[SPEAKER_01]: Welcome to the Iran Breakdown, I'm your host Mark Dubois.
[SPEAKER_01]: For more than four decades, the contest between Tehran and Riyadh has been the organizing access of Middle East geopolitics, the Cold War between a revolutionary fiatcracy, and a kingdom that I'm so recently defined as self as the steward of Sunni Islam, and the status quo.
[SPEAKER_01]: Today both polls of that contest are made in real time.
[SPEAKER_01]: Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Haminay is dead, and Islamic Republic is reeling from the joint U.S. Israel campaign.
[SPEAKER_01]: The straight of her moves is contested.
[SPEAKER_01]: Saudi Arabia publicly lobbied against the strikes, while private leadership President Trump to act, and is now pressing Washington not to walk away from the job.
[SPEAKER_01]: Reads message to the White House is unambiguous, to not elite Iran with a chokehold on our knees, to not leave the regime with a nuclear missile and drone capabilities, it has used and will use again to threaten the kingdom in the Gulf.
[SPEAKER_01]: And looming over all of it is the question of whether Saudi Arabia, long warned by its defactor ruler that if Iran gets a bomb, we will follow.
[SPEAKER_01]: It is about to walk through a door that Iranians may have just kicked open.
[SPEAKER_01]: To break this down, I'm joined by one of the foremost scholars of the Arabian Peninsula and the world, Bernard Heiko, is Professor of Neary's Studies at Princeton University.
[SPEAKER_01]: We direct the Institute for the Trans-regional Study of the Contemporary Middle East.
[SPEAKER_01]: He is a senior fellow here at FDD, in the author or editor of foundational works on solid-fizmed Wahahi's and politics of the college.
[SPEAKER_01]: He's also writing what will be the definitive biography of Mohammed bin Salman, the country and its rise.
[SPEAKER_01]: It's called the realm, MBS and the transformation of Saudi Arabia, the forthcoming from the penguin press.
[SPEAKER_01]: Few people have spent more time in the room on the ground and in the archives understanding how the kingdom works, how the Legion works, and where MBS is taking it.
[SPEAKER_01]: Bernie.
[SPEAKER_01]: Welcome to the Iran breakdown.
[SPEAKER_01]: Thank you.
[SPEAKER_01]: It's lovely to be here.
[SPEAKER_01]: It's nice to finally be in DC as well.
[SPEAKER_01]: What's great to have you here?
[SPEAKER_01]: And obviously, you've been a great mentor to me and a good friend and somebody who's helped me understand Saudi Arabia and the Gulf for many years.
[SPEAKER_01]: I want to jump in on the question of MBS and what the kingdom thinks about Iran.
[SPEAKER_01]: You're writing this definitive biography of MBS, you've had unprecedented access to the man.
[SPEAKER_01]: And after all the time you spend with him and with the system, how does he personally understand the Iranian threat and how was that changed over the years and where do you think this relationship between React and Tehran is going?
[SPEAKER_00]: Okay, well, I think the thing about MBS is that he was mentored and educated by his father.
[SPEAKER_00]: And his father has a very keen, this is King Salman, has a very keen sense of history.
[SPEAKER_00]: And is extremely aware of the nature of the Iranian regime, both before the Revolution in 1979, when Iran also had hegemonic ambitions over the region.
[SPEAKER_00]: And since the revolution, now since the revolution with Hamani, the leader of the revolution, Ayatollah Hamani, who preceded Ayatollah Hamani, who was recently killed, the view of the Iranian Mullahs was that the regime in Saudi Arabia had to be toppled.
[SPEAKER_00]: that it could not, the world would remain a kind of a world of injustice, as long as the Al-Saroud, the Saudi royal family controlled Mecca and Medina.
[SPEAKER_00]: And he had very nasty words in describing the Saudi royal family.
[SPEAKER_00]: So someone like MBS knows that Iranian regime is an existential threat.
[SPEAKER_00]: to both his dynasty and to the political, you know, the way Saudi Arabia is politically constituted and that they will always want to control and have ambitions over Mecca and Medina.
[SPEAKER_00]: And you can see this by the way in popular culture that is produced by the Iranian Revolutionary regime where you have songs that constantly vilify and excoriate the Saudis.
[SPEAKER_00]: mainly describing them as lackeys of the West as traders, as bad Muslims or, you know, heretics and so on.
[SPEAKER_00]: So the Iranian Mullahs view Saudi Arabia and the same category as they would view, say, Israel, a country that they would want to see existentially annihilated, eliminated.
[SPEAKER_00]: So he has no illusions about the nature of the regime, and that this is a regime that threatens him.
[SPEAKER_00]: Now, what is changed with him is that he has tried every possible tactic to try to contain and ward off the dangers of this regime.
[SPEAKER_00]: Initially, when his father came to power, exceeded to the throne in 2015, he was MBS was extremely aggressive.
[SPEAKER_00]: you know, comparing how many to Hitler saying that we'll take the fight to them if they fight us will mainly meaning that he'll mobilize the minorities, I think minorities and Iran against the regime.
[SPEAKER_00]: He said things like if they acquire nuclear weapon, we would acquire nuclear weapon.
[SPEAKER_00]: He saw them as building a Hezbollah-like force in Yemen with the Houthis and stationing rockets and missiles on his border, so he really was extremely aggressive.
[SPEAKER_00]: The problem though for him is that his military capability to fight the proxies in Yemen or even to fight the Iranians directly is very limited.
[SPEAKER_00]: because the Iranians, as we know, play with either proxies and or cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, drones, and so on.
[SPEAKER_00]: So they play very dirty and they don't fight a conventional war.
[SPEAKER_00]: And his army is basically constituted to fight conventional wars.
[SPEAKER_00]: And so he's weak, militarily vis-a-vis Iran.
[SPEAKER_00]: So he's tried different things.
[SPEAKER_00]: And then when he couldn't defeat the Houthis and Yemen, because he wasn't willing to send his army in to fight them.
[SPEAKER_00]: Because he was a worried that you'd end up with a Vietnam like situation with the Saudis there, or in Afghanistan like situation.
[SPEAKER_00]: What he ended up doing was try to adopt a different policy with Iran, which is like, let's see if we can build, playkate them,
[SPEAKER_00]: for some time, hoping that how many would die and that the next regime over say it five to 10 year period would be less revolutionary and more nationalist.
[SPEAKER_00]: He wants them to become more nationalist and to abandon the revolution.
[SPEAKER_01]: I mean, I mean, some of the transformation that took place internally within Saudi Arabia, is that fair to say?
[SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, in a way similar to that, but unlike Saudi Arabia, I believe that the regime in Iran,
[SPEAKER_00]: will never abandon this ideology because if they do, they're risen on debt for their very reason for existing, would cease and they could notice the glue that holds that those revolutionaries together.
[SPEAKER_00]: So without vilifying America, without vilifying Saudi, without wanting to destroy Israel, there's no reason for this Mueller's regime to exist.
[SPEAKER_00]: Because they
[SPEAKER_00]: inflict tremendous suffering and pain on their own people in the name of the cost for the revolution right for projecting and fighting this war.
[SPEAKER_00]: So they would lose.
[SPEAKER_00]: And so I think he's attempted a detent with the Iranians, which ended up in an agreement,
[SPEAKER_00]: in March of 2023 of the resumption of the diplomatic relations they had shut down their embassies broker by the Chinese.
[SPEAKER_00]: This was finally kind of broker.
[SPEAKER_00]: The Chinese kind of gave their imprimatur at the end.
[SPEAKER_00]: The inclusion of the Chinese was again, MBS is way of saying which country out there has the most influence over Iran.
[SPEAKER_00]: It's likely to be China.
[SPEAKER_00]: So maybe we can get the
[SPEAKER_00]: There are nefarious activities, you know, there are tax on us and there are tax on us through proxy and so on.
[SPEAKER_00]: Obviously that didn't work, right?
[SPEAKER_00]: Recently the Saudis in this last war, the Saudis have been the victims of an Iranian repeated Iranian attacks.
[SPEAKER_00]: And so, and the and the Saudis MBS that is asked the Chinese to put pressure on the Iranians and the Chinese basically refused.
[SPEAKER_00]: So he's now in a situation where the taunt strategy has also not worked and does he go back to the very aggressive form of dealing with the Iranians as the UAE is doing or does he try to find some other kind of medium, kind of like a middle way between the UAE and between the taunt.
[SPEAKER_00]: This is all now being discussed in Riyadh as we speak, I mean in the Royal Court as to what's
[SPEAKER_01]: Well, it's interesting, because sort of this middle way between the UAE and other countries in the Gulf was kind of on full display, I thought, in the lead up to the February 28th war, where publicly MBS was talking about not allowing the United States to use Saudi bases.
[SPEAKER_01]: publicly lobbying against President Trump to initiate major military operations against Iranians.
[SPEAKER_01]: And yet, privately, there was some reporting that he and other Saudi officials were actually encouraging the United States to hit the regime in Iran hard.
[SPEAKER_01]: And then since the war has started, there's also been public reporting that on one hand, you know, they want to see some kind of ceasefire and negotiations on the other hand.
[SPEAKER_01]: They don't want to leave this regime standing.
[SPEAKER_01]: You know, kind of a wounded animal with half of its missile capability still intact still tens of thousands of drones.
[SPEAKER_01]: And
[SPEAKER_01]: having now shut down or moves to Saudi oil shipments.
[SPEAKER_01]: They want to see the United States not walk away from this.
[SPEAKER_01]: Is that Saudi Arabia sort of playing both sides of the tent?
[SPEAKER_00]: So, I mean, they certainly don't want to US to walk away from it.
[SPEAKER_00]: I think the Saudi view is still
[SPEAKER_00]: quite ambivalent.
[SPEAKER_00]: You know, they want Iran contained, they want the regime to stop its aggression.
[SPEAKER_00]: They're worried that if the regime fails completely and you end up with a civil war, like Libya and Iran, you would end up with chaos and then that would affect them with refugee flows and so on.
[SPEAKER_00]: So I think that there, frankly, maybe one way to describe how they think about all this is that
[SPEAKER_00]: ambivalent, maybe confused.
[SPEAKER_00]: They don't really see a silver bullet solution to this.
[SPEAKER_00]: They want, yes, they want pressure on your own, but not so much pressure that you end up with chaos.
[SPEAKER_00]: The reason for their ambivalence is this, and it's a very simple thing, actually.
[SPEAKER_00]: Saudi Arabia depends for at least 65% of its water consumption on desalination.
[SPEAKER_00]: These desalination plants are on the Persian Gulf, on the coast, and they're also on the Red Sea.
[SPEAKER_00]: And they're extremely vulnerable.
[SPEAKER_00]: And if the Iranians hit them, you can't quickly fix them.
[SPEAKER_00]: It's not like a pipeline that can be quickly repaired.
[SPEAKER_00]: It would take a very long time.
[SPEAKER_00]: And you have cities with seven, eight million people like Riyadh, for instance, that would probably have to be evacuated.
[SPEAKER_00]: So for them, and attack on desal plans, is the equivalent of a nuclear weapon going off in their country.
[SPEAKER_00]: And they don't have a way to defend against that.
[SPEAKER_00]: So the way I see the Saudi position,
[SPEAKER_00]: is one of a defensive crouch because a fear that if this war is, if the Iranians get to take a shot at them, then they would have a real problem kind of dealing with the humanitarian consequences.
[SPEAKER_00]: Domestically, right.
[SPEAKER_01]: I'm interesting to contrast the approach of Saturday with UAE, for example, and I want to talk about some of the other Gulf states like Oman and Katan Bahrain as well But I mean if you if you really think about Saturday, maybe in the UAE with respect to Iran They're taking very different approaches of this publicly And the MRId is finally after years of allowing Dubai to be used as a sanctions-busting
[SPEAKER_01]: money laundering jurisdiction for Iran, they seem to have started to crack down on that.
[SPEAKER_01]: So financially, like cutting off this sort of financial long of the regime.
[SPEAKER_01]: Militarily, again, public reports, not clear if it's true or not, but that the Emirati Air Force and Emirati military has been involved, potentially an offensive operation against Islamic Republic.
[SPEAKER_01]: And also obviously very close cooperation with Israel.
[SPEAKER_01]: It was reported out recently that Israel actually provided the Emirates with the Iron Dome air defense system as well as the Barack system, which had been very useful to the Emirates and defending against these drones and missiles that have been fired at the Emirates.
[SPEAKER_01]: So taking a very aggressive posture, but one very closely aligned with the United States and with Israel in this war.
[SPEAKER_01]: And then Saudi Arabia, as you say,
[SPEAKER_01]: more ambivalence.
[SPEAKER_01]: I don't see any evidence they're involved in military operations.
[SPEAKER_01]: Clearly the United States has been defending Saudi Arabia, but it'd be interesting to ask you the question about whether a close relationship with Israel would have been more useful to them.
[SPEAKER_01]: in terms of air defenses and other is really defense technology or what would it have put them in the crosshairs of the Iranians and their desalination plants at risk.
[SPEAKER_01]: And then financially what's your sense of on the financial side in terms of Saudi.
[SPEAKER_01]: you know, the financial and intelligence pictures specifically.
[SPEAKER_01]: Are they choking off Iranian money flows?
[SPEAKER_01]: Are they shutting down sanctions of Asian networks?
[SPEAKER_01]: Or is it is there very little business between Saudi Arabia and Iran to begin with?
[SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[SPEAKER_01]: And it's not like Dubai.
[SPEAKER_00]: No, the Saudis really have very little business with the Iranians.
[SPEAKER_00]: And in fact, the Saudis, after 9-11,
[SPEAKER_00]: several years after 9-11, you know, instituted all kinds of policies for controlling money flows.
[SPEAKER_00]: And this was mainly because of Al Qaeda and ISIS.
[SPEAKER_00]: So I don't think there's any financial dealings between the Saudis and Iranians.
[SPEAKER_00]: And as I said, I mean, the Saudis really do see the Iran regime as an enemy regime and an existential threat.
[SPEAKER_00]: So I don't think they would work with them or help them in any way.
[SPEAKER_00]: The Iranians have been quite clever, what the Iranians have done is they've tried to split the GCC countries.
[SPEAKER_00]: They've treated, and you can see this in the targeting, by the way.
[SPEAKER_00]: The number of missiles and drones that have hit the UAE is much more, in fact, more than Israel, and certainly much, much more than Kuwait or Saudi or Bahrain or Qatar.
[SPEAKER_00]: And so this is, I think, a deliberate policy on the part of the Iranians to try to
[SPEAKER_00]: say that the UAE because of its treaty because of the Abraham Accords with Israel is the real enemy and they've said this kind of openly that they're actually trying to topple the regime there and that you listen to one of the Iranian shills and Iranian professor called Marandi, you know, I mean it's just very clear.
[SPEAKER_00]: And so I think the UAE feels genuinely that there's a zero some competition here with the Iranians, like either we survive or they survive, but the two can no longer coexist.
[SPEAKER_00]: And that's why they've taken these positions.
[SPEAKER_00]: They've also benefited from these rallies in terms of defense.
[SPEAKER_00]: It's a much smaller territory to defend and the Saudis huge is bigger than Western Europe.
[SPEAKER_00]: And I think also that the Saudis have long kind of bureaucratic and diplomatic tradition of being super cautious, preferring to pay, like use check what is called checkbook diplomacy to try to ward off.
[SPEAKER_00]: Threats and you still have remnants of those people in the system in the kingdom.
[SPEAKER_00]: So when MBS is thinking about Iran He'll have a variety of views saying, you know in the past we've done this and it's worked and you know You don't need to go super aggressive on them, you know, maybe you let's try this instead and so on.
[SPEAKER_00]: So I think that you know He is really trying to
[SPEAKER_00]: It's trying every possibility, including the Pakistanis.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, the whole Pakistani effort at mediation is strongly endorsed by the Saudis.
[SPEAKER_00]: And it actually is, in part, so let me back up a bit, before the war last years, the Saudis signed a mutual defense agreement with the Pakistanis.
[SPEAKER_00]: The idea was that because Pakistan has strong
[SPEAKER_00]: ties with Iran that mutual defense agreement would act as a deterrent.
[SPEAKER_00]: It would help stop Iranians from attacking Saudi Arabia once the war started, which the Saudis believed it would.
[SPEAKER_00]: That didn't work.
[SPEAKER_00]: So the Pakistani's given their strong ties to the Chinese said, you know, we will do everything to bring the Chinese on board.
[SPEAKER_00]: to get the Iranians to stop and then that didn't work either and then the Pakistanis also sent airplanes and pilots to Saudi Arabia saying that they will help defend Saudi Arabia not from Pakistan but from Saudi should the Iranians keep attacking.
[SPEAKER_00]: You know, this is one of the many ways the Saudis have tried to defend themselves.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, clearly they're not like the UAE.
[SPEAKER_00]: They're not as aggressive.
[SPEAKER_00]: And you can see this today, by the way, even in today's news, where the UAE dropped out of OPEC and OPEC plus to pursue their own independent oil policy.
[SPEAKER_00]: And this again has to do with not wanting to be tied to a Saudi dominated.
[SPEAKER_00]: oil cartel where that was constantly restricting their production.
[SPEAKER_00]: They want to just do whatever production they want.
[SPEAKER_00]: They want to do and they are planning to build up to 5 million barrels of daily production capacity by 2027.
[SPEAKER_00]: I believe they're at 4 now.
[SPEAKER_00]: So that's a huge amount of oil.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, they will be like another Saudi Arabia in terms of spare capacity in oil markets.
[SPEAKER_00]: So the UAE is kind of its own much more aggressive, much more independent.
[SPEAKER_00]: But again, because they just don't see their tied to the West, their tied to America, their tied to Israel.
[SPEAKER_00]: They've made their bets, they've put their chips there.
[SPEAKER_00]: And the Saudis are still trying to put their chips on multiple
[SPEAKER_00]: kind of numbers and trying to see if, you know, what combination will work.
[SPEAKER_00]: Sooner later, I think the Saudis, though, will have to revert to the UAE position.
[SPEAKER_00]: Because I don't think this Iran regime is going to give up almost easily.
[SPEAKER_00]: And they're not going to give up on their ballistic and drone capabilities.
[SPEAKER_00]: And they're always going to be an extorter.
[SPEAKER_00]: trying to extort the Gulf countries for passage, for security and safety.
[SPEAKER_00]: It's like a mafia, or living next to an arsonist who's constantly threatening to burn your house and is willing to burn their own house, so you have to pay them not to do it.
[SPEAKER_00]: And I think the Saudis are not going to be comfortable with that situation long term.
[SPEAKER_01]: So you think, I mean, after putting chips on, on,
[SPEAKER_01]: You know, multiple numbers that didn't come up, the Chinese play, the Pakistani play, um, trying to hedge, um, and obviously hedging with, with the Russians as well.
[SPEAKER_01]: You think that B.S.
[SPEAKER_01]: is moving closer and closer to a realization that at the end of the day, his security and the security of the kingdom and the prosperity of the kingdom depends on close to line with the United States and, and Israel.
[SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I think, to certainly the United States, that's not going to change.
[SPEAKER_00]: And I think when it comes to Israel, he's likely to want some of the kit that these Israelis have because it works.
[SPEAKER_00]: Um, he's a very practical guy.
[SPEAKER_00]: He's not a, you know, he's not an ideal log and he's a nationalist.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, if there is an ideology there, it's a nationalist ideology.
[SPEAKER_00]: And whatever is in the interest, the strategic interests of Saudi Arabia, he will do.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, he's not going to adopt sort of ideological positions of resistance to Israel or resistance to empire or resistance to the Western.
[SPEAKER_00]: And you know, none of that matters to him at all.
[SPEAKER_00]: It doesn't resonate.
[SPEAKER_01]: I mean, what's interesting to me is that, you know, if I were NBS, I've met NBS a couple times, but obviously I haven't spent as much time with him as you have.
[SPEAKER_01]: By the way, I mean, very interesting guy, very affable, very charming, very smart.
[SPEAKER_01]: in how we sort of think about the region, the global competition between the super powers and Saudi Arabia's role.
[SPEAKER_01]: And I think for anybody who's been in Saudi Arabia pre-NBS and now during NBS, the transformation of the country is extraordinary in every way.
[SPEAKER_01]: But it would seem to me that if I were looking at American political vicissitudes in 2021,
[SPEAKER_01]: Um, whoever's in the White House of Democrat is not like to be pro Saudi Republican who maybe skeptical if it's not Marco Rubio, um, that he would be worried about where the United States would be going with respect to the U.S. Saudi relationship, the defense of Saudi Arabia against a still hostile Iran.
[SPEAKER_01]: And a recognition that the only real military power that is in the Middle East and is staying in the Middle East is Israel.
[SPEAKER_01]: At least the only military power that's going to be of any assistance to him against the Iranians.
[SPEAKER_01]: I mean the Turks are a military power, but I don't see the Turks defending Saudi Arabia against...
[SPEAKER_01]: and Iranian threat.
[SPEAKER_01]: That would seem to me to increase the likelihood of greater US Saudi Israel normalization.
[SPEAKER_01]: That's sort of that triangular relationship.
[SPEAKER_01]: Is that where you see things going?
[SPEAKER_00]: Well, I definitely see that the calendar in terms of time, so 2021 will be the end of President Trump's second term.
[SPEAKER_00]: And I think MBS would ideally want to lock in as many agreements with the US and Israel because it's a package and I think it is presented to him as a package before President Trump leaves the office.
[SPEAKER_00]: So in that package would involve not just normalization, which would be staged, and so it's not like automatic immediate, sort of, you know, visits between leaders and embassies on.
[SPEAKER_00]: There would be a process as he sees it.
[SPEAKER_00]: But also it would involve all kinds of commitments from the United States to Saudi Arabia, including
[SPEAKER_00]: a much stronger mutual defense agreement, a nuclear agreement, you know, he already has the AI agreement, but he could beef that up some more.
[SPEAKER_00]: He would want, say, weapon sales to be streamlined and made, you know, more, you know, less onerous in terms of congressional oversight.
[SPEAKER_00]: So those are the kinds of things that he wants from the US.
[SPEAKER_00]: He wants to secure
[SPEAKER_00]: And he can't do that on his own, he needs America, and he needs ideally a kind of alliance system.
[SPEAKER_00]: Understand, calm, that definitely would include Israel.
[SPEAKER_01]: Let me ask you about the nuclear element of that because there certainly has been quite a bit of discussion here at FDD and in Washington about the question of providing a country with domestic enrichment capabilities or plutonium reprocessing capabilities.
[SPEAKER_01]: And we've had a long-standing position at FDD that
[SPEAKER_01]: no country, ally or certainly adversary, should be given the core nuclear capabilities that it could use to produce nuclear weapons.
[SPEAKER_01]: And of course, we've had a quite outspoken position for many years that the Islamic Republic of Iran should never get that.
[SPEAKER_01]: And that's why the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the JCPOA in 2015, was a fairly flawed agreement because it surrendered in Richmond and reprocessing to the leading state sponsor of terrorism.
[SPEAKER_01]: and that it then had these restrictions, I would sign said over time, and Iran would emerge with this industrial size, enrichment capability, and would allow it to, at a time of its choosing, develop nuclear weapons.
[SPEAKER_01]: But we've also adopted a position that Saudi Arabia, even though we see, obviously, Saudi Arabia as a close US ally, should also not have these enrichment capabilities, because, again,
[SPEAKER_01]: which the Emeraldies have signed up to amongst others.
[SPEAKER_01]: You can have a civilian nuclear program and you can buy your fuel rods in the international market.
[SPEAKER_01]: You don't need that capability that can be turned into weapons, nuclear weapons capability.
[SPEAKER_01]: How does NBS see this?
[SPEAKER_01]: What are some of the options with respect to
[SPEAKER_01]: a Saudi nuclear program and how much of an obstacle would that be to concluding this broader comprehensive agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia that that also would bring in these rallies.
[SPEAKER_00]: Right.
[SPEAKER_00]: So my sense.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean.
[SPEAKER_00]: First of all, I think you have to distinction between rhetoric and reality, okay?
[SPEAKER_00]: So, this is true for the Middle East in general.
[SPEAKER_00]: But the Saudis will talk about wanting things, but whether they actually ever develop them or acquire them is another matter.
[SPEAKER_00]: Like for instance, they want 16 nuclear power plants.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, that's a huge...
[SPEAKER_00]: And multi-year investment and I doubt will ever see that many nuclear power plants if any in the kingdom.
[SPEAKER_00]: The idea with having nuclear power plants is to be able to liberate more oil and gas for export.
[SPEAKER_00]: So given that, I think what the Saudis know is,
[SPEAKER_00]: is that they have large uranium deposits and they want to be able to benefit from those deposits in terms of exports.
[SPEAKER_00]: You know this mining is kind of an extension of oil and petrochemicals in a way so it's sort of in their daily work, right?
[SPEAKER_00]: So they want to develop those mines.
[SPEAKER_00]: Now they've talked about wanting to process
[SPEAKER_00]: And here there are a lot of rumors.
[SPEAKER_00]: Some say, you know, just yellow cakes, some say, no much more.
[SPEAKER_00]: But if you look at the actual economics of processing and exporting, it doesn't make sense at all, right?
[SPEAKER_00]: So again, I doubt they'll ever go,
[SPEAKER_00]: even if they even say they want it, they'll ever actually develop that kind of capability.
[SPEAKER_00]: What they do want is, as I said, to develop the uranium deposits, and what they also do want, is protection from the potential of Iranian nuclear weapon.
[SPEAKER_00]: And so they've said publicly, he said, if they acquire a weapon, we're going to acquire a weapon.
[SPEAKER_00]: I think there are many ways for them to get a nuclear umbrella and defense without actually them, they developing their own nuclear weapons.
[SPEAKER_00]: So one idea that's been floated and that MBS has talked about is that he could imagine US nuclear weapons being based on Saudi soil, man by US, to protect him from the Iranians ever getting a weapon or actually having one.
[SPEAKER_00]: He also, there also been talk that if they ever do processing, it wouldn't be them processing, although it would happen in their country, it would be Americans doing it there, you know, all kinds of guarantees and so on.
[SPEAKER_00]: So I think we're very far from any of that.
[SPEAKER_00]: What I do know he would want more than anything are two things.
[SPEAKER_00]: One is that he wants to develop those uranium deposits, whether they are processed or not, is a kind of second order question, not a first order question.
[SPEAKER_00]: And the other is that he wants a nuclear protection, a nuclear umbrella type situation, if the Iranians get a weapon, and he would be perfectly happy with the Americans providing that for him.
[SPEAKER_00]: He's trying to acquire, he's trying to link Saudi Arabia to the United States.
[SPEAKER_00]: militarily and strategically, but also in terms of AI, technologically, and a way that where he can turn around to his people and say, you know, I'm the first king who was able to deliver what no other king was able to deliver, you know, which is not some sort of, you know, verbal agreement of protection, but actual and actual treaty that protects us and actual treaty that gives us
[SPEAKER_00]: the right to develop these deposits and actual treaty that gives us U.S. nuclear weapons protection and actual treaty on AI and all of that.
[SPEAKER_00]: So he wants real wins.
[SPEAKER_00]: And so that he can say, I've put the Saudi national interest first before anything else.
[SPEAKER_00]: And no king has done that.
[SPEAKER_01]: This is interesting to me, because you mentioned Pakistan and the mutual defense treaty that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed last year, and it does remind me that it was the Saudis actually financed the Pakistani nuclear weapons program.
[SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[SPEAKER_01]: Is there any sense in Riyadh and from MBS himself that at any moment MBS could pick up a phone, call the Pakistanis and have a deliverable nuclear weapon in Riyadh within a couple
[SPEAKER_00]: So look, there's been a lot, you know, we hear a lot about this possibility.
[SPEAKER_00]: I personally don't think so.
[SPEAKER_00]: And if the Saudis think that the Pakistanis will give them a nuclear weapon, I think they're dreaming.
[SPEAKER_00]: Because what people often don't realize, I mean,
[SPEAKER_00]: including in the region and the Middle East, is that, you know, and nuclear weapon is not just a weapon.
[SPEAKER_00]: It's like a whole system, it's a whole culture, it's a whole way of dealing with the thing.
[SPEAKER_00]: And the Pakistanis have it, the Indians have it, but, you know, it's not just bringing a weapon over.
[SPEAKER_00]: And the Saudis don't have any of that.
[SPEAKER_00]: you know, and that takes a generation to build that kind of culture for managing a weapon and handling it and so on.
[SPEAKER_00]: And the Pakistan is just not going to hand that over to them.
[SPEAKER_00]: They can't.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, it's just not, I don't think it's even feasible, you know, for them to do that.
[SPEAKER_01]: Is there, and so the question then is the sort of mutual defense treaty.
[SPEAKER_01]: I mean, if I were with Saudis, I wouldn't trust a Pakistani mutual defense treaty.
[SPEAKER_01]: I don't know what that gets me.
[SPEAKER_01]: You don't see how Islamabad is at all reliable.
[SPEAKER_01]: with respect to him.
[SPEAKER_00]: He knows that, by the way, because in 2015, when they decided to attack the Houthis in Yemen, they asked the Pakistanis, and the Pakistanis had a vote and promised that no.
[SPEAKER_00]: Yeah.
[SPEAKER_00]: So they have experience with the Pakistanis, not coming through for them.
[SPEAKER_01]: So obviously, a mutual defense treaty with the United States is the gold standard, and that's certainly what MBS wants, and we would assume that there would be some very active negotiations going on right now to get that locked in before President Trump leaves office.
[SPEAKER_01]: but a mutual defense treaty or some...
[SPEAKER_01]: architecture, it binds, re-ad, and Jerusalem together, seems to make even more sense than having this Pakistani guarantee.
[SPEAKER_01]: I mean, if you've got these railies who have nuclear weapons, who have a powerful military, who have a sophisticated AI industry, who have sophisticated defense tech industry, and can provide not only technology, but truly a fighting force that's capable of taking on
[SPEAKER_01]: uh, enemies not just by the way, the Iranians, but also the Muslim brotherhood, which I think for MBS, he sees that as a threat to the kingdom as well.
[SPEAKER_01]: Um, locking in that relationship between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
[SPEAKER_01]: with U.S. oversight and integration under Sandcom, would seem to me if I were in the S to be a real strategic benefit.
[SPEAKER_00]: Yeah.
[SPEAKER_01]: And the question I have for you is not just on the strategic benefit element, which I think is obvious, but on the politics of that in the kingdom and how that plays to the Saudi people in the wake of October 7th.
[SPEAKER_00]: Yeah.
[SPEAKER_00]: So, I mean,
[SPEAKER_00]: You know, I met with him, I think late August, or September, 2023, just before the attacks.
[SPEAKER_00]: September, I think it was 2023, and he gave an interview to Fox News at the time with Brett Bear, where it was clear that that's exactly what he had in mind.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, exactly what you just described, which is this umbrella.
[SPEAKER_00]: with Israel and the United States providing the sent comments on, providing the protection.
[SPEAKER_00]: And I think that would have happened, had October 7th not taken place.
[SPEAKER_00]: Since then, what's happened is that you have a young generation of studies that was not politicized.
[SPEAKER_00]: You know, his core constituency is the young.
[SPEAKER_00]: And those people weren't politicized.
[SPEAKER_00]: October 7th and all the images and the news coverage, especially from Jezira, did politicize this generation.
[SPEAKER_01]: So from Al Jazeera owned by the Cateri Royal Family, promoting there is Lamist Muslim Brotherhood agenda, which itself represents a threat to the kingdom.
[SPEAKER_01]: So the, so MBS is getting this, from all sides, from the Iranian side, from the Brotherhood,
[SPEAKER_00]: And also the social media that has a lot of Muslim brotherhood and ideology as well being promoted.
[SPEAKER_00]: So yes.
[SPEAKER_00]: So that generation has become more politicized and so he does feel MBS does feel pressure from his own society.
[SPEAKER_00]: Something should be done for the Palestinians, namely what they called an irrevocable road map to a Palestinian state.
[SPEAKER_00]: As far as I can tell, mean that he wants these really to offer some sort of symbolic gesture to the Palestinians, begin negotiating with the Palestinians, while retaining a veto, these areas would retain a veto over the outcome, meaning that whatever a Palestinian state if a Palestinian state should ever emerge, it would not have any of the things that these
[SPEAKER_00]: And so that was the one thing that got added more seriously after October 7th.
[SPEAKER_00]: And I think it's mostly for domestic reasons.
[SPEAKER_00]: And I suspect also that with time that desire for this will probably receive in terms of Saudi demand.
[SPEAKER_01]: You think you think it's going to recede in the wake of Iranian acts on the kingdom?
[SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I think so.
[SPEAKER_00]: I think so.
[SPEAKER_00]: I think, you know what this war has done is it's concentrated the minds of the Saudis in ways.
[SPEAKER_00]: And I think a lot of people in the Arabian Peninsula is concentrated their minds in a way that it's become very clear that Iran is an existential threat to them.
[SPEAKER_00]: That they had planned for years to destroy the infrastructure of these countries.
[SPEAKER_00]: and that they have that capability without nuclear weapons.
[SPEAKER_00]: Also, the Iranians can quite easily and cheaply block Hormos.
[SPEAKER_00]: That I think was not known.
[SPEAKER_00]: The idea that they could try to block it was there, but just how easily that can be done, because of insurance rates and because of these tankers costing so much, and how long it takes to build one and so on.
[SPEAKER_00]: I think all of that came as a bit of a surprise to many, and they are now talking, the Saudis are talking to the Quadis and others about building more pipelines so that everything gets, gets transported from the east to the Red Sea.
[SPEAKER_00]: So, you know, there's thinking about all kinds of ways to get around hormones, but ultimately you can really catch because it's not just about oil and gas, it's also about all kinds of other things that need to be transported namely
[SPEAKER_00]: You know, and so the present situation is just unacceptable for them, and they will not allow the Iranians to be in control of that straight.
[SPEAKER_00]: And essentially, you know, choking them at will.
[SPEAKER_00]: And so I think all of that means that they're going to have to rethink a lot of their strategic posture, including what Israel can bring to the table for them in terms of protection and security.
[SPEAKER_00]: because they're going to privilege their protection security over anything and everything else after once this war is over and you'll see it.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean for instance, you know, they've become much closer to the Ukrainians because of the drones.
[SPEAKER_00]: They realize that the Russians are basically their enemies because the Russians really want chaos and always have wanted chaos in the Gulf because their oil becomes much more valuable and precious.
[SPEAKER_00]: The Russians are the main backers of the Iranians and they've given them targeting data and information for the Iranians to hit places all over the GCC countries.
[SPEAKER_00]: So, you know, I think a lot of the illusions that were there before have kind of disappeared, and you're going to see a much more realistic view and a set of policies on what really matters to them and matters to their security.
[SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, it's interesting to mention Ukraine, because I mean, as you know, Bernie, foundation for defense democracies, defending Believer democracies, and certainly high on our list are the Taiwanese, the Israelis, and the Ukrainians.
[SPEAKER_01]: And I think Zelensky really has emerged as one of the most forceful in our ticket European leaders at this time.
[SPEAKER_01]: Perhaps the only European leader that is actually provided anything of value.
[SPEAKER_01]: in this Iran war by sending anti-drone technology and anti-drone expertise to our Gulf allies to help them fend off these Shahi drone attacks.
[SPEAKER_01]: So yeah, the Ukrainians have really, I think,
[SPEAKER_01]: been exemplary allies, and I always talked to my friends on the right that this sort of anti-U crane pro-Russia sentiment and elements of the Republican Party is just dangerous for American national security, as is this anti-Israel sentiment on the left in the Democratic Party.
[SPEAKER_01]: And that really, it's Israel and Ukraine that have really been exemplary model allies.
[SPEAKER_01]: over the past.
[SPEAKER_00]: Well, they certainly carry their own water.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, they're not asking for US troops to defend them.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, which is unlike many other so-called allies, right?
[SPEAKER_00]: Where they can't defend themselves.
[SPEAKER_01]: Right.
[SPEAKER_01]: I mean, they fight and unfortunately die in their own defense.
[SPEAKER_01]: You mentioned the Red Sea, and that sort of gets me to Houthis, geopolitics, but also energy politics.
[SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[SPEAKER_01]: Because the Saudis and the Emirites have been using two pipelines
[SPEAKER_01]: that has been blockaded in horror moves out to the red sea.
[SPEAKER_01]: I think it's the east-west pipeline that the Saudis use.
[SPEAKER_01]: Right.
[SPEAKER_01]: It's the Fujaira pipeline that the Emirates use.
[SPEAKER_01]: Right.
[SPEAKER_01]: I mean, moving.
[SPEAKER_01]: But what is it?
[SPEAKER_01]: Five, six million barrels a day?
[SPEAKER_00]: Yeah.
[SPEAKER_00]: It's up to seven million on the east-west and one point five to Fujaira.
[SPEAKER_01]: Okay, so I mean, that's, you know, seven and a half million barrels a day.
[SPEAKER_01]: I mean, that's been critical to keeping oil prices down and getting oil flowing, but it's moving in the red sea and that brings up the issues of the hoothies.
[SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, that obviously attacking red sea shipping over the past number of years, and it's always been interesting to me why that that dog hasn't barked why the hoothies haven't gotten.
[SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, more intimately involved in the so-or-on war on behalf of their Iranian masters.
[SPEAKER_01]: What's your take on that?
[SPEAKER_00]: So, first, I think to understand the Houthis, I mean, obviously there's an internal domestic Yemeni dynamic that explains their rise, but the Iranians were very, very able and very early on from the 1990s to cultivate certain people in Yemen, eventually leading to the Houthi movement.
[SPEAKER_00]: And so the Houthis are a proxy of the Iranians.
[SPEAKER_00]: The non-aproxy in the same way as Huzballa is, although Huzballa is a very important role in developing the Houthi capability in drones and missiles.
[SPEAKER_00]: But the Houthis basically see themselves in alliance and in this access of resistance with Iran.
[SPEAKER_00]: And Houthis can actually create a real problem in Bevel Mandab, the entrance from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea.
[SPEAKER_00]: And the reason they haven't done this are two, I think, they haven't blocked it again.
[SPEAKER_00]: One is that there are rumors, and I suspect there are more than rumors, of the Saudis having paid them off, not to attack Saudi Arabia.
[SPEAKER_00]: And these payments are not very major, but they've covered sort of the salaries of bureaucrats and some of the soldiers and so on.
[SPEAKER_00]: So this is the sort of thing that the Iranians also want to do, you know, post-war is to basically extort for protection.
[SPEAKER_00]: And that's not sustainable.
[SPEAKER_00]: So one reason is the payment.
[SPEAKER_00]: The other is, I think the Houthis have been seriously weakened.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean the attacks that the Americans wage against them and then the Israelis have been quite devastating for them and that's I think another reason they haven't been much more active but the idea that you can build out pipelines more pipelines and that the Red Sea is safe and secure forever which is what the Saudis and the Kuwaitis and so on are talking about now is false.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean because the Houthis
[SPEAKER_00]: can if they if they have the capability and they can easily get that capability they can block that momentum again and that means you're you have a choke hold me two choke points harm moves and that momentum closed and that would be a very very serious I mean it would devastate the the countries of the GCC but it would also you know be have a devastating effect on the global economy
[SPEAKER_00]: something like 14, 15% of all global trade goes through the Red Sea and up through Suez.
[SPEAKER_00]: And certainly it would mean no oil and gas coming out at all.
[SPEAKER_01]: So the interesting from a society perspective, if you're going to build more pipelines, and you build more pipelines to the Red Sea, but you have that vulnerability with the Houthis, clearly you cannot let the Iranians dominate or lose because or lose will always be a critical
[SPEAKER_01]: area where we're oil and other commodities flows, but if you're building pipelines, eventually build pipelines that actually connects Saudi Arabia to Israel.
[SPEAKER_01]: and then the Mediterranean.
[SPEAKER_01]: And then have the Mediterranean as a third outlet for your oil.
[SPEAKER_01]: And I mean, do you see that?
[SPEAKER_00]: Well, there was already a pipeline, by the way, called the tap line that actually brought Saudi oil from the eastern province.
[SPEAKER_00]: This was built in the 50s.
[SPEAKER_00]: And that ultimately ended up in Lebanon, but originally it was also supposed to it could have easily gone to Hifah as well.
[SPEAKER_00]: as a terminus for Saudi oil.
[SPEAKER_00]: So yeah, that pipeline exists.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, it would need to be re-den and rehabilitated, but one could easily see that happening.
[SPEAKER_00]: And also, one can see that, again, this was something that was being discussed right intensely before the October 7 events that there would be a corridor for shipments, for goods from India all the way to Europe via,
[SPEAKER_00]: Saudi Arabia and then I'll tell you.
[SPEAKER_00]: This is the eye man.
[SPEAKER_00]: Time man.
[SPEAKER_00]: That's right.
[SPEAKER_00]: Yeah.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, when MBS thinks about the future of the region, he thinks about a kind of European union and economic integrated zone with his country as a major hub.
[SPEAKER_00]: connecting Asia, Africa to Europe, and that Israel would be intimately part of that whole setup, because for the whole region to prosper, you need Israel to be included.
[SPEAKER_01]: Right, so Israel brings access to the Mediterranean.
[SPEAKER_01]: Israel brings a powerful military.
[SPEAKER_01]: Israel brings technology to fans tech and other technology that cyber and AI and other
[SPEAKER_01]: I mean, the Saudis can always assume, I think, safely, that Israel has no desire to bring down.
[SPEAKER_01]: That's right.
[SPEAKER_00]: Look at the kingdom.
[SPEAKER_00]: Look at where Neon was as being set up and built.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, Neon was like within spinning distance of Israel.
[SPEAKER_00]: Right.
[SPEAKER_00]: If they were worried about Israel, they wouldn't build their futuristic city there.
[SPEAKER_01]: Well, actually, with Neymar, I want to ask you about Vision 2030 in the broader project, because so Vision 2030 was, I think, built on the assumption of a stable region and a globalized kingdom and open for tourism, sports, capital.
[SPEAKER_01]: And now you've got warntas borders, you've got drones, you've got missiles, you've got attacks against oil infrastructure, you've got, you know,
[SPEAKER_01]: How survivable do you think 2030 is in this environment?
[SPEAKER_01]: And add to that, how do you think 2030's going?
[SPEAKER_01]: And you mentioned Neon, which has had some serious problems getting off the ground and took the Saudis have been shutting down or scaling back on other gigan mega projects.
[SPEAKER_01]: What's your assessment of 2030 today?
[SPEAKER_00]: So,
[SPEAKER_00]: So first, you write that, you know, that the whole plan is about diversifying the economy of Saudi Arabia, making it less dependent on oil and gas and petrochemicals and developing new sectors of the economy.
[SPEAKER_00]: That's what Vision 2030 is about, you know, tourism is part of it, AI is another, you know, logistics, travel, you know, all kinds of manufacturing as well, logistics.
[SPEAKER_00]: None of that can really fully develop if the region is not stable.
[SPEAKER_00]: And for Saudi Arabia, the region means not just Iran being kind of less hostile, being kind of friendly, but also the end to the civil war in Sudan, and end to the wars in Yemen, the security instability of Jordan and of Iraq.
[SPEAKER_00]: So, you know,
[SPEAKER_00]: Often when you talk to, let's say, Saudi leaders, this is not MBS, but let's say the head of intelligence will tell you something like that we are a beautiful garden surrounded by wildfires all around, right?
[SPEAKER_00]: And we want to keep this garden, but we also want the fires to go out.
[SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, these really say that they're a villa in a jungle.
[SPEAKER_01]: So they're using different metaphors to
[SPEAKER_00]: underscore the same concept, the same idea.
[SPEAKER_00]: So definitely you need all of that for it to happen.
[SPEAKER_00]: Now, turning to vision 2030 itself and it's whether it's successful or not, I think here the record is mixed.
[SPEAKER_00]: So for instance, on many issues, vision 2030 has been successful, so on the social transformation,
[SPEAKER_00]: the making Saudi Arabia feel like a normal place rather than a place where zealots run around.
[SPEAKER_00]: Making life hellish for young people, especially for women.
[SPEAKER_00]: The incorporation of women into the workforce, it's nearly tripled.
[SPEAKER_00]: Removing all the guardianship rules that constrain the lives of women.
[SPEAKER_00]: That's also gone.
[SPEAKER_00]: So I think on the domestic, having all this entertainment, Saudi Arabia being a place where you can have fun where there are like comedy sellers and all kinds of other movie theaters.
[SPEAKER_01]: Saudi Arabia is a great place to go now.
[SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, it's an awesome place to go and people are really friendly and nice.
[SPEAKER_00]: So, on all of that, it's been very, very successful, right?
[SPEAKER_00]: On the economic front, oh, also, I mean, I think if you look at the numbers in terms of, you know, the percentage of home ownership has gone up significantly, because they have new mortgage plans.
[SPEAKER_00]: If you look at, you know, on a number of kind of core metrics, it's been quite good.
[SPEAKER_00]: On some issues it hasn't like for instance some number of these gigaprojects are just way too expensive and too Kind of exotic and their and the country doesn't have the money for it.
[SPEAKER_00]: You know because the price of oil has been that low relatively speaking now Of course if the price of oil hits 150 and stays there for 10 years I think they can pay for everything assuming they can get their oil shipped.
[SPEAKER_00]: Absolutely.
[SPEAKER_00]: Yes, they they but they could they will be able to pay for for all of it
[SPEAKER_00]: but given reality and given that they don't want to acquire more debt, they've had to cut back and scale back on many of these on a number of these big big projects, Neon being one of them.
[SPEAKER_00]: But Neon has been now re kind of cast as an AI place where you can build AI data centers because land is available, energy is virtually free,
[SPEAKER_00]: There's no regulation or minimal regulation, so there are a lot of comparative advantages that Saudi Arabia has and there's a lot of capital still for that kind of thing.
[SPEAKER_00]: So Saudi Arabia still has a comparative advantage in a number of those areas.
[SPEAKER_00]: So I think the record is mixed and they never thought they would fully fulfill all of those targets.
[SPEAKER_00]: that you know if they hit 30% of their targets that would be pretty good because before vision 2030 there was no vision and all they were relying on was a bloated civil civil sector, the basically employing all the people in the government and relying on government on oil revenues to pay for those salaries that is unsustainable and if they had continued as they had done under the previous king of dalla
[SPEAKER_00]: Saudi Arabia would be a bankrupt by now.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, it really would be a dire dire straits.
[SPEAKER_01]: But it seems so much in Saudi Arabia is dependent on this one man who you're writing a biography about and about the transformation that's taking place in the kingdom.
[SPEAKER_01]: And one doesn't want to talk about this and put bad omens in the universe.
[SPEAKER_01]: But I am reminded when I am in React, and I am talking to MBS or talking to other Saudi officials
[SPEAKER_01]: There's two kind of disaster scenarios in my mind.
[SPEAKER_01]: And they represent a bite to historical personalities.
[SPEAKER_01]: One is Anwar Sadat, and the other one is the former Shah Varan.
[SPEAKER_01]: The Sadat one is obvious.
[SPEAKER_01]: Sadat makes peace with Israel, Sadat wants to transform Egypt from a Soviet-backed failed state into a pro-Western
[SPEAKER_01]: successful state, and he goes through the camp day, but Accords, and he's assassinated by Islamist zealots.
[SPEAKER_01]: And the Shah wants to transform Iran, again, into a pro-Western country that is aligned with the United States, and is prosperous, and he gives, you know, rights to women, and he frees Iranian society, and the economy starts to boom, and
[SPEAKER_01]: Opposim and I told a homie takes over.
[SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[SPEAKER_01]: Is there a chance that MBS could be sadat or could be the shiver on?
[SPEAKER_00]: Well, I mean, look, there's always the possibility of an assassination attempt on his life, and he's very, very important, certainly, because a lot of these ideas about the vision you know, are rooted in his own personal kind of vision for the country, but there's a fundamental difference between the Saudi regime and the one in Iran and the one in Egypt.
[SPEAKER_00]: First, this is not a one bullet regime.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, there are a lot of princes who can easily become the next king.
[SPEAKER_00]: So it's not, it's a family that's, and it's also a family that's deeply rooted, you know, Saudi Arabia was, it's been around since the first half of the 18th century.
[SPEAKER_00]: So it's older than the United States, and this is a family that united this country, that country exists because of what this particular family has done.
[SPEAKER_00]: So their legitimacy is quite deep and well entrenched, and again, it's not just about one person.
[SPEAKER_00]: You might get someone else, if God forbid, you know, MBS is assassinated, who has a somewhat different vision.
[SPEAKER_00]: But he's trying to lock in a number of things that will make it impossible for the next king to change.
[SPEAKER_00]: Like, for instance, on women's issues, I don't think that's going to go back to the way it was.
[SPEAKER_01]: So he's institutionalizing his vision within the Saudi system and his, so Saturday was not a one bullet country with Sadat, is the chance that it could be like 1970s Iran, where all of these transformations, socially and economically, are infuriating the, the Islamists inside the country and outside the country.
[SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[SPEAKER_01]: And you get some kind of,
[SPEAKER_01]: Saudi homini.
[SPEAKER_00]: Right.
[SPEAKER_00]: So I'm sure that there are Islamists in Saudi Arabia and that there are conservatives who are not happy with a lot of what's been happening.
[SPEAKER_00]: But the more visciferous ones are in prison.
[SPEAKER_00]: So this is an authoritarian regime that does repress its opposition, especially if it feels like they were in Iran as well, burning the 70s.
[SPEAKER_01]: I mean,
[SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, but there's a qualitative difference between them.
[SPEAKER_00]: And also in the case of Iran, the Shah was a Westernizer.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, he presented himself almost as an anti-Muslim Westernizer.
[SPEAKER_00]: In the Ataturk Turkish kind of mode, he was a secularist.
[SPEAKER_00]: MBS is not a secularist.
[SPEAKER_00]: MBS is not against a slah.
[SPEAKER_00]: He has no problems with Islam as being an integral part of Saudi identity, you know, that religion is important to him.
[SPEAKER_00]: It's important for the country.
[SPEAKER_00]: So he's not presenting any of this as anti-Islam.
[SPEAKER_00]: In fact, he's trying to say that his view of Islam
[SPEAKER_00]: is what allows all of these changes to happen, right?
[SPEAKER_00]: So he's pushing this very much within Islamic kind of orientation.
[SPEAKER_00]: But one where Islam is a personal religious matter, rather than kind of I'm going to impose one particular version of the Sharia and all of you, of Islamic law and all of you.
[SPEAKER_00]: So he's anti-Islamist, but he's not anti-Islam.
[SPEAKER_00]: And I think that's a profound difference between him and the Shah.
[SPEAKER_01]: What is, first of all, in fascinating conversation, I just want to get to the last question.
[SPEAKER_01]: I mean, you spend more time with MBS than any other Western scholar.
[SPEAKER_01]: I guess question one is when the dust settles on this Iran war.
[SPEAKER_01]: Does MBS come out of this stronger, more constrained, more exposed?
[SPEAKER_01]: And second question is, what's the one thing
[SPEAKER_01]: you think Washington stole them to understand about the ban.
[SPEAKER_00]: So, I mean, I think that as far as the war is concerned, it really depends on whether we see this humanitarian catastrophe unfolding.
[SPEAKER_00]: So if the desalination plants are hit, then this will be a crisis like one, the Saudis have never ever faced before.
[SPEAKER_00]: And I suspect that it'll harden the country rather than soften it, and it'll make MBS even more powerful than before.
[SPEAKER_00]: So my sense, if I were betting I would say this war will lead to a much more powerful and much clearer vision of what is in the Saudi National interest.
[SPEAKER_00]: But certainly he doesn't want the US to leave the Iranians in control of her moves.
[SPEAKER_00]: That's for sure.
[SPEAKER_00]: And he doesn't want the Iranians to have a nuclear weapon.
[SPEAKER_00]: So, in that respect, he's totally aligned at seems with what President Trump wants right now.
[SPEAKER_00]: In terms of what, you know, is misunderstood about him, is that I think, you know, in the popular imagination in the West, especially with liberal media,
[SPEAKER_00]: There's a lot of prejudice about Arabians, about people from Arabia, and about Muslims, but especially Muslims from Arabia, and they think of him as kind of this spoiled brat, this prince who essentially is just interested in having fun and partying and having a wild time and so on.
[SPEAKER_00]: And what I've seen of him is more like a monk.
[SPEAKER_00]: You know, this is a person, yes, he does play video games and he does have a comfortable life for sure, but he is kind of dedicated his life to the transformation of his country.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, we may disagree with, you know, the vision of the transformation that he wants, but this is a person who's like, you know, putting in long, long hours and totally devoted to his country and to the well-being of his people.
[SPEAKER_00]: as he sees those things, so he's kind of like King Faisal, a previous king in Saudi Arabia, who also was very, very devoted and kind of almost like austere.
[SPEAKER_00]: And he's so, and be a friend since doesn't travel overseas, he doesn't vacation overseas, he's always in the country, he has been for many years now.
[SPEAKER_00]: It's very unusual, you know, Saudi kings and Saudi Crown Prince's and so on were constantly partying in Marbea and in Morocco,
[SPEAKER_00]: You know, had palaces everywhere, and you know, we're having fun and so on, not MBS.
[SPEAKER_00]: He's working 24-7-365 in the country.
[SPEAKER_00]: that's very unusual.
[SPEAKER_01]: But you mentioned the bromidea and the criticism of of MBS.
[SPEAKER_01]: I mean, you know, let's be fair.
[SPEAKER_01]: I mean, that he has made moves.
[SPEAKER_01]: I mean, he's put, you know, women write women's rights activists in jail gone after his opponents, including those in the kingdom and outside the kingdom.
[SPEAKER_01]: So there is this human rights issue for the fact that the kingdom for sure.
[SPEAKER_01]: What do you think
[SPEAKER_01]: is behind that.
[SPEAKER_01]: I mean, is there a sense that for MBS?
[SPEAKER_01]: I'm going to transform this country, but don't get ahead of me.
[SPEAKER_01]: Like, if you, I'm going to get a woman drive and join the work force, and I'm going to relieve them of these guardianship rules, but don't be an activist, trying to force me to do that because if you get ahead of me,
[SPEAKER_01]: Then they're going to be consequences.
[SPEAKER_01]: Oh, by the way, on the Islam aside, if you're in hislamist and you're of the old Saudi guard, don't don't criticize me or try to get ahead of me.
[SPEAKER_01]: I will transform the country at my own speed.
[SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[SPEAKER_01]: And if you try to get in the way of that,
[SPEAKER_01]: you're going to end up in jail.
[SPEAKER_01]: Is that?
[SPEAKER_01]: Yeah.
[SPEAKER_01]: So I think those sides is that's just sense.
[SPEAKER_00]: So I think first of all, he's an authoritarian and he's repressive and he doesn't hide the fact that he's an authoritarian and that he's repressive.
[SPEAKER_00]: The way he, I think, um,
[SPEAKER_00]: justifies the repression is to say, I'm transforming this country in very major and dramatic ways and to maintain order and stability, I need to be repressive.
[SPEAKER_00]: That's the classic kind of argument of all authoritarian.
[SPEAKER_00]: They justify repression in the name of order and stability.
[SPEAKER_00]: I think there's another element though to why he does what he does, which is he's not a Democrat.
[SPEAKER_00]: He's saying that if change comes, it comes from me, it comes from the top.
[SPEAKER_00]: It's never going to be coming because of popular mobilization or civil society type activism, right?
[SPEAKER_00]: So that's the other side to his political vision, which is one where people can talk to him, they can advise him, they can counsel him, especially in private,
[SPEAKER_00]: And he has a very keen sense on the pulse of the country.
[SPEAKER_00]: He's constantly polling.
[SPEAKER_00]: I mean, they're constant, daily polls of everything.
[SPEAKER_00]: And sentiment analysis of the population.
[SPEAKER_00]: I've told him once that it's much more taxing to constantly poll your population than just have elections.
[SPEAKER_00]: Because with elections, it's very clear.
[SPEAKER_00]: You don't have to worry like every constantly about what they're thinking.
[SPEAKER_00]: But he's constantly worried and thinking about what his own people are thinking.
[SPEAKER_00]: But essentially, he is someone who wants change to come from the top and not from the bottom.
[SPEAKER_01]: Bernie Hickel, thank you so much for being on the Iran breakdown.
[SPEAKER_00]: Thank you.
[SPEAKER_01]: Burning high hope and extraordinary conversation, a master class on a kingdom and transformation and a regime being remade.
[SPEAKER_01]: For our listeners, keep an eye out for Bernie's forthcoming book, The Realm and BS and the Transformation of Saudi Arabia coming from Penguin Press.
[SPEAKER_01]: If you want to understand where Saudi Arabia goes next and therefore where the Gulf and the Middle East goes next, that's the book you'll want on your shelf.
[SPEAKER_01]: The bottom line from today.
[SPEAKER_01]: If you're on question in the Saudi question, kind of long to be analyzed separately, the trajectory of these scientific public, whether collapses, consolidates, or sprints for a bomb will shape Saudi, nuclear choices, the future of vision 2030, the prospects for normalization with Israel and the architecture of American power in the Gulf of the next generations.
[SPEAKER_01]: Rihide is no longer a pass of a sick-y inter-regional events under MBS, it's an actor.
[SPEAKER_01]: Sometimes a hedgeer, sometimes a mediator, sometimes a quiet hawk, but never again a bystand.
[SPEAKER_01]: Understanding how MBS thinks is essential for understanding how this war ends, and what comes next.
[SPEAKER_01]: Thanks to Bernie Heiko for joining us, thanks to FTV for making all of this work possible.
[SPEAKER_01]: And thanks to all of you for listening.
[SPEAKER_01]: Time Mark Dubois, this has been Miron Breakdown, until next time, when we break a down all over again.
[SPEAKER_01]: So that's it for today's episode.
[SPEAKER_01]: They're on breakdown if you wanna better understand what's really happening with these LAMIC Republic.
[SPEAKER_01]: Please subscribe, rate us five stars and show the people who need to hear it.
[SPEAKER_01]: But it's your first time here, we're about to episode one.
[SPEAKER_01]: That's where we began laying the groundwork in the episode with Crown Prince Reza Palavi.
[SPEAKER_01]: You can find me on X, Instagram at M.E.D.B.W.I.T&C.
[SPEAKER_01]: I'm Mark Dubois, thanks for listening, and look forward to breaking it down again with you next time.