Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Washington Forum:
A Conversation with Jake Sullivan, Deputy Assistant to President Obama and National Security Adviser to Vice President Joe Biden

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Speaker:
Jake Sullivan, Deputy Assistant to President Obama and National Security Adviser to Vice President Joe Biden

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MARK DUBOWITZ: So my name's Mark Dubowitz. I'm the executive director of FDD.

And I have a real distinct pleasure of introducing you to somebody who I admire greatly, Jake Sullivan. Now, Jake has a resume that would make anyone in Washington jealous, and you really want to dislike Jake for his success except it's truly impossible because he is -- he's actually one of the nicest people in Washington, and I think it owes a lot to the fact that he comes from Minnesota.

He has degrees from Yale and Oxford. He's a Rhodes Scholar. He's been a professor of law. He's been a chief counsel to a Minnesota senator, senior positions on the Clinton presidential campaign. He's been director of policy planning at the U.S. State Department, the deputy chief of staff to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. He's now the national security adviser to the vice president.

And to add to this already impressive CV, I understand that Jake was a former debate champion -- world champion. I've learned about this absolutely the hard way in many spirited discussions with Jake in his White House office on Iran policy. And you would think, if you hadn't seen Jake come on stage, that he would be approaching retirement, he'd be beginning to write his Washington memoirs. Yet, he recently made Time magazine's list of top 40 civic leaders under the age of 18. (Laughter.) Under the age of 40 -- under the age of 40.

Despite his impressive credentials, he's also done something very un-Washingtonian. He's actually avoided the public spotlight. He's instead preferred to work quietly behind the scenes. He frequently traveled overseas with then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. He's been one of the Obama administration's key figures in its diplomacy with Iran. In fact, Jake's personal outreach to Iranian diplomats paved the way for the interim agreement that was reached in Geneva between the P-5 plus one in Iran.

And we know Jake's going to have his work cut out for him to ensure that this interim agreement is translated into something successful and something enduring. But as Vice President Biden said when he hired Jake: Jake is the ideal person to serve as my national security adviser. He's respected across the administration for his intellect, his dedication to our country and the perspective he brings to even the most complex issues.

We are very, very lucky to have someone like Jake at the top levels of this administration. And we really look forward to welcoming Jake back to FDD when he's leading national security for a future administration. Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming Jake Sullivan. (Applause.)

JAKE SULLIVAN: Thank you, Mark. You're much too kind. I also, being an Irish-American, have a habit of blushing. And that introduction very much made me do that. I also want to thank Jim Woolsey and Cliff May and the entire FDD leadership for giving me the opportunity to come here today.

And I'm honored to have the chance to speak after so many other committed friends and partners from Congress, the executive branch, the military and the diplomatic corps have had the
chance to engage with you on some of the major issues facing us in the world today. And I want to offer a heart-felt congratulations to the award recipients -- to Michael Hayden, to Chairman Menendez and Senator Kirk, and to Chairman Royce and Representative Engel, who I saw in Kiev just last week when I was there with the vice president.

I told a friend of mine that I was coming to speak at FDD and he said, I take it that's not a home game for you. (Laughter.) It's no secret that FDD and the administration don't always see eye-to-eye, but I believe that we do share the same core values and objectives -- advancing American interests and universal values, defending free peoples and free markets and keeping America and our friends safe from terror and aggression.

We also share the same commitment to rigorous evidence-based policy analysis. I'm an avid consumer of FDD's work. I actually get it for free, but I still think I've read enough to earn some kind of bulk discount. (Laughter.) And I've spent many hours talking to Mark and his colleagues, about Iran in particular.

It's always a respectful and thought-provoking debate, and oftentimes in Washington, when people use words like "respectful and thought-provoking," they mean they didn't really like the conversation very much. But in this case, I relish them and I look forward to them, because it makes me sharper and it makes our policy better, I believe.

I've spent a lot of sleepless nights wrestling with the hard problems and hard decisions we face, and I think it's important to seek input and advice from every direction, because the stakes are high, and we need all hands on deck. We need all people of good faith with an idea or an argument to step forward and offer it, even, and in fact, especially when they see things differently. And that means reaching out to those who would challenge you or criticize you for your policy as well as to your friends, and it means actually listening to them. And it's in that spirit that I've come here today.

Now, it's a big world out there, and there's plenty to talk about, but to leave some time for questions, I thought I would focus my remarks on two timely issues: the nuclear negotiations with Iran and the crisis in Ukraine. Both of these involve challenges to the rules-based order that America has sought to build and defend. Both involve governments that do not share our views or our values. Both demand smart and sustained pressure to counter aggression and transgression, together with strong support for our friends.

Let me start with Iran. We all share a common objective, which is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon now or at any point in the future. And we've made clear that we're prepared to do what it takes to achieve that objective. And there has been broad support over the years for the core logic of our approach, which has been to put the choice to Iran, meet your international obligations or face mounting pressure. And to that end, we've worked closely with Congress and many in this room to construct the most effective sanctions in history -- this is something Mark knows a heck of a lot about -- effective because of their strength and breadth and because of the multilateral support behind them.
Of course, sanctions have never been an end in themselves. They're one of the tools, along with enhanced force posture and security and intelligence partnerships that we've used to change the calculus of Iran's leaders and to provide us leverage to attempt to reach a diplomatic resolution.

So when Iran came back to the table last year, we decided it was time to test whether we could convert the pressure we had built into results at the negotiating table. We reached a six-month arrangement in which Iran agreed to halt progress on its nuclear program and roll it back in a key respect, diluting and converting its 20 percent stockpile so that it was one critical step further away from a bomb.

Iran also agreed to daily inspections at its enrichment facilities and to new access to other key parts of its nuclear infrastructure. In return, we agreed to provide limited relief while maintaining the core sanctions architecture and continuing to vigorously enforce a long list of sanctions, including oil sanctions that bottle up Iranian revenues in overseas accounts, financial and banking sanctions, broad sanctions against major sectors of Iran's economy, like energy and shipping, sanctions on Iran's military and ballistic missile programs, all U.N. sanctions, including strong measures to disrupt Iran's sensitive nuclear and missile supply chains and our sanctions to Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, its role in Syria and its human rights violations. In fact, just this past Tuesday, we announced additional designations to demonstrate that our enforcement continues the pace during this period.

Now, in a perfect world, we would have arrived at a comprehensive solution right away, but in the real world, we knew that negotiations on a comprehensive solution would take time, and we didn't want the Iranians to be able to advance their program as the negotiations unfolded. That was the logic behind what's called the Joint Plan of Action.

And think about where we would be without the JPOA. Iran's program would continue to advance. Thousands of additional centrifuges, including next-generation centrifuges, could be spinning. Iran could make progress on the plutonium track by working to fuel and commission the Iraq heavy water reactor. It could grow its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to beyond the threshold for one bomb's worth of material, and all that without intrusive new inspections that give us tools to help detect breakout or the existence of a covert program.

Thus far, the Joint Plan of Action appears to be working. The IAEA has reported that Iran is keeping its commitments. The sanctions architecture is holding. Our leverage at the negotiating table remains.

All of this is going to require daily vigilance, a point that Mark reminds me of every time he comes to see me, especially given the reports of schemes to escape the bite of sanctions. We have to stay on top of it, and we will.

Now the P-5 plus one is in the midst of comprehensive negotiations. I know that many in this audience are skeptical of the talks and what they will or won't produce. I would ask only that you wait for the outcome to pass judgment and that you judge whatever the outcome is in its
entirety and against the realistic alternatives, not against an unachievable ideal. Let me make four points about how we see the path ahead.

First, our bottom line is that we will only accept a deal that effectively constrains Iran's ability to break out and produce a nuclear weapon. That means real curbs on all elements of the program and a verification regime that gives confidence Iran isn't conducting activities in secret.

Second, as the president said, we understand that there is as good a chance that we won't reach a deal as there is that we will. So while we negotiate in good faith we are actively planning for either possibility. If the talks break down because Iran refuses to meet its obligations, there should be no doubt that the administration will work with Congress to quickly impose new sanctions and ramp up the pressure. We're also actively planning for the possibility that we do reach a deal, including what it would take to enforce it and what further opportunities and risks a deal creates.

Third, even as we negotiate we're working closely with our allies and partners in the region to counter Iran's destabilizing activities. We're also working simultaneously to build the capacity of our friends. Recently we worked hand-in-hand with the Israelis on their interdiction of a ship carrying weapons bound for terrorists in Gaza. And our commitment to Israel's security is a bedrock commitment, one that will not falter or waver at any point during this effort. We're engaging at the highest levels with our friends to enhance and already robust security architecture in the region. That was a key part of the president's trip to Saudi Arabia. And all of this work will continue and intensify.

Finally, we must continue to speak out against the gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Iran and the hateful anti-Semitic rhetoric from some of its leaders, and we must keep providing support and assistance to those brave Iranians seeking to have their voices heard. At the same time, we will spare no effort to bring home safety Amir Hekmati, Saeed Abedini and Bob Levinson. We believe, as President Reagan and Kennedy did, that clear-eyed and tough negotiations can produce results that enhance our security and the security of our allies. That is what we're striving for and that is what we want to work with all of you to achieve.

With that, let me turn to Ukraine. Much has been said on this subject over the past few days so I won't give a comprehensive accounting here. For the sake of parity with Iran, I'll make four points on this issue as well, first on Russia.

As my friend Toria Nuland has put it, Russia is playing the role of arsonist while masquerading as the firefighter. So we've demonstrated that the costs will only mount if Russia continues its destabilizing behavior. We've already expanded our sanctions, targeting not just individuals but crony-linked firms and banks, as well as Russia's high-tech defense industry.

I know that there are those who would like us to do more and faster, but it's hard to deny the economic hit Russia has taken. Its markets are down. Its growth forecasts are down. The ruble is down. The world knows that Russia is not a very good bet right now. Of course Russia has not ceased its illegal intervention and provocative actions so we must be prepared to impose still greater costs. Beyond Ukraine there's the larger question of how to handle Putin's Russia and the
threat that it poses to the post-Soviet space and beyond. That's a big piece of business and we're eager to engage with Congress and the people in this room to chart the path ahead.

Second, NATO. In response to Russian aggression, America is taking steps to make clear to our allies that we will honor our Article 5 commitments. My boss, Vice President Biden, has been sending that message loud and clear and we have been backing it up: F-16s to Poland and additional F-15s to the Baltics, ships in the Black Sea to reassure friends in Bulgaria and Romania, four paratrooper contingents for exercises in Poland and the Baltics. And we've asked other NATO allies who are capable of making similar contributions to do so, and many have.

This administration's commitment to NATO did not start with this crisis. From contingency planning for the Baltics to deploying an aviation detachment to Poland, to hosting the NATO summit in Chicago in 2012, we've sought to prepare this alliance for the challenges of the 21st century. The alliance must be prepared increasingly, not just for new threats but also for the underlying Article 5 commitment that has always bound it together -- a commitment to collective self-defense and territorial defense.

And we're committed to ensuring that NATO emerges from this crisis even stronger. We're advancing a plan that involves more air policing sorties over the Baltic region, more allies ships in European waters and measured ground deployments to enhance NATO's preparedness, training and exercises. And the upcoming NATO summit in South Wales will give all allies an opportunity to increase their commitment to the collective self-defense. Bottom line, we'll do our part and we won't let any ally off the hook in terms of doing theirs.

Third, we're determined to ensure that this commitment to collective self-defense extends to energy security, not just physical security. So we're executing a coordinated energy security strategy with our European partners, focused on both the short and the long term. We're working to complete the southern corridor so that pipeline gas from sources other than Russia can reach Europe.

We've conditionally approved significant volumes of LNG for export and we're committed to putting gas on the global market because we know that increased global supplies helps our allies and partners. But there are things that only Europe can do for itself, from pricing reform to infrastructure to developing unconventional gas supplies to improving efficiency. We're pressing Europe to follow through and providing advice and assistance.

Fourth, and perhaps most important, there's the issue of supporting Ukraine itself. Just last week, as I mentioned, I was in Kiev with the vice president meeting with political leaders and with some of the brave activists who stared down snipers' bullets on the Maidan. They kept asking themselves, and they kept asking the vice president, how do we avoid the mistakes of the past two decades? How do we get a democracy that really finally delivers?

It's a tall order. So we've mobilized urgent assistance to help the Ukrainian government with their immediate challenges -- energy assistance so that they can get gas supplies from other European countries now, including a new arrangement with Slovakia; economic assistance,
including an IMF package and help from Europe and the United States so they can stabilize their economy without hitting their people too hard.

And we're focused now on the elections on May 25th, trying to help Ukraine ensure that all of its citizens can cast their ballots freely and that pro-Russian thugs don't steal that choice from them. This is an urgent priority and a very complex undertaking.

As for security assistance, sending weapons now will not change the realities on the ground, but there are practical things we can do to help the Ukrainians with the most pressing threats to security in the east, including border infiltrations and explosive devices. They've asked our help -- they've asked for our help with these things and we're delivering.

But you all know as well as I do that these short-term political, economic and security measures are simply not enough. Ukraine will only succeed in charting its own course if it can shrug off the yoke of corruption and push back against the anti-democratic forces that have held it back for so long.

That will require a long-term commitment across the board -- from the Ukrainians themselves, first and foremost, but also from American or European partners. And we're committed to that. And as we pursue these lines of effort on Ukraine, we have to keep our eye on the bigger picture -- a strong trans-Atlantic community, a revitalized NATO, deeper trade and investment ties, European energy security and further steps along the path of a Europe whole and free.

So let me conclude where I began. We're eager for consultation with all of you on Iran and Ukraine. These are two hard issues with hard men on the other side. And there are many more like them -- from Syria to the South China Sea. So we're looking for good ideas and good partners from across the political spectrum. Mark mentioned that I traveled frequently with Secretary Clinton. I've actually now logged more than a million miles in that blue and white plane that says United States of America on the side.

And there are times, even in this job, when you can get a little bit jaded by things, but every time I see that plane I'm reminded of how humbling and thrilling it is to be able to represent the United States of America around the world, because I believe that for all of our imperfections, we remain the greatest force for good this world has ever known -- a force for progress, a force for freedom -- and we should never forget that, any of us, in government or out.

And we have to recognize that we all have to pull through together.

So I hope you'll take me up on my invitation to continue working with us to advance the interests and values of the country we all love and the principles we all stand for.

And with that, I'd be happy to take a few questions. Thank you. (Applause.)

MR. DUBOWITZ: OK, so Aaron (sp), do you have a microphone over there?
Q: Jake, thank you for doing this. Michael Wilner with the Jerusalem Post. You say sanctions are not an end in and of themselves, and you say that the president will work with Congress to swiftly impose new sanctions if talks fail. But I've been asking this question to folks across the aisle, because I think it's -- it really goes to the heart of both positions. What is the logic behind revisiting sanctions as policy should diplomacy definitively fail in Vienna if the purpose of sanctions thus far has been to compel Iran to negotiate in the first place? Realistically, would the goal be a future second round of negotiations? Would the U.S. seek another pause in Iran's nuclear work?

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you. It's obviously very difficult to predict the future. We are focused now, between now and July 20th, which is the end of this six-month arrangement that we reached in Geneva last November, on trying to arrive at a comprehensive solution that resolves the world's concerns related to Iran's nuclear program and gives us the insight and verification that we need to have confidence that Iran is complying with the terms of that arrangement.

As I said in my remarks, we're also preparing for the possibility that these -- that these negotiations do not produce an agreement on July 20th. If talks break down, and if Iran is not negotiating in good faith, we are prepared to work with Congress to impose more strict sanctions, and the logic behind that is that there is an opportunity to continue to sharpen the choice for Iran that they can either negotiate in good faith and arrive at a resolution that resolves the international community's concerns about their program, or they are going to face mounting pressure.

We've also made clear that sanctions aren't the only tool available and that as this situation unfolds, we're prepared to consider a very wide range of options. But it's impossible to scenario-plan or predict what is going to happen down the road. All we can do is put ourselves in a position to tighten the economic pressure should the eventuality come to pass that Iran simply isn't prepared to do a deal in good faith.

Q: Hi, Jake.

MR. SULLIVAN: Hi, Elise.

Q: Elise Labott with CNN. Moderators get a free question. I'd like to follow up on your remarks on Ukraine, and you said considering additional sanctions. But the president pretty much has made clear that short of a, you know, physical invasion of Ukraine, that the kind of sectoral sanctions that really might, you know, really tighten the noose around Putin and the government are not going to be considered. And it just seems as if you're handicapping yourselves because there are plenty of other ways now that he knows this red line that he can destabilize Ukraine without -- and absorb the cost of whatever sanctions you're going to put on without actually having to invade.

And then I'm just wondering, if the -- part of the problem with Russia is that we haven't -- the U.S. hasn't really found an accommodation with Russia or a way to include Russia since the fall of the Cold War and the fall -- since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union
which doesn't exacerbate their own inherent insecurities, it seems as if the way the U.S. might have handled the fall of Yanukovych and its support for that might have further played into his insecurity. Thank you.

MR. SULLIVAN: We’ve made clear -- the president and all of the leaders of our national security team have made clear that if Russia continues its destabilizing activities in the east that it will face mounting pressure. And we have a number of tools to bring that to bear, tools beyond individual designations, as I mentioned.

We've gone to firms and banks. We've gone to elements of their high-tech defense industry. So while I can't lay out for you today what the next step would be, we're in a position where working with our European partners, we can continue to impose further cost on Russia should Russia continue to make the choice which it's been making to destabilize Ukraine and to deny the people of Ukraine the free choice they deserve about their future.

With respect to the broader question about Russia and its role in a post-Cold War Europe, both Democratic and Republican administrations have made clear to Russia that there is a place for them if they are prepared to act as a responsible player on the international stage. Things like an illegal occupation of Crimea are the exact opposite of responsible. But at times when Russia has been prepared to act more responsibly, the United States and Europe have been prepared to cooperate with them on arms control, on the P-5 plus one negotiations with respect to Iran, on the Northern Distribution Network to Afghanistan and others things as well.

It was not the United States that led to the series of events or that created the series of events that resulted in Yanukovych leaving on February 21st. It was the people of Ukraine who rejected Yanukovych's kleptocratic and corrupt form of governance and demanded a different and better future.

And at the end of the day, what this all has to come down to is the right of the Ukrainian people to make their own choices about their future. It's been our position that Ukraine should have strong, positive, balanced relations with all its neighbors, including Russia, but that at the end of the day, it's Ukraine's choice to make.

Putin has fundamentally rejected that notion and has decided that it ought to be Russia's choice to make what happens here. That, neither the United States nor Europe can support as a proposition. We reject spheres of influence, and we reject the notion that Putin or Russia should be making determinations on behalf of the Ukrainian people. And that is where this issue of imposing continuing cost comes in.

Q: Thank you, Jake. Indira Lakshmanan from Bloomberg. And we all miss on the State Department beat and the secretary's plane, so --

MR. SULLIVAN: Good to see you, Indira.

Q: Nice to see you. I'm also taking the moderator privilege here.
I want to ask what the administration is willing to bear in terms of the economic cost of potential blowback, since Putin himself a couple nights ago explicitly threatened to punish energy majors, U.S. and European companies, but particularly he mentioned energy majors. So how much of a cost are we willing to accept for our economy and our businesses?

And then beyond that, since you know I'm such a sanctions geek, I'm curious in this case what real modeling you have to show that Putin will actually respond, even though his economy is tanking. You know, what are you planning if geopolitically, holding on to -- you know, or meddling in Ukraine is more important to him than whatever hit his economy may take?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah. To take the second part of the question first, obviously, Putin is going to make decisions sitting in the Kremlin that he sees as being in Russia's interests. And he can look at all of the factors that are driving down the Russian economy right now and decide to ignore them. That is his choice. It is our view, though, the mounting cost and isolation will make the choice much sharper for President Putin about further action to destabilize Ukraine or illegal interfere in it.

But that's only one part of our broader strategy. You asked about how we're approaching this. One part of it is to show Russia that there are very real costs to the type of steps that it is taking. Another part is to stand behind the Ukrainian people as they try to deepen their democracy, stabilize their economy, provide for their own energy security. And then another element is to look at the broader Trans-Atlantic Partnership and say how do we position ourselves, this community of free and democratic nations, in a way to take on the challenges of the 21st century and in a way to push back against the aggression of actors like Putin and Russia.

And as I laid out in my remarks, that runs the gamut of investments to make today in the sources of our strength so that we are prepared tomorrow for whatever comes at us. It's Article 5 in NATO. It's energy security for Europe, something often talked about but where more work needs to be done and urgently. It's concluding the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership to deepen the investment and trade ties between the United States and Europe.

So in that regard we are also playing the long game here, a game that we believe will position the United States and Europe to succeed on the playing field of the 21st century.

With respect to your first question, we've made clear that we are looking at a wide variety of areas with respect to sanctions, and in fact in the sanctions that we've already done. We've sanctioned an energy company in Crimea. We've sanctioned crony-linked banks. We've sanctioned elements of the high-tech defense industry in Russia. So this is not a matter of Western will or resolve. It's a matter of us taking a look at what Russia is doing and being prepared to impose increasing costs as he proceeds. And we've made clear we're prepared to do that and we're consulting closely with the Europeans so that we remain on the same page.

Q: Dwight Bashir with the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. I want to thank the administration for speaking out regulatory on the human rights situation in Iran while engaged in nuclear discussions, but I do want to ask you if I could get some clarity from
the administration on the administration's position on sanctions for human rights abuses, which is part of CISADA, the legislation.

As recently as December, National Security Advisor Rice said that despite the first-step deal and moving forward, they would name -- the administration would name others for human rights abuses and impose travel bans and asset freezes. Is that still the administration's position, because I've noted that some other officials have spoken out, have said some things, including the president has spoken out about abuses, but have traveled back from the imposition of the human rights sanctions, which I don't think has happened, if I'm not mistaken, since President Rouhani was elected in June. So any clarity on that would very much be appreciated. Thank you.

MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you for the question. And as I said in my remarks, this is an important line of effort that has to continue regardless of what is happening on the nuclear file or on any other issue. We've got to stand up for our values, and we need to stand against the human rights abuses and violations of fundamental freedom, including religious freedom, happening in Iran. And we have to provide real support to those voices on the ground who want to be heard, who want to push for a better future.

On the issue of sanctions relating to human rights violations in Iran, I'm all too familiar with the wording of the Joint Plan of Action, which speaks to the issue of nuclear-related sanctions. And that word was chosen very carefully, nuclear-related, because we have made clear that sanctions relating to terrorism and sanctions relating to human rights violations are not covered by the discussions that we are having on the nuclear file and that we are prepared to continue to follow through on that.

I can't answer your question on individual designations. That's a matter that State and Treasury work together, building evidence packages and the like, but I can tell you, as a matter of policy this administration is committed to continuing to enforce and follow through on that set of sanctions.

MR. DUBOWITZ: Yeah, I think -- (off mic).

MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah.

MR. DUBOWITZ: Jake has this excuse why he has to leave early. I think he's got a basketball game but he tells me that he's got to go see the president. (Laughter.) So we're going to get him out of here in a couple of minutes.

Patrick, do you want to raise the last question?

Q: Patrick Clawson from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Bringing together the two topics you addressed, the Iranian officials have been speaking about large deals with Russia -- a $20 billion oil barter, $10 billion electrical generating facilities. What's the most effective way that we can persuade Russia that it would be bad to proceed with these things prior to any kind of deal on the nuclear issue? And would it be useful to spell out for Russia, perhaps quietly, what will be the consequences in the event such deals were to proceed?
MR. SULLIVAN: So we've had intensive conversations with the Russians on this, now going back months since some of these reports first began to circulate, at a variety of levels, including very high levels, to make clear that our view of this is that it's a violation of sanctions and it's a violation of the Joint Plan of Action. We continue to believe that, and the net result of following through on any kind of deal of this kind would be the imposition of sanctions for the behavior being conducted.

And we believe that's a part of convincing the Russians and the Iranians not to do it. The other is that as we go through a set of very intensive, sensitive negotiations on the nuclear file, now is not the time to be pursuing these kinds of exercises. That's a point we've registered with both the Russians and the Iranians, but at the end of the day we're prepared to do what our sanctions architecture is designed to do, which is to push back through designations and the imposition of sanctions against these types of transactions.

But beyond that, I would just say, we've had the opportunity to go into this in significant detail with our Russian colleagues, both those colleagues who deal with the P-5 plus one and those who deal with economic and policy matters and Moscow. And we've laid out for them our view of this and what the result would be if they were to follow through.

All right. Thank you guys. And we do have, actually, late tonight, the staff versus interns OVP basketball game, so I hope you'll wish us luck in beating the interns. (Laughter, applause.)

MR. DUBOWITZ: All right, folks. Well, Jake, thank you very much. It's really a pleasure, and thank you for your public service and for your openness. That concludes the Washington conference. We have just one other thing that I'd like to emphasize -- this entire event -- the Washington forum -- was put together by four people, which is truly extraordinary, and so I want to thank those people for everything they've done. It is amazing to me that you can pull together something like this with only four people working incredibly hard day and night. So I'd like to just single out my colleagues, who I think are all sitting somewhere in the front row or somewhere close -- Jamie?? -- Jamie where are you -- thanks, Jamie -- (applause) -- and Aaron (sp), I see you back there. Aaron (sp), thank you. (Applause.) I don't know where Kristin (sp) is, but Kristin (sp) put up her hand. Kristin (sp), thank you for everything. (Applause.) And finally, Julia, who came back from maternity leave right in the middle of this to help out. So thank you, Julia. (Applause.)

And thank you all for coming. It's my hope that we've, you know, not arrived at the end of these important conversations, but a jumping off point for discussions that will continue in the days and weeks ahead, and we hope to see you next year at Washington Forum 2015. Thank you. (Applause.)

(END)