though she knows that a

life-long sense of deprivation may follow, for one or more of them. It may have to be the father who helps to restore the balance, even quite early.

Deeply unconscious in him, and yet strongly at work, the child carries a sense of the eternal Father-Spirit, Giver to every being of its place in space and time. He looks to older people, and especially to his own earthly father, to be in some way representatives of this Spirit. A whole great people has always been able to look at their forefather Abraham in this way. And the particular earthly father and mother necessarily fail to fulfil this expectation, though it revives again and again—and what they *can* give, is received with the deepest gratitude. Among themselves, or in their relations with other children with whom they play and fight, difficulties come up, in which they may call for the arbitration of father or mother. Sometimes great efforts will be made to talk it out; sometimes they will be told "Settle it yourselves"; but in both cases the whole bearing of their parents towards problems of justice will have a far-reaching effect. And much will depend on the ability of adults and children to put the difficulties and the answers into effective words. This is perhaps the ultimate task of human speech—to give selfless judgement. It is significant that when the usurpers and would-be murderers in "The Tempest" have at last to hear the words of judgement (including Prospero's own brother), it is not Prospero himself, but Ariel, who speaks to them:

"You are three men of sin, whom destiny—

That hath to instrument this lower world

And what is in't—the never-surfeited sea

Hath caused to belch up you, and on this island

Where man doth not inhabit, you 'mongst men

Being most unfit to live."

Where words of judgement are not spoken selflessly, they become wounding. Again and again, behind bitter and wounding words of every kind, a frustrated, disappointed sense of justice can be found. When Hamlet "speaks daggers" to his mother, it is with the conviction that the ultimate monstrous injustice has been done to his father with her consent—and with *no* conviction that God or man can put right what has happened.

In that eternal core of our being, which carries wisdom and courage and temperance from life to life, there lives the will, ourselves to be just. And in the pain of having suffered injustice—particularly

from a father or a mother—there is present the tragic anxiety: “Shall I, in my everyday life, be able to do any better—shall I not be an unjust man, denying my innermost spirit?”

Everywhere, when acts of terrible violence happen, often injuring human beings quite indiscriminately, there are behind them many who regard themselves as representatives of unjustly treated nations or groups—and who think that what they are doing is thereby justified. These events are a severe test for humanity; not to be enraged, so that further acts of violence follow in an inexorable sequence, but to have a patient faith in the potential goodness of *every* nation and group.

In miniature, the same thing happens in families. Someone who is attempting a spiritual path may read the words from Mabel Collins’ “Light on the Path”:

“Before the voice can speak in the presence of the Masters, it must have lost the power to wound.”

And such a pupil of a spiritual path may say to himself: “In my life generally, I might indeed succeed in wounding no one by my words—but could I ever achieve this in all the tensions of my family, small and great?” The mother who told the Newsoms’ interviewer “I start off speaking kindly to them; but I end up shouting like a maniac” spoke for many.

A sentence from Rudolf Steiner’s commentary on “Light on the Path” shows the direction in which one can find hope. “As long as you impress your wish on a single thing without the wish having been born from the thing itself, you are wounding it.” Words of judgement are wounding, and therefore not helpful, when the speaker has let his own wishes play too great a part. In him, Lucifer, Lord of Wishes, has not yet looked sufficiently upon the Christ.

In the ordinary practice of human justice, we start with the conception of equality; then we differentiate, according to the particular needs and deserving of individuals; and then we try to modify the differentiation, back in the direction of equality. This process goes on constantly in families; and it reflects in miniature great cosmic events. In St. John’s Gospel can be found the greatest expression of the common beginning of men in the Word, and of their common goal; and on the way, of their great diversity, as individuals to whom Christ speaks in the words needed by each, leading them back towards universal tasks.

Our word today can only develop further, if we begin to feel and to fulfil what Rudolf Steiner has described; that we are to work with the Archangels to consecrate language afresh, through true imaginative understanding of the Father, the Son, and the Healing Spirit.

REVIEWS

SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT

Guidance in Esoteric Training by Rudolf Steiner. (Rudolf Steiner Press, £1.30).

WHEN we approach a book by Rudolf Steiner, it is good if we remember to which of three categories it belongs. It may be a book that he himself wrote for publication. It may be a series of lectures, given by himself as a whole, but not revised by him. Or it may be a collection, made by others, of what he said or wrote at different times, put together for some reason—where it may not be possible to be sure that the arrangement, or even the publication, would have had his approval. Books of this third kind may contain material for which we are exceedingly grateful; but we should approach them with a specially wakeful and critical attention, always remembering the circumstances of their origin.

Guidance in Esoteric Training is largely based on notes from instructions given by Rudolf Steiner in the Esoteric School led by him between 1904 and 1914, which Frau Marie Steiner decided to publish in 1947. They are not a complete course of instruction, but a selection; ranging over ten years, they everywhere presuppose a context which is for the most part inaccessible. While *Knowledge of the Higher Worlds*, though originally written in parts, was welded by Rudolf Steiner himself into a magnificent whole, and given by him for the use of future generations—we have here parts of the instruction given by him to particular small groups of people, instruction of which we cannot know whether he would have regarded it as suitable for other people and other times.

But as long as this is remembered, we can be deeply grateful to have access to these things. Here is to be found the address given by Rudolf Steiner on the stormy evening of 20th September, 1913, on the hillside of Dornach, when the Foundation Stone of the first Goetheanum was laid. This address contains the macrocosmic Lord's Prayer, of which Rudolf Steiner spoke again in lectures on the Fifth Gospel; and it is of great significance, as Dr. Zeylmans van Emmichoven has pointed out, to think of this in connection with the Foundation Stone Meditation of Christmas, 1923, and the rhythms given as belonging to it.

These rhythms were connected by Dr. Zeylmans, in his book on the Foundation Stone Meditation, with the days of the week on which they were originally spoken. It can be very rewarding to compare them with what is given in this book as meditations or exercises for the days of the week.

Among the instructions in this book is one which includes breathing exercises to be done in the course of a particular meditation. This is

something very rare indeed, in all that Rudolf Steiner has to say about spiritual development. Here perhaps more than anywhere else we should recall that this was given at a particular moment, for specific people; and we can compare what is said in a lecture given on March 31st, 1910, in Vienna, in the course *Macrocosm and Microcosm* (published in English by the Rudolf Steiner Press in 1968). Those interested in this problem should read the passage as a whole, but perhaps a few sentences may be quoted here.

"If exercises that may be undertaken include any that have to do with regulating the breathing process, the utmost caution must be applied to such exercises and the teacher must feel the greatest possible sense of responsibility. . . . It may be said quite objectively that all the instructions given so lightheartedly nowadays about this or that mode of breathing really make the impression of children playing with fire. . . . Once it is realised that everything physical has a spiritual foundation it will also be known that any modification of the breathing belongs to the sublimest of revelations of the spiritual in the physical; it should be associated with a mood of the soul that is akin to prayer, where knowledge becomes prayer. . . ."

A.B.

What Coleridge Thought by Owen Barfield (Oxford University Press, £3.70).

As I read this book, I began to feel, increasingly, that the title should have been in the present tense. For although Barfield's aim is to make his writing transparent, so to speak, for the thought of a man who died well over a century ago, the result is that Coleridge seems to be speaking with almost uncanny immediacy to us now, in the second half of the twentieth century.

The central question to which he speaks is not so much a defined issue as a diffuse experience which pervades much current thought and feeling in educated Western society, and which is perhaps most simply summed up in the over-used word "alienation". The word points to a deep and painful awareness of *separateness*, especially in social life, and has brought with it a corresponding search for something expressed by an equally over-used word, namely "community".

It has now begun to dawn on a good many people that this experience may have to do with the fact that our scientific culture has been systematically preaching and practising "separateness" for several centuries. If we set out to treat nature "objectively", as an assemblage of impersonal things, while regarding our personal thoughts and feelings as "subjective" and not quite real, we should not be surprised to find ourselves becoming alienated from nature, from each other and from our own selves as well. The interest in other modes of consciousness—dreams, drug experience, etc.—is just one symptom of the search for ways to overcome the isolation of the "onlooker" consciousness which is now becoming intolerable.

Steiner threw a flood of light on this problem with his accounts of the evolution of human consciousness. Even in present-day dream, the dichotomy of subject and object which is now so much part of our normal awakeness, is often less acute. We swim in our dream experiences rather than behold them objectively. This points back to older, more participative forms of consciousness, out of which, as Steiner describes, our present sharply dualistic experience has emerged.

A great deal depends on whether we begin to understand this dualism as the outcome of an evolution (and as capable of resolution by further evolution), or whether we conclude, as did Kant, that it is a fundamental feature of the universe, so that we are doomed to be separate for ever, as knowers, from the realities (the "things in themselves") of the surrounding world which we seek to know.

If, on the other hand, we can recognise the dualism of experience as the outcome of an evolution, we can learn to understand it, not as a dichotomy, but as a *polarity*. We can then begin to realise that the two poles of our experience (our inner and outer worlds) are distinct but not separate, that they are inwardly connected and that the existence of the one entails the existence of the other.

At the turn of this century, Rudolf Steiner showed, in his *Philosophy of Freedom*, how we may begin to bring into fuller consciousness that 'spiritual activity' in which we weave between the inner and outer aspects of our experience, between the percepts apprehended by the senses and the concepts apprehended by the mind, and how we can then begin to find in the latter, not some kind of spectral exudations from our brains, but the 'inwardness' of nature itself, the creative spiritual ideas of the world, known intuitively.

Steiner thus showed a bridge which spans the gulf of separateness, a bridge which has never been entirely lost: For pointed back to Goethe, and through Goethe to a kind of underground stream of Western culture leading through alchemy and the neo-platonists, right back to Plato himself, for whom human thinking was still attached, by a kind of umbilical cord of memory, to the spiritual experiences of the un-separated soul before birth.

To this stream, as Owen Barfield shows (or rather, helps his subject to show), Coleridge most unmistakably belongs. Indeed he belongs to it, in some ways, more explicitly than Goethe, who was a poet and scientist but not much of a philosopher, and was not very articulate about his 'method'. A full exposition of this had to await the commentaries which Steiner wrote while editing Goethe's scientific works at Weimar. Coleridge, by contrast, was highly self-conscious about his 'system', although his descriptions of it are often both scattered and tortuous. This is why it is so immensely valuable, both for Coleridge and for us, that Owen Barfield has assembled, ordered and described this 'system' under a number of headings. For the first time, it is possible to explore what Coleridge thought in a coherent way.

For students of Steiner it is a quite remarkable exploration. For here are not only close parallels to Goethe (it seems extraordinary that Cole-

ridge apparently knew little of his work), but remarkable anticipations of themes that are later developed in Steiner's *Philosophy of Freedom* and related works.

The "onlooker" consciousness can know, at first, only what is dead in the world, what is "thing" not "process", which Steiner later called the "finished work", and which Coleridge calls *natura naturata*. If we would know the living activity out of which the finished work is born, we may be tempted to go back, so to speak, into the womb, to an old dream-like clairvoyance in which we cease to be onlookers, but also lose ourselves. Or—and this is the emerging issue of this century—we may strive for Steiner's "living thinking" which can lead into a fully awake participation in nature's thinking, a world, to begin with, of "living pictures" which Coleridge called "*natura naturans*". Steiner called this the world of 'Imagination' and Coleridge saw clearly that it is entered by way of "imagination" (with a small "i"). By this, he did not mean "fancy", which is the—often arbitrary—juggling of already-formed pictures and memories (Steiner's 'Vorstellungen' or "mental pictures"). He pointed rather, to the need to become more awake within the activity of thinking itself, an awakeness which he saw as the source of the true creative imagination of the artist.

Barfield has traced these themes and many others through Coleridge's work with wonderful sympathy. Imagination and fancy are explored in detail, as are Coleridge on 'Man and God' and 'Man in history and society'. The central theme of 'polarity' comes again and again, and is examined further in an appendix. There are copious notes and references for further study. Many passages are hard going—I felt fairly awash at times—but I never actually sank, and the voyage is invigorating.

Steiner often described how the Romantic movement, whose representatives were so deeply interested in the "truth of imagination", was unable to flower fully into European and Western culture, as it could and should have done. It was suffocated by the industrial and social revolutions of the time, and by the positivistic temper of philosophy and science. During our century, though, it has begun to draw breath again, helped most profoundly by Steiner, but also by the widespread search for a new "community" of inner and outer experience. It is possible that through Barfield's work, Coleridge will now be able to speak to the Western world so that the true Romantic impulse of the twentieth century, which Steiner called "spiritual science", can be more fully born into our culture.

JOHN DAVY

The Unknown in the Gospels by Alfred Heidenreich (Christian Community Press, £1.50).

THE seven chapters of this book—for it is a book, not just a 'collection of lectures'—record seven lectures given by the late Dr. Alfred Heidenreich in London in 1967, with an introduction by A. C. Harwood, who was Chairman. The slight but necessary editing required for their production in printed form (they were tape-recorded when delivered)

has been most ably done by Margaret Roberts, who also contributes a foreword.

The first thing that will strike many readers is the curious way in which the gospels here *come to life*: the landscape, the social setting, the individual characters, the dialogue, become almost startlingly real and immediate. From being a vaguely familiar "background" to the biblical Christ-story, they are encountered as a living part of it. They also serve to highlight the mysterious 'unknown' elements in that story.

Dr. Heidenreich begins with a survey of the place of the Bible in religious literature. The Bible, as most people know, has long been, and still is, a world best-seller. There are a dozen or more different English translations, and plenty of scholarly analyses—literary, historical and religious. The Gospels, however, have a style markedly different from that of most other religious literature, and seem to elude the ordinary historical, mythological or ritualistic classifications.

With what one might call a kind of inspired simplicity, Dr. Heidenreich leads us into a study of the historical Jesus and the cosmic Christ in which the 'unknowns,' illuminated by the spiritual insights of Rudolf Steiner, find their essential, even logical, place. The different birth and childhood stories, the baptism, the transfiguration, the walking on the water, the raising of Lazarus, the strange cry "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?"—even the literary and historical analysts who classify these as 'myths' might, I feel, find a new and arresting quality in their treatment here.

It is not the purpose of this review, nor is it possible, to give a comprehensive summary of the book. Suffice it to say that anyone who reads it attentively, and with an open mind, will find it rewarding and memorable.

D.D.

MATURITY

The Fulfilment of Old Age, by Dr. Norbert Glas (Anthroposophic Press, New York, \$4.95, Rudolf Steiner Press, London, £2.10).

DR. GLAS, who has been practising medicine in Gloucester for some decades and has a nursing home for the elderly in Stroud, and who is profoundly steeped in all aspects of anthroposophy, was exceptionally well qualified to write a book like this one, which tells how all of us, young or old, may grow older gracefully and continue to live a fruitful life right up to the end. The secret he reveals may be summed up in the words *acceptance* and *metamorphosis*: inward acceptance of the truth that we are no longer young, and that this truth has practical consequences, and the transformation of our declining sense faculties into their spiritual counterparts.

To accept the truth of our mortality may seem easy for anthroposophists, who, after all, have certain beliefs which might be thought to be consoling; and it should not be too difficult for us to accept our destinies in view of our knowledge of the role of karma in human life. But what Dr. Glas does is to spell out in detail with often very interesting examples how our

various faculties change with advancing age, and how each change is, or should be, a challenge and a responsibility. We are bidden not to try to keep what we used to have for as long as we can, but to set in motion a process by which, for example, the physical sense of touch can be consciously transformed into its spiritual counterpart, tact. Acceptance of our life as we have lived it means for Dr. Glas the acquisition of a new perspective. The perspective of old age cannot be held by the young. It is not possible for them to look back on the lives they have lived and perceive how karma worked, and where they made mistakes that have had lasting consequences. But when we are old—and perhaps it is never too early to start making the exercise—this is a perspective that we should try to win for ourselves, perceive the thread of karma that worked through our lives, how one person or another affected us, how someone we may have thought to be an opponent, even an enemy, may turn out to have been the very means by which we were enabled to make spiritual progress.

It is impossible in a short review to do justice to the depths of Dr. Glas's insights in the whole book, nor especially to the profound feeling that informs his last chapters on the attitude to be taken in the face of death, with some moving examples taken from his own experience. It is a rare book, and there is nothing quite like it, in my view, in the whole range of anthroposophical literature.

S.E.

SHAKESPEARE AND THE ROSE CROSS

Shakespeare's Flowering of the Spirit by Margaret Bennell, edited and completed by Isabel Wyatt. (The Lanthorn Press, £1.80).

IN a long, rich life as a teacher, Miss Margaret Bennell developed a warm and practical knowledge of English literature and particularly of Shakespeare. In her last years she made a close study of the little-known work, *The Chymical Wedding of Christian Rosenkreuz*, which appeared in Germany a few years before the outbreak of the Thirty Years War. She became deeply impressed by the relationships she found between Shakespeare's work and Rosicrucian teachings.

At her death, the book in which she described her findings, and her picture of Shakespeare's life and work as a whole, was incomplete. With great care and devotion, Mrs Isabel Wyatt, her close friend and colleague, has completed it. Both brought to their task wide historical knowledge and a deep study of Anthroposophy.

The book places Shakespeare in the context of the history of drama from its origin in the pre-Christian Mysteries. It describes the social and intellectual mood of his time, and the writers who prepared the way for him in London. As with many books on Shakespeare there is a constant danger, which this book does not altogether escape, of making statements about his life that are more definite than the external evidence

seems to warrant. But it is a vivid and persuasive picture. When his life and poetic character as a whole have been described, the book goes on to discuss in detail eight of the plays: three early plays, *Love's Labour Lost*, *A Midsummer Night's Dream* and *The Merchant of Venice*; two great tragedies, *Hamlet* and *King Lear*; and three of the plays regarded as late, *Pericles*, *The Winter's Tale* and *The Tempest*.

Shakespeare's plays, and the people in them, are so much alive that understanding for them can never reach an end. And as with living people we know, strongly held and widely diverging opinions can be held by discerning minds. But it is possible to achieve a gradually increasing certainty of interpretation if we observe how themes from one play reappear and are developed in another, or in the Sonnets. There could be few lovers of Shakespeare who would not find much that is fresh and illuminating—and which they themselves can apply to other plays—in these chapters and in the Epilogue which draws them together.

Finally, an appendix gives a helpful summary of the extraordinary story contained in the *Chymical Wedding*.

The book is beautifully produced—and extremely good value at its price!

A.B.

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ANTHROPOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

A quarterly journal issued by the Executive Council of the Anthroposophical Society of Great Britain to the Members but obtainable by others at 20p per copy or £1.00 per annum, by post, from the Rudolf Steiner Bookshop, 35 Park Road, London, NW1 6XT.

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