WEBVTT

00:00.151 --> 00:12.374
[SPEAKER_01]: Just a quick note that, so the best bits about where the war is at now, how Russia can be prevented from using the winter offensive to its benefit.

00:13.435 --> 00:18.316
[SPEAKER_01]: The Russia is real and Russia's Syria relationships are all in the bonus bit from mega-orderers.

00:18.836 --> 00:25.278
[SPEAKER_01]: You can find those at disordershow.com forward slash club to join our mega-orderers club.

00:25.418 --> 00:27.298
[SPEAKER_01]: All of that is the bonus

00:34.063 --> 00:36.726
[SPEAKER_01]: I'm Jason Pack and this is Disorder.

00:37.427 --> 00:41.852
[SPEAKER_01]: The show where we look at how the world got so crazily disordered.

00:42.533 --> 00:46.237
[SPEAKER_01]: And then we ask, is it entirely Russia's fault?

00:47.778 --> 00:54.766
[SPEAKER_01]: And given Putin's interest in this permanent disorder, what can we do to actually bring a semblance of order?

00:55.822 --> 01:08.000
[SPEAKER_01]: We are discussing things literally to the day four and a half years from the start of the full scale invasion of Ukraine.

01:09.001 --> 01:16.664
[SPEAKER_01]: And, of course, Russia has paid enormous costs for this war, but it has not been fully isolated internationally.

01:17.384 --> 01:26.967
[SPEAKER_01]: Putin, in fact, has increasingly turned a Ukraine war into something much bigger, a global contest in which Russia acts as the disorderer in chief.

01:27.527 --> 01:43.476
[SPEAKER_01]: kind of at the head of the axis of disordering powers connected to Iran and China and North Korea Venezuela at times and also online as a key nexus in the prevailing of narratives of disorder.

01:44.196 --> 01:46.417
[SPEAKER_01]: It can trade with China and India.

01:46.918 --> 01:54.422
[SPEAKER_01]: It builds very deep relationships with other sanctioned states and helps them evade sanctions Iran, as a case of point.

01:55.262 --> 02:00.026
[SPEAKER_01]: and it cultivates partners and narratives across the global south.

02:00.046 --> 02:12.877
[SPEAKER_01]: So above all, Russia is betting that it can endure longer than Ukraine and its western backters because those western backers are not all united.

02:13.578 --> 02:20.964
[SPEAKER_01]: Hannah Notay has described this wider effort as Russia's attempt to globalize its war against Ukraine.

02:21.665 --> 02:25.306
[SPEAKER_01]: and bank on disorder in the international system.

02:25.906 --> 02:29.967
[SPEAKER_01]: That is the argument at the heart of Hannah Notte's new book.

02:30.467 --> 02:34.608
[SPEAKER_01]: We shall outlast them, Putin's global campaign to defeat the West.

02:35.328 --> 02:42.750
[SPEAKER_01]: Hannah Notte's one of the leading analysts of Russia and its foreign policy and Moscow's relationships globally.

02:43.430 --> 02:59.822
[SPEAKER_01]: Her work has focused particularly on Russia's role in the Middle East, relationships with Iran and other sanctions states, and since 2022, the way Russia has internationalized its confrontation with Ukraine into a global strategy, Hannah, welcome to disorder.

03:00.303 --> 03:01.944
[SPEAKER_00]: Thanks so much for having me, Jason.

03:03.345 --> 03:07.148
[SPEAKER_01]: So, Hannah, the title of your book is We Shall Out Last Then.

03:08.680 --> 03:11.101
[SPEAKER_01]: Who is the we, who is the them?

03:11.121 --> 03:15.504
[SPEAKER_01]: And is Putin being proved correct that he can outlast us?

03:16.644 --> 03:19.986
[SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, the we in the title refers to Russia.

03:20.206 --> 03:25.709
[SPEAKER_00]: This is the story of how Russia has tried to outlast us in a struggle.

03:28.058 --> 03:32.419
[SPEAKER_00]: I suppose the key question is outlast us where in what context.

03:32.520 --> 03:36.121
[SPEAKER_00]: And here I think the story that the book tells is twofold.

03:36.641 --> 03:41.583
[SPEAKER_00]: This is very concretely a Russian effort to outlast the West in Ukraine.

03:42.303 --> 03:51.686
[SPEAKER_00]: Because what Vladimir Putin got when he launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022 was a war that he did not expect, a war that Russian elites did not expect.

03:52.347 --> 04:07.082
[SPEAKER_00]: I think it's fairly safe to assume that Putin thought that this would indeed be a special military operation, one in which Russia would create a new reality on the ground in Ukraine quickly, that the government would fold, would collapse.

04:07.422 --> 04:27.282
[SPEAKER_00]: perhaps Zelensky would flee that Russia would install a plan government in Kiev and that the war would be over and that perhaps there would still be to some extent business as usual with the West afterwards, that the West wouldn't like this, but that it would have to swallow this just as it swallowed to some extent the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

04:27.922 --> 04:29.484
[SPEAKER_00]: Now we know that this did not happen.

04:30.184 --> 04:37.071
[SPEAKER_00]: The West introduced massive economic sanctions against Russia, Russia today, is the most sanctioned country in the world.

04:37.931 --> 04:43.436
[SPEAKER_00]: The West totally severed its political ties with Russia, so Russia had to hustle.

04:44.401 --> 04:53.426
[SPEAKER_00]: To secure lifelines for its economy and for its defense enterprise to outlast the West, its chief adversary, concretely in the war against Ukraine.

04:54.026 --> 05:03.491
[SPEAKER_00]: But as I argue in the book, there's another story of outlasting, because the war in Ukraine from a Russian perspective is, in fact, a struggle over global order.

05:03.511 --> 05:10.055
[SPEAKER_00]: This is not just about controlling Ukraine and the territorial configuration of Ukraine.

05:14.077 --> 05:18.943
[SPEAKER_00]: to accept Russia as an equal interlocutor, particularly forced the United States.

05:19.644 --> 05:27.373
[SPEAKER_00]: Russia, laying acclaimed to being a great power, which from a Russian point of view, means a veto ride over the European security architecture.

05:27.413 --> 05:29.235
[SPEAKER_00]: So this is also about global order.

05:29.976 --> 05:39.827
[SPEAKER_00]: And so this is also why outlasting the West plays out not just in Ukraine, but it also plays out in other regions where the Russians are playing.

05:39.867 --> 05:41.849
[SPEAKER_00]: It plays out in multilateral institutions.

05:41.889 --> 05:43.711
[SPEAKER_00]: It plays out at the United Nations.

05:44.412 --> 05:47.115
[SPEAKER_00]: The struggle has really encompassed a lot of areas.

05:47.155 --> 05:49.077
[SPEAKER_00]: And this is the story I tried to tell in the book.

05:49.737 --> 05:51.319
[SPEAKER_01]: And I would argue.

05:52.430 --> 06:06.817
[SPEAKER_01]: he wants to it last us by keeping the world disordered, but there really isn't in us anyway because neo populists control the White House for Raj and the AFD resented.

06:07.058 --> 06:14.661
[SPEAKER_01]: In Europe, Marine Le Pen has magically gotten that court case preventing her from running to somehow be lifted.

06:14.721 --> 06:17.443
[SPEAKER_01]: So isn't there really no us to outlast?

06:18.968 --> 06:32.722
[SPEAKER_00]: It's a great point and you use the term disorder versus order, I think, another way to look at it is fragmentation versus consolidation and I think you can find both in the West over the last four and half years.

06:33.503 --> 06:40.710
[SPEAKER_00]: There is fragmentation and you're very right to point out that Russia is always banking on fragmentation and trying to tap into fragmentation.

06:41.277 --> 06:43.098
[SPEAKER_00]: because that is how Russia can thrive.

06:43.158 --> 06:45.559
[SPEAKER_00]: That's when it can exploit divisions.

06:46.219 --> 06:47.579
[SPEAKER_00]: And we have fragmentation.

06:47.639 --> 07:05.426
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, whenever we discuss, for instance, a new sanctions package against Russia at the EU level, there's outliers, this countries that don't want to go along with this or that measure, we can talk at length about the friction and the transatlantic relationship that emerged and got exacerbated with Donald Trump to return to the White House.

07:06.166 --> 07:10.629
[SPEAKER_00]: And all that has meant for Russia in terms of giving Russia some breathing space.

07:11.349 --> 07:15.672
[SPEAKER_00]: But I think you can also tell a story about order and about consolidation in the West.

07:16.412 --> 07:25.397
[SPEAKER_00]: The Europeans have really stepped up the game, I think, to make up for the reduction in U.S. support for Ukraine over the last year and a half.

07:27.798 --> 07:48.964
[SPEAKER_01]: I just want to be clear that they have done so monetarily but not structurally and you're coming a week after our episode with general Ben Hodges and two week after I spoke with Glenn Morgan and what they would argue is sure the Europeans have rallied together and ponyed up cash but they've not structurally fixed.

07:49.644 --> 07:57.897
[SPEAKER_01]: The problem when it comes to defense procurement, missile defense, air defense, and essentially the structures needed to persecute the war.

07:59.332 --> 08:07.757
[SPEAKER_00]: That's fair, and I think there's a lot of room for improvement, and we know that things move very slowly and too slowly on the European continent in that regard.

08:08.478 --> 08:16.863
[SPEAKER_00]: But you know, if I look at this question from a Russian point of view, Russia is now faced with a Europe where Finland and Sweden have joint NATO.

08:17.323 --> 08:20.325
[SPEAKER_00]: Finland has a 1,300 kilometer border with Russia.

08:20.825 --> 08:25.908
[SPEAKER_00]: So if this was about dividing Europe and weakening Europe, I think you can make an argument

08:29.490 --> 08:32.072
[SPEAKER_00]: I was looking at this war against, against Ukraine.

08:32.112 --> 08:44.239
[SPEAKER_00]: So I think you can look at it from both sides, but I think if Putin calculated four and a half years ago, that Europe would fold, that it would just abandon Ukraine because Russia cares so much more about Ukraine than we do.

08:44.819 --> 08:47.280
[SPEAKER_00]: We can also tell the story that Putin was mistaken.

08:47.881 --> 08:51.323
[SPEAKER_00]: Now, of course, we have the rise of populist parties in Europe.

08:51.783 --> 08:55.925
[SPEAKER_00]: We just had the AFD doing fairly well in recent regional elections in Germany.

08:55.945 --> 08:58.087
[SPEAKER_00]: So there's warring trends, no doubt about it.

08:58.707 --> 09:09.615
[SPEAKER_00]: But I think the jury is still out whether the force of fragmentation or consolidation will prevail on the themsites, if we talk about we being Russia wanting to outlast them the West.

09:10.355 --> 09:11.136
[SPEAKER_01]: I think that.

09:12.112 --> 09:14.393
[SPEAKER_01]: overarching feces are also useful.

09:14.833 --> 09:29.919
[SPEAKER_01]: Therefore, I want to help unpack the overarching feces of Hannah's book, which is that the Ukraine war has become the organizing principle of Russian foreign policy, and that this shapes how Russian engages with the South Caucasus, the USA, India, China.

09:30.379 --> 09:32.199
[SPEAKER_01]: Could you tell us what does it mean in practice?

09:32.520 --> 09:38.422
[SPEAKER_01]: What does it mean in practice for strategists in the Kremlin to be like, we have to engage in Nagorno-Karabakh,

09:39.182 --> 09:42.504
[SPEAKER_01]: or in relationships with Trump, vis-a-vis the war in Ukraine.

09:42.984 --> 09:43.744
[SPEAKER_01]: Explain that to us.

09:44.465 --> 09:47.086
[SPEAKER_00]: It's actually, this one's actually quite simple, Jason.

09:47.466 --> 09:48.887
[SPEAKER_00]: It means that since 2022,

09:50.466 --> 09:57.452
[SPEAKER_00]: Russian diplomats, technocrats, businessman, whatever, have assessed their measures on this or that issue.

09:57.472 --> 10:01.134
[SPEAKER_00]: In terms of does this help us when the war against Ukraine or not?

10:01.175 --> 10:04.557
[SPEAKER_00]: Does this help us wear down Western resolve on Ukraine or not?

10:04.917 --> 10:08.380
[SPEAKER_00]: So that has shaped how Russia has engaged

10:10.331 --> 10:26.547
[SPEAKER_00]: Whatever issue at the United Nations, or in other multilateral organizations, it has shaped our Russia has pursued its straight relationships with other countries, it has shaped also how Russia has been willing or not to play in other theatres, sometimes.

10:27.488 --> 10:33.090
[SPEAKER_00]: Making everything subordinates to the war in Ukraine has actually men Russian restraint.

10:33.210 --> 10:41.153
[SPEAKER_00]: We can talk about the South Caucasus and a Russian decision not to intervene in 2023 when Azerbaijan took over Nagorno-Karaba.

10:41.513 --> 10:43.694
[SPEAKER_00]: We can talk at length about the Russian decision.

10:44.254 --> 10:53.344
[SPEAKER_00]: to abandon Bashal Assad to his fall in December of 2024, not to intervene another time to save him when the rebels started their offensive.

10:53.704 --> 11:02.373
[SPEAKER_00]: So this was a decision of restraint because the priority in Russia's foreign policy, the only thing that matters is persevering in Ukraine.

11:02.393 --> 11:05.457
[SPEAKER_00]: And so that dictates Russia's foreign policy elsewhere.

11:06.290 --> 11:12.114
[SPEAKER_01]: However, obviously above the desire to persevere in Ukraine is Putin's desire to stay in power.

11:12.654 --> 11:19.579
[SPEAKER_01]: And I would argue that his need to persevere in Ukraine is he knows that if he loses in Ukraine, he's going to be killed or overthrown, right?

11:19.639 --> 11:25.543
[SPEAKER_01]: So that this goes back to, I think, our mutual friend Marcel Dersis argument about dictators.

11:25.743 --> 11:32.087
[SPEAKER_01]: Dictators have to continue fighting because they will get killed if they're not in power anymore.

11:34.128 --> 11:46.981
[SPEAKER_01]: what you're talking about in Nagorno-Karabakh, whether it's abandoning their previous Armenian allies or abandoning Bashar, this is because it's all through the lens of regime preservation in the Kremlin.

11:47.442 --> 11:54.429
[SPEAKER_01]: And I agree that's couch vis-a-vis the Ukraine war, but above the Ukraine war is regime preservation, or do you disagree?

11:54.825 --> 11:59.070
[SPEAKER_00]: Jason, I think that Putin is concerned with regime preservation.

11:59.531 --> 12:07.901
[SPEAKER_00]: I'm not totally convinced by the argument that he believes he needs to fight on and Ukraine because if he ends the war tomorrow, he's going to be killed or loses power.

12:08.482 --> 12:11.445
[SPEAKER_00]: I'm yet to see convincing evidence that this would actually happen.

12:11.946 --> 12:25.077
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, we can play this through as a thought experiment, what would actually happen if Putin announced that the special military operation achieved its results tomorrow and decides to freeze the conflict.

12:25.597 --> 12:31.982
[SPEAKER_00]: I'm not sure that we can be certain that his hold on power would be threatened or that there would be a challenge to his power.

12:32.183 --> 12:39.208
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, we can talk about the fact that opposition has been largely sightlined or decimated in Russia over many years with the

12:39.989 --> 12:48.273
[SPEAKER_00]: consolidation of what we call the power vertical in Russia, who would be those people who would then threaten his old on power?

12:48.293 --> 12:51.335
[SPEAKER_00]: I'm yet to see evidence that this is a real thing.

12:51.535 --> 13:04.362
[SPEAKER_00]: My own view, Jason, is that Putin continues to prosecute the war, not because not so much because he believes that he absolutely must, because otherwise his regime is threatened, but he continues because he believes he can.

13:05.182 --> 13:08.004
[SPEAKER_00]: He continues because he thinks there's still more to be gained.

13:08.784 --> 13:16.112
[SPEAKER_00]: that he can go further, that he can, again, outlast the other side, that he has the greatest stamina in this confrontation.

13:16.512 --> 13:19.856
[SPEAKER_00]: Yes, the war's costly to Russia, one and a half million wounded.

13:20.116 --> 13:21.017
[SPEAKER_00]: I just want to jump in.

13:21.037 --> 13:22.699
[SPEAKER_01]: What you've said is very profound there.

13:23.720 --> 13:29.966
[SPEAKER_01]: And I accepted as a critique to my argument and Marcel Dersis's argument.

13:30.800 --> 13:32.241
[SPEAKER_01]: I want to reiterate what you've said.

13:32.921 --> 13:40.286
[SPEAKER_01]: Putin has so consolidated power that it doesn't matter if it's Mishustan or Shoygou, obviously, Progusion is dead.

13:40.606 --> 13:42.928
[SPEAKER_01]: There are no real Arab parents and challengers.

13:43.388 --> 13:49.292
[SPEAKER_01]: And if he had the two or three potential people on board, he could even announce that the Special Military Operation was over.

13:49.912 --> 13:53.415
[SPEAKER_01]: I accept what Hannah has just said, and we need to critique

13:54.270 --> 14:02.515
[SPEAKER_01]: the idea that the war is existential for Putin, because maybe by critiquing that idea, we could find ways to deescalate.

14:02.875 --> 14:13.202
[SPEAKER_01]: And hence, this is an important question for Steve Wittkov and other major players at the global level to think about.

14:14.103 --> 14:16.764
[SPEAKER_01]: And I would like us to return to this.

14:16.824 --> 14:22.068
[SPEAKER_01]: In fact, what we speak with Professor Mark Galiade in two weeks time.

14:25.058 --> 14:38.600
[SPEAKER_01]: I am going to argue that whether or not Putin thinks he needs to continue to fight to stay in power, he is ideologically committed to fighting because he has a certain ideological coherence.

14:38.640 --> 14:51.583
[SPEAKER_01]: And I believe that Putin believes in disordering the global arena, disordering democracies, so that democracy is made to look hollow, the kind of RTification of, you know, the Western

14:53.283 --> 15:05.616
[SPEAKER_01]: So I would argue that Russia has been disordering the whole time and that the narratives you discuss in your book about the global south, election, meddling in Maldova and Armenia are all about this kind of disordering.

15:06.037 --> 15:11.462
[SPEAKER_01]: And what I want to ask you is am I onto something with the idea that there is a deep

15:12.495 --> 15:24.415
[SPEAKER_01]: Russian Putinists, active measures, Thomas Reed, Soviet, just disorder, throw so much shit at the wall, or is there an order that they're trying to put into being that I'm missing?

15:25.583 --> 15:39.411
[SPEAKER_00]: No, I think the strategy that you describe in terms of fueling disorder, chaos, confusion, perhaps also fear, that is a good characterization of a lot of Russian disinformation and in other parts of the world.

15:39.451 --> 15:50.578
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, I think there's also a real Russian effort to convince audiences in the non-West or call it the Global South, that Russia is on the defensive here, that it is

15:51.378 --> 15:56.500
[SPEAKER_00]: waging a defensive war against Ukraine, Russia calls it an anti-neal colonial war.

15:56.620 --> 16:06.944
[SPEAKER_00]: So to tell a story where Russia is the victim, Russia was pushed into this war by an aggressive and expansionist NATO, and it is standing up against the West.

16:07.404 --> 16:18.488
[SPEAKER_00]: And the savvy thing here about this Jason is that by framing the West as anti-neal colonial, Russia, of course, is creating the sort of solidarity with people in the non-Western world,

16:18.908 --> 16:21.489
[SPEAKER_00]: that were victims of past European colonialism.

16:21.589 --> 16:23.929
[SPEAKER_00]: So you create this kind of discursive link.

16:24.449 --> 16:47.195
[SPEAKER_00]: And Russia has tried to tap into these existing grievances quite aggressively, you know, sort of following Russian media campaigns in Africa over the last four and obvious, they've really expanded quite aggressively, opening new media initiatives, opening Russian houses, these centers of Russian soft power.

16:48.055 --> 16:50.617
[SPEAKER_00]: in Africa, reopening consulates in embassy.

16:50.637 --> 16:52.378
[SPEAKER_00]: So there's a lot of activity there.

16:53.239 --> 16:59.643
[SPEAKER_00]: I want to come back to you with one final thought though here about disorder and order and what Russia benefits from.

17:00.603 --> 17:12.771
[SPEAKER_00]: I think as an overall idea, it's totally correct to state that Russia thrives most when there's disorder, when there's chaos, when there's these cracks that Russia can exploit.

17:13.371 --> 17:15.353
[SPEAKER_00]: But I think we've also seen over the last,

17:16.317 --> 17:33.702
[SPEAKER_00]: I would say year and a half since the return of Donald Trump into the White House, that when we have another big power that emerges as what I call in the book, the Disruptor in Chief, another major power that creates this order that acts in unexpected fashion that starts new wars.

17:34.202 --> 17:46.592
[SPEAKER_00]: that throws the transatlantic relationship into chaos, it also creates actually situations that rattle Russia and actually expose Russian weakness and the limitations of Russian power.

17:47.533 --> 17:54.658
[SPEAKER_00]: Because in the Middle East and the South Caucasus of Central Asia, for example, the Americans are now playing in ways that Russia didn't expect.

17:55.219 --> 18:02.865
[SPEAKER_00]: And oops, we're seeing that Russia doesn't have all that many cards to play, because again, it has its hands full in the war with Ukraine.

18:07.452 --> 18:12.555
[SPEAKER_01]: Join us again after the break to hear Hannah's wisdom on Russia's role in the world.

18:27.350 --> 18:33.632
[SPEAKER_01]: We are back from the break with Hannah Notet, author of We Shall Outlast Them.

18:34.533 --> 18:37.994
[SPEAKER_01]: I want to ask you, you lived in Russia.

18:38.274 --> 18:40.015
[SPEAKER_01]: You had like a homestay, and

18:41.924 --> 18:57.511
[SPEAKER_01]: What was it like for you just to experience the change in how Russians feel about themselves and has this war tapped into some kind of Dostoevsky in grit and angst?

18:59.372 --> 19:08.677
[SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I mean, Jason, I visited Russia frequently and then I also lived there as you mentioned over a sort of 10 year period.

19:09.650 --> 19:13.072
[SPEAKER_00]: So my first stay was just before the annexation of Crimea.

19:13.653 --> 19:16.374
[SPEAKER_00]: I then moved there in 2015, 2016.

19:16.434 --> 19:17.055
[SPEAKER_00]: I lived there.

19:17.135 --> 19:18.075
[SPEAKER_00]: I was working there.

19:18.536 --> 19:22.298
[SPEAKER_00]: And then up to the full scale invasion of Ukraine, I visited a few times a year.

19:22.919 --> 19:31.084
[SPEAKER_00]: And what I would notice that I could feel just being there on the ground, this growing sense of confrontation with the West.

19:31.304 --> 19:36.287
[SPEAKER_00]: That my interlocutors spoke less freely, that there was a sort of shrinking space,

19:38.368 --> 19:50.350
[SPEAKER_00]: freely, when I was visiting and this growing sense that Russia was wronged, that it's interest we're not taken seriously, by the way, it coupled also with a growing self-confidence on the international stage.

19:50.451 --> 20:02.673
[SPEAKER_00]: I think the fact that the Russians did fairly well in their Syria intervention, and you noted also the wars in Georgia and the annexation of Crimea, I think this fueled a certain exuberance on the part of Russia's leaders,

20:03.073 --> 20:07.375
[SPEAKER_00]: that they could pull of another quote unquote special military operation in 2022.

20:07.415 --> 20:15.118
[SPEAKER_00]: So you both had the sense of grievance and also the scoring sense of self confidence and sort of being a player on the international stage.

20:15.698 --> 20:18.259
[SPEAKER_00]: Now what I'm not convinced of or what I didn't feel even

20:19.680 --> 20:28.646
[SPEAKER_00]: You know, I was there till the day before the full-scale invasion started, it was that there was this pervasive sense that Wool therefore was becoming inevitable.

20:28.907 --> 20:48.841
[SPEAKER_00]: A lot of people I spoke with in the days leading up to the full-scale invasion were adamant that the Wool was not going to come, because it made no sense from Russia's point of view that Russia had conducted the build-up of troops around Ukraine as an element of coercion to force the West into a deal of sorts at the negotiating

20:49.501 --> 20:58.325
[SPEAKER_00]: So I still think that you cannot explain the invasion without pointing to Putin sort of quite singular ideological obsession with Ukraine.

20:58.705 --> 21:04.988
[SPEAKER_00]: But yes, I mean, there was a sense that things were changing and Russia certainly through the decade leading up to the war.

21:09.567 --> 21:14.348
[SPEAKER_01]: Russia in its more cultural and spiritual totality.

21:14.588 --> 21:22.350
[SPEAKER_01]: It's vastness from the Siberia to the step to the European-looking cities in the West.

21:22.870 --> 21:30.732
[SPEAKER_01]: How do you think that we need to understand that if we are in Trump's or in Nishni Novgorod and thinking about this war?

21:30.792 --> 21:31.712
[SPEAKER_01]: Because I feel like

21:32.873 --> 21:39.564
[SPEAKER_01]: Our friends in Chicago and in Dortmund may not understand this.

21:40.962 --> 21:47.846
[SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I think what you're pointing to here is maybe this notion of Russian resilience and where it comes from.

21:47.946 --> 21:50.147
[SPEAKER_00]: And it's a concept that I work with in the book.

21:50.267 --> 21:55.109
[SPEAKER_00]: I use the term Stoicost, which does translate as resilience or endurance.

21:55.729 --> 21:57.590
[SPEAKER_00]: And you know, this is very interesting, Jason.

21:57.630 --> 22:02.873
[SPEAKER_00]: I think we can talk about this at the cultural level, or even at the individual level.

22:03.013 --> 22:05.394
[SPEAKER_00]: And here, this idea of resilience

22:07.056 --> 22:10.461
[SPEAKER_00]: being able to endure suffering, self-reliance.

22:10.621 --> 22:16.170
[SPEAKER_00]: That has deep historical religious artistic roots in Russia.

22:16.270 --> 22:20.737
[SPEAKER_00]: So we can look back towards eastern orthodoxy, which puts a certain

22:21.859 --> 22:27.626
[SPEAKER_00]: aesthetic emphasis on suffering, on sacrifice, on the redemptive value of pain.

22:28.327 --> 22:32.211
[SPEAKER_00]: That is an idea that you find in Russian religion and in music and the arts.

22:32.632 --> 22:41.281
[SPEAKER_00]: I think we could talk about resilience and endurance as part of Russians lived experiences through the centuries, whether that is the peasant life.

22:41.842 --> 23:01.558
[SPEAKER_00]: You know, underserved them, which lasted until fairly late in the Russian Empire, to, I mean, the 20th century, the purges under Stalin, the Gulak, the 1990s, which were a harsh decade for Russians, and the Russian language even is quite rich, in terms of the verbs that you can use to denote this kind of idea of suffering.

23:01.578 --> 23:05.321
[SPEAKER_00]: You know, you have a verb-like strategy, which means to suffer.

23:05.401 --> 23:07.883
[SPEAKER_00]: You have telepits, which means to endure.

23:08.584 --> 23:14.851
[SPEAKER_00]: So there's a lot to that idea, I think, of suffering and endurance in Russian culture.

23:15.332 --> 23:24.382
[SPEAKER_00]: And then you can take it to the geopolitical level where Russia also likes to emphasize this idea of self-reliance.

23:25.343 --> 23:33.889
[SPEAKER_00]: I have a quote from Sergei Lavrov, which he gave not so long ago when he talked about this idea of Russian self-reliance in the world.

23:34.829 --> 23:39.753
[SPEAKER_00]: And he said, since the time of the Russian Empire, we knew that Russia had only two allies.

23:40.573 --> 23:42.435
[SPEAKER_00]: It's army and it's navy.

23:43.155 --> 23:45.476
[SPEAKER_00]: and now we also have the aerospace forces.

23:45.896 --> 23:52.358
[SPEAKER_00]: So sort of painting this idea of Russia loaning the world ultimately only being able to rely on itself.

23:52.398 --> 23:58.320
[SPEAKER_00]: And one last thing I want to say is that all this idea of suffering and self-reliance

23:58.740 --> 24:02.562
[SPEAKER_00]: It's also tied quite intimately to this notion of Russian victimhood.

24:03.042 --> 24:07.164
[SPEAKER_00]: And that is a cool pillar also of the story that Russia tells about itself in the world.

24:07.544 --> 24:12.786
[SPEAKER_00]: Russia is the eternal victim of Western encroachment of others trying to enslave it.

24:14.607 --> 24:19.230
[SPEAKER_00]: the Spiritless West, trying to enslave the spiritual Russia.

24:19.670 --> 24:32.119
[SPEAKER_00]: And that narrative of victimhood coexist with another narrative which promotes Russia as a vanguard, as a pioneer, that is going to lead the rest of the world into a different kind of order.

24:32.199 --> 24:36.041
[SPEAKER_00]: And so you have this odd coexistence of victimhood and being vanguard.

24:36.422 --> 24:40.985
[SPEAKER_00]: And also of, I think, an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the West.

24:41.425 --> 24:50.253
[SPEAKER_00]: Coupled with a superiority complex that says that Russia is actually in terms of morals and spirit it is greater than the West.

24:50.713 --> 24:55.838
[SPEAKER_00]: And it's these kind of interesting dichotomies that characterize the Russian story.

24:56.667 --> 25:16.838
[SPEAKER_01]: Now, we are back with the main episode, and you have just missed this incredible mega-order error, bonus where Hannah has tackled the state of play of the negotiations, what Whitcoff is doing, how the Donbassist, the critical issue that's being fought over, and

25:17.657 --> 25:20.542
[SPEAKER_01]: the state of Israel and Russian Syria relations.

25:21.324 --> 25:27.235
[SPEAKER_01]: Now the time has come, after the break we will border the disorder.

25:36.147 --> 25:47.813
[SPEAKER_01]: We are back with Hannah Notae, the author of We Shall Outlast Them, and as eloquent as she is speaking on the pod, she is even more brilliant as a writer.

25:48.274 --> 25:49.594
[SPEAKER_01]: The prose just flows.

25:49.654 --> 25:57.819
[SPEAKER_01]: You're with her on her journey traveling to Africa to the Caucasus to Israel, her time living in Russia.

25:57.859 --> 25:59.500
[SPEAKER_01]: She gives of herself.

25:59.540 --> 26:04.503
[SPEAKER_01]: You get a flavor of her life and how she sees the world and how she experiences

26:05.715 --> 26:08.437
[SPEAKER_01]: Russia's changing and evolving role in the world.

26:08.597 --> 26:16.161
[SPEAKER_01]: I really enjoyed reading your book, Hannah, and we're going to feature it in our collaboration with the new books, Network.

26:16.842 --> 26:20.884
[SPEAKER_01]: So check out the links in the show notes if you'd like to by Hannah's book.

26:21.444 --> 26:27.268
[SPEAKER_01]: Now, I want to benefit from all your wisdom on how we can order the disorder.

26:28.823 --> 26:40.347
[SPEAKER_01]: what would actually disprove Putin's thesis that Russia cannot last us, what can Westerners do either individually or as a coalition to disprove that thesis?

26:41.227 --> 26:46.709
[SPEAKER_00]: I think if the West just keeps calm and carries on, that is the answer to your question.

26:46.829 --> 26:49.850
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, the most important thing here, Jason, really is that

26:51.183 --> 26:55.085
[SPEAKER_00]: Europe in particular does not fold in terms of its support for Ukraine.

26:55.165 --> 26:56.686
[SPEAKER_00]: Ukraine still needs a lot of money.

26:56.706 --> 26:59.747
[SPEAKER_00]: It has another big budget shortfall for this year.

27:00.387 --> 27:04.889
[SPEAKER_00]: It will need support to defend itself against Russian ballistic missile and drone attacks.

27:05.590 --> 27:09.532
[SPEAKER_00]: It will need support to keep waging this war for as long as it's necessary.

27:10.032 --> 27:12.693
[SPEAKER_00]: And so the most important thing here is that Europe does not

27:14.654 --> 27:24.622
[SPEAKER_00]: When Russian hybrid measures against Europe are likely to intensify, I do think that we're at a bit of a watershed moment at an inflection point in this war.

27:25.202 --> 27:32.208
[SPEAKER_00]: Because for the last four and a half years, and this is the story I tell in the book, Russia has done quite well securing support for itself.

27:32.828 --> 27:35.029
[SPEAKER_00]: But I think that support has plateaued.

27:35.149 --> 27:37.130
[SPEAKER_00]: It's not going to drastically increase.

27:37.770 --> 27:42.693
[SPEAKER_00]: It will keep going, but it's not been enough to enable Russia to actually win the war.

27:43.073 --> 27:49.756
[SPEAKER_00]: The biggest problem that Vladimir Putin has in 2026 is Europe and Europe's continuing support for Ukraine.

27:50.056 --> 27:51.817
[SPEAKER_00]: So I think the Russians will

27:52.970 --> 27:57.157
[SPEAKER_00]: step up their efforts to try to erode that European support for Ukraine.

27:57.257 --> 28:05.030
[SPEAKER_00]: And so really outlasting Russia in this just means that we need to keep going, steady, calm, but consistent.

28:05.732 --> 28:08.354
[SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, winning the war of ideas and the war of resolve.

28:08.374 --> 28:09.534
[SPEAKER_01]: You explain that very well.

28:10.235 --> 28:15.498
[SPEAKER_01]: Ukraine is able to strike Russian refineries deeper inside Russia.

28:16.338 --> 28:21.181
[SPEAKER_01]: And this gives Ukraine the ability to outlast Russia.

28:21.602 --> 28:26.064
[SPEAKER_01]: What can we do to decrease Russia's ability to absorb those blows?

28:26.405 --> 28:29.947
[SPEAKER_01]: Because I look at it as two boxers in the beginning of the fight.

28:30.527 --> 28:33.788
[SPEAKER_01]: we were dealing with Tyson versus Lennox Lewis.

28:34.288 --> 28:36.529
[SPEAKER_01]: And these are two haymakers, they're going at it.

28:37.269 --> 28:47.111
[SPEAKER_01]: And then all of a sudden, we find ourselves with George Foreman versus Ali, where it's the rumble in the jungle, and it's rope adope, and it's endurance, and it's body blows.

28:47.651 --> 28:53.553
[SPEAKER_01]: So what can we do to decrease rushness ability to absorb these body blows?

28:54.588 --> 29:10.131
[SPEAKER_00]: Right, so when it comes to hampering Russian income from oil, which is what you really talking about, a main pillar of the Russian war economy and what keeps also the Russian military industrial complex afloat, there's a few things that we can do.

29:10.771 --> 29:16.233
[SPEAKER_00]: I'm not sure that going to China and India and asking them to completely stop trade with Russia is going to work.

29:16.253 --> 29:18.273
[SPEAKER_00]: It hasn't worked over the last four and a half years.

29:18.693 --> 29:20.014
[SPEAKER_00]: it's not going to work now.

29:20.874 --> 29:27.378
[SPEAKER_00]: But for example, measures against the Russian shadow fleet to undermine Russia's ability to export.

29:27.878 --> 29:29.379
[SPEAKER_00]: There's more that can be done.

29:29.399 --> 29:31.721
[SPEAKER_00]: There's more that the Europeans, by the way, have announced.

29:31.781 --> 29:38.024
[SPEAKER_00]: The German government has announced harsh measures against the Russian shadow fleet with the waiting to see what that means.

29:38.905 --> 29:43.807
[SPEAKER_00]: Those increased measures against the shadow fleet is something that can actually be done.

29:44.268 --> 29:47.450
[SPEAKER_00]: By a few willing countries, France,

29:48.310 --> 29:51.231
[SPEAKER_00]: Do you, okay, perhaps Germany is Sweden, others?

29:52.372 --> 30:02.397
[SPEAKER_01]: If Europe wants to end the war on terms that Ukraine can accept, what does it need to do differently now rather than us facing this conversation in 2028?

30:03.017 --> 30:07.239
[SPEAKER_01]: And as much as I want to talk to you again, I don't want to talk to you about these same issues.

30:07.379 --> 30:08.740
[SPEAKER_01]: I want things to be progressed.

30:09.740 --> 30:13.162
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, the most urgent thing that we need to do is get Ukraine through this winter.

30:15.264 --> 30:33.980
[SPEAKER_00]: Support Ukraine in air defenses with whatever we can give Ukraine so that Ukraine is still standing and is still in a strong position in spring of of 2027 We basically need to get Vladimir Putin I think into a space where he sees more value in freezing the war

30:34.963 --> 30:49.992
[SPEAKER_00]: then instill prosecuting it and the Russians are not there yet, but they might be there next year if they just see that they cannot move forward, that the gains are still incremental, that they cannot bump the Ukrainians into submission.

30:50.032 --> 30:56.977
[SPEAKER_00]: So this is the most urgent task for me, support the Ukrainians through this winter economically militarily with with what we have.

30:57.938 --> 31:00.479
[SPEAKER_01]: When you finished, we shall outlast them.

31:00.879 --> 31:09.903
[SPEAKER_01]: Did you conclude that Putin's strategy was working on its own terms in trying to outlast the West and making his narrative land in the global South and elsewhere?

31:10.444 --> 31:12.925
[SPEAKER_01]: Or did he mortgage Russia's future for this?

31:13.485 --> 31:16.406
[SPEAKER_01]: And even if it works, it hasn't achieved its aims.

31:17.127 --> 31:23.409
[SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I think I concluded at the end of the book that ultimately this is a story of tragedy for Russia.

31:23.930 --> 31:24.570
[SPEAKER_00]: Because yes,

31:25.377 --> 31:38.182
[SPEAKER_00]: Putin has thrown everything at this war, he's made Russia's entire foreign policies subservient to the war, and Russia has muddled through fairly successfully, we've talked about Russian successes in its statecraft.

31:38.342 --> 31:44.285
[SPEAKER_00]: But ultimately, for chasing his obsession of subjugating Ukraine, I think he's ultimately weakening Russia.

31:45.465 --> 31:57.870
[SPEAKER_00]: He skewed the Russian economy, which is becoming more and more militarized and Russia is not investing in civilian sectors and I don't know AI or biotech or technologies of the future.

31:58.971 --> 32:02.272
[SPEAKER_00]: It is losing power in other parts of the world.

32:02.732 --> 32:08.675
[SPEAKER_00]: It has totally alienated Europe and by the way also people in other countries that are close to Russia.

32:09.275 --> 32:12.938
[SPEAKER_00]: people who will be fearful and distrustful of Russia for a long time to come.

32:13.458 --> 32:16.340
[SPEAKER_00]: Not to speak of Ukraine, of the Ukrainian people, of course.

32:16.800 --> 32:25.466
[SPEAKER_00]: So if you compare where Russia is today, and of course there's also the question over the growing dependence on China and what that means strategically for Russia.

32:26.167 --> 32:30.810
[SPEAKER_00]: I think in a way, Russia headed quite good in 2022 before it invaded Ukraine,

32:31.370 --> 32:40.777
[SPEAKER_00]: And now it is in a position where I think it's place in the world will likely be weaker as a result of this decision to wage war against Ukraine.

32:41.717 --> 32:46.361
[SPEAKER_01]: Hannah, it has been so enjoyable to discuss these issues with you.

32:46.921 --> 32:48.442
[SPEAKER_01]: You're a brilliant communicator.

32:48.582 --> 32:53.226
[SPEAKER_01]: I want to close with three rapid fire what I call elevator questions.

32:59.937 --> 33:05.860
[SPEAKER_01]: and the incoming UN Secretary General who will be elected and will likely be a woman.

33:06.380 --> 33:07.881
[SPEAKER_01]: So let us start with Whitcoff.

33:08.681 --> 33:09.582
[SPEAKER_01]: You're in Manhattan.

33:10.642 --> 33:13.044
[SPEAKER_01]: You get in the elevator at this really nice restaurant.

33:13.544 --> 33:14.244
[SPEAKER_01]: What do you know?

33:14.945 --> 33:23.729
[SPEAKER_01]: Whitcoff just walks in and you recognize him and you say, Steve, I have an idea for you.

33:24.930 --> 33:25.750
[SPEAKER_01]: What would you tell him?

33:26.282 --> 33:36.826
[SPEAKER_00]: I would give Steve Wittkov a list of people of individuals with great Russia expertise and great Ukraine expertise that I recommend he hire to get on his team before it keeps working on the issue.

33:38.066 --> 33:42.488
[SPEAKER_01]: Sorry, although in an ideal world that would work, we know that they hate experts.

33:43.068 --> 33:47.129
[SPEAKER_01]: We know that he like Trump and Jared decline their briefings every morning.

33:47.630 --> 33:48.630
[SPEAKER_01]: I will let you try again.

33:49.310 --> 33:50.831
[SPEAKER_01]: Your in-westmen stir.

33:51.962 --> 33:54.805
[SPEAKER_01]: And what do you know, you see the Prime Minister.

33:55.265 --> 34:00.550
[SPEAKER_01]: He gets in the elevator with you and he says, Hannah, how can I help Zelensky win?

34:01.731 --> 34:14.023
[SPEAKER_00]: Well, I would tell Andy Burnham that we've forgiven the UK for Brexit and then you should keep going, aligning very closely with Macron and Matt's on the issue, because E3 unity on Ukraine is going to be vital.

34:15.807 --> 34:16.267
[SPEAKER_01]: amazing.

34:17.208 --> 34:32.456
[SPEAKER_01]: Now it is younger next year in 2020, 7 and some here to 4 unknown woman leader is elected and she's having a summit of young female thinkers and leaders in foreign policy and you're invited.

34:33.117 --> 34:39.080
[SPEAKER_01]: And what do you know you find yourself in the elevator with the Secretary General on the way to giving your talk?

34:40.754 --> 34:50.062
[SPEAKER_01]: What is your advice on what the UN can do and what international institutions can do in resolving this conflict?

34:51.025 --> 35:12.960
[SPEAKER_00]: I would emphasize to her that this ongoing war is causing a lot of problems for global grain supplies, global grain prices, food prices, and that the UN needs to work a lot more actively behind closed doors, quietly to impress on other leaders to weigh in with Putin, to add a minimum agreed to an energy and food ceasefire.

35:20.884 --> 35:24.726
[SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, well, that was a real tour de force from Hannah Notine.

35:25.426 --> 35:26.627
[SPEAKER_01]: We shall outlast them.

35:27.327 --> 35:34.530
[SPEAKER_01]: Well, I hope we the disorder podcast show outlast the economic pressure that makes it incredibly difficult for us to continue.

35:35.130 --> 35:47.516
[SPEAKER_01]: The only way we really can continue is if you join the mega-orderer's club by going to disordershow.com forward slash club, joining the mega-orderer's club and supporting us, you know, we lose money every month.

35:48.136 --> 36:00.746
[SPEAKER_01]: So we're taking more content and pulling it behind the paywall for bonus and there's this amazing stuff that we talked about with Hannah that you should check out and you can only do that if you're a member of the mega order as club.

36:03.669 --> 36:05.751
[SPEAKER_01]: I really really enjoyed this pod.

36:05.791 --> 36:09.694
[SPEAKER_01]: We're going to have more on Hannah's main arguments on the sub stack.

36:10.755 --> 36:12.496
[SPEAKER_01]: You can join the sub stack, the ordering

36:18.422 --> 36:22.506
[SPEAKER_01]: And, as always, our producer has been the one, the only the George MacDonna.

36:24.248 --> 36:26.130
[SPEAKER_01]: Disorder is powered by Red Circle.

36:27.951 --> 36:34.458
[SPEAKER_01]: And, I am wishing you a Putin-free, merry-order mess.

