Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Washington Forum:
Presentation of the George P. Shultz Award

Moderator:
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President,
Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Speaker:
General Michael Hayden,
Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency

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CLIFFORD D. MAY: A little bit – yeah, OK. Feel free.

All right. I’m going to start because we need to get going and keep – try to keep on – keep on schedule here.

Yep, we will. We will have time for a little Q-and-A here.

So we’ve now arrived at one of – what I see to be one of the highlights of this conference. If I can ask you to take your seats. We’re going to present to General Michael Hayden this year’s George P. Shultz Award for distinguished service.

Now, George Shultz I believe is a man whom everyone here is familiar with, everyone here admires, a man who exemplifies the best in American leadership and statesmanship. You’ll all recall that Secretary of State George Shultz actually held an astonishing four Cabinet-level positions. He was first director of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. He then became secretary of labor, secretary of the Treasury under President Nixon and finally served as secretary of state under President Reagan for almost seven years, a term unprecedented in the modern era.

In his time as secretary of state, Secretary Shultz confronted enormous challenges in what we now know to have been the final battles of the Cold War. For his lifetime of service to the United States, Secretary Shultz received the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor.

And one quick story, and I actually saw this take place, Secretary Shultz used to invite all new ambassadors into his office. And he would show them a very large globe. And he would spin the globe, and he would say, show me your country. And with great pride, they’d point out Brunei or Equatorial Guinea or some place in Latin America. And he would invariably shake his head and say, no, that’s not your country. (Laughter.) Your country is the United States of America. You should never, ever forget that. (Applause.) I’m glad some people didn’t know that story and I could share with them.

Secretary Shultz couldn’t be with us today, but he has sent us a brief video address, which we will roll I hope right now.

GEORGE SHULTZ: (From video.) I’m really honored to be part –

I’m really –

MR. MAY: Whoops.

Ah, there we go.

MR. SHULTZ: (From video.) I’m really honored to be part of this occasion and be part of presenting the FDD award to Michael Hayden. This man really deserves this award. He served in the uniform of the United States –
I’m really honored to be part of this occasion and be part of presenting the FDD award to Michael Hayden. This man really deserves this award. He served in the uniform of the United States Air Force for 40 years. For six of those years he was head of the NSA, and for three he headed the CIA. He retired as a four-star general.

Now, he didn’t just serve. He was a creator. He was a big contributor.

But he’s also a real human being, and like a lot of us, right after 9/11, he as head of the NSA called his family to see how they were doing.

But he devoted himself to being sure that we used our assets, our very considerable assets, to see that our country would remain safe and secure as we contemplated the implications of the 9/11 attack on us.

He understands how complicated is the relationship between the gathering of intelligence and the use of it as we conduct our diplomacy, as we use our military capacity to great effect.

Mike Hayden has not left the job when he left the Air Force. He continues to make his mark in the conversation in the United States about how to maintain our security. He has among other things taken a great interest in the Iran nuclear negotiations. And he said at one point, we’ve hidden – we’ve hit the pause button, but now we have to have some diplomacy that hits the stop button.

I’m sure that General Hayden will continue to contribute to our national security, and I look forward to any of his remarks and his actions and suggestions about how we hit a halt button on Iran’s nuclear program.

Ladies and gentlemen, we need to pause and reflect a little on how important our intelligence community is to our security. There is the gathering of information. There is the relationship of one piece to another. There is the whole problem of understanding its meaning and presenting that material to our policymakers, civilian and military for their use. It is a completely nonpartisan operation and is based on a dedication to the best interests of the national security of the United States of America. And Mike Hayden has developed that, stood for it, represented it and done so as a great American.

Thank you, General Hayden. (Applause.)

MR. MAY: Secretary Shultz has our gratitude. And General Hayden, it’s my honor to present you with this award and to thank you and ask you to say a few words and take a few questions.

GENERAL MICHAEL HAYDEN: All right. Thank you. (Applause.)

MR. MAY: Hold that (way ?) one second. We get one picture while we’re doing this here. Thanks.
GEN. HAYDEN: Well, that was overly generous on the part of Secretary Shultz, very kind words. Let me thank him for his service to our country. And I recall what it was like in the military when he was secretary of state. And it was actually a condition a little bit better than that I heard described at the end of the last panel. (Laughter.) Actually, he was more generous to me on the video than he was last summer when we were having dinner at Phil Tallman’s (sp) house out in Sanford. So he’s just being nice. (Laughter.)

Well, let me thank FDD for the award. Cliff, thank you. Executive Director Mark Dubowitz, board of directors. Let me thank the chairman, Jim Woolsey – Jim, one of my predecessors at CIA. Jim was a wonderful example to me. He was CIA director when I was a brigadier general selectee. I was still wearing eagles. And I was the J2 for U.S. forces in Europe.

And the DCI was coming to Germany for a visit. And I don’t even know if he remembers this, but he actually phoned down to Stuttgart and said: I want the J2 to come on up towards Heidelberg and come with me on my day’s activities, where the Germans were hosting him. So I got to see more castles and eat more spargel – (laughter) – during that day than in my entire rest of my tour at Stuttgart.

Look, the work of FDD, with Congress, the executive branch, we note it, all right? It’s praiseworthy. But I need to add to that, you know, the intelligence community notes what FDD does and deeply appreciates it as well. Your scholarship shows connections between a whole bunch of nefarious actors out there – proliferators, sanctions-busters, money-launderers and so on.

And so, what it is you’re able to do with open sources complements and reinforces what goes on inside the intelligence community. And that’s a dialogue that I think enriches both us in the intel community and us in FDD. So I’m here – thank you for the award, but I’m here to accept it on behalf of the American intelligence community that Secretary Schultz kind of pointed out, plays a very unique role in our democracy. It’s especially moving for me to do this on their behalf when that intelligence community is facing such intense and unfounded criticism.

So it’s just very heartening that you have chosen the IC to be recognized. And I’m honored and humbled to accept the award on their behalf. Cliff, special recognition to your important work, all you’ve done to kind of make this debate – and it’s an important debate – on this balance between security and civil liberties. And your columns on this subject separate real concerns, real issues, real facts from rhetoric and urban legends that actual distort, don’t inform, an important national debate.

Look, I understand these are tough issues. This is not really about how long NSA does or does not keep your metadata, all right? This is a perennial issue. This is kind of like 1787 to 1789, you know, when we were debating how strong we want our government to be in order to protect us, but not so strong that it is in a position to threaten us and to threaten our liberties. And now we’re just trying to – trying to recalibrate that decision coming out of the Article of Confederation – remember, far too weak – to the Constitution under which we still work that
seems to hit the balance right. But it has to be recalibrated, reinterpreted with new circumstances. And we’re trying to recalibrate that in an age of unprecedented transparency.

I had an advisory board at CIA, way pre-Snowden, all right? This is 2007-ish, maybe early 2008. I gave a subcommittee that board a tasking – because I – we’re just kind of watching what’s going on in the broader society. And the subcommittee was headed by Carly Fiorina. And I said, Carly, I’m been wondering, how about you taking some members here and go to the mountain top and think and answer me this question: Will America be able to conduct espionage in the future inside a broader political culture that every day demands more transparency and more publicly accountability from every aspect of national life?

And they went ahead and talked to folks and huddled up. And three or four months later said, hey, wait, we’re ready to meet with you. I walk across the hall from the seventh deck at Langley. I plop down in my conference room and say: OK, Carly, will America be able to conduct espionage – which you know relies on secrecy to succeed. Will America be able to conduct espionage in a broader political culture that every day demands more transparency and public accountability? And she – Carly looked me in the eye and said: Hard to tell – (laughter) – which is actually a very profound answer.

I mean, what she was saying was that on which we have relied for both security and liberty since the foundation of the republic – I’m very fond of pointing out the nation’s first spymaster was that commander of the Continental Army. And when we elected him president he insisted on and got a secret covert action budget, right? I went to see the D.C. premier of “Turn” the AMC series on the Long Island spy ring.

And I was on a panel afterwards. I was the only real spy on the panel. All the rest -- all the rest were actors, OK? (Laughter.) And I got to – I got to say Washington, spy ring – you know. I said, hey, face it, this is apple pie and baseball. This is – this is quintessentially American. Now, the question is, in an age of such a demand for transparency, do we get to do it – or, put another way, do we get to do it in a way that makes it useful to do in the first place? Big question. And informing the debate is a big deal.

There’s one other – one other debate out there that is actually kind of reflected in the comments at the back end of the last panel that I’ll share with you too, because I do think FDD has a role to play. And that’s fundamentally, what is our role in the world? What is – what is it appropriate for, we, Americans, to think we are entitled to do and we are responsible for doing. I, frankly, in my military life – I never kind of pinned the American exceptionalism button my tunic. I was a little uncomfortable about it, a little too self-referential, you know, maybe a little too self-aggrandizing – until it was in the ’90s and that tour in Europe where Director Woolsey had visited me.

I was in Sarajevo. And the market there had been hit the previous weekend – it was February – probably February ’94. And it was hit the previous weekend by 120 millimeter mortar that probably the Serbs – hard to tell in this war – had lobbed in an incredibly high arc over some buildings and dropped it down into the market. It’s one of those one in a hundred shots. But the market had those stalls with metal frameworks and the 120 millimeter hit one of
the frameworks and the fusing was such that it detonated at about eight feet. And you can imagine the impact it had on the market. I think there were 60 or 70 people killed.

I was there the following Tuesday or so, and I went to the market. And I’m – it’s brutally cold, so I’m in my parka – you know, poor civilians are there freezing to death in just normal clothes. I’m there in a GI parka, and I’m in battle rattle; I’ve got Kevlar and, you know, I’m armed.

And I’m looking at the holes in the asphalt from the fragments, and the people kind of start to recognize me and my little entourage. And a couple of people came up and saw – you know, we all wear the American flag on our sleeve – and saw the American flag and just said, USA, USA, USA. It was almost a prayer, and it occurred to me then – and that thought stayed with me until now, obviously, because I’m going to share it with you – it really almost doesn’t matter whether you think you’re exceptional. Everyone else does, and everyone else expects you to act that way.

Now, this might not be anything we actually earned, OK. This might not be a reflection of merit, but it is a reflection of an accurate reading of current history. And our choice is not whether we’re exceptional or not. Or choice is whether or not we carry out this peculiar role with or without responsibility. And look, someday, it won’t be our role. That’s how this happens. And the best grade we could expect history to give us is, sometime in the future, people looking back will say, you know, as global hegemons, these guys weren’t bad. But that is a role that we are uniquely designed, directed, required to play, and if we choose not to play it, the world is a less safe and less free place almost as the laws of physics – not something we have to intend, not something others have to intend. It just ends up badly.

And so when you have these kinds of discussions about what it is we should be doing out there and informing the national debate that although we’re a weary nation, we still have some tasks to do, that also is a genuine contribution to a very, very fundamental issue that we have to resolve. So thank you again for this. I think Cliff’s going to have me sit down next to him, and if anything I said offended you or energized you, go ahead and ask me a question. Thank you all very much.

MR. MAY: (Laughs.) Thank you. (Applause.)

I’m going to let you ask questions if you’re ready to. I see one right there – hand up first – let’s get a – mic over there. Hand up. Yep. Yeah. Stand up.

Q: First, I’d like to thank you, Cliff, for –

MR. MAY: Identify yourself if you would.

Q: OK. Larry Gerlach, lieutenant colonel, United States Marine Corps, retired. I served in Beirut in 1983. (Applause.) I’d like to thank you, Cliff, for inviting us to attend this, and good morning, General. It’s good to see you, sir. Benghazi’s in the news, and since the intelligence community took some hits about that, I’d like to ask you to make a comment, sir.

GEN. HAYDEN: OK. You all remember that movie about 20 or 30 years ago – I think it’s Matthew Broderick – “WarGames”? And they had that big computer, and they thought we
were going to go to nuclear war, and then the machine’s whirring there at the end, and then, finally, it shuts down? And he goes, interesting game. The only way to win is not to play.

That’s the CIA relationship to public talking points. (Laughter, applause.) And I’m serious. I mean, it happened during my tenure there. I mean, we’d go downtown, we’d do something. Steve would call – Hadley call up about 10:30, 11:00, and in the most honorable way, he’d say, hey, Mike, that was a really interesting briefing; it’s going to be front burner. We don’t want to mess this up. We want to get it out just accurately so. So could you guys write down a few talking points? And we would say, no, you guys write it down, send it up the river; we’ll check your syntax.

In other words, you write when the page is blank, because, let me tell you the dynamic that happens if you do it reverse. So who did this thing, OK, in Benghazi? Extremists? Jihadists? Fundamentalists? Renegade militias? Al-Qaida? All those words are true. If you’re writing – when the page is blank and you’ve got to pick it, and you pick a word that then gets argued about downtown for another accurate word, all right, you are now changing the word you chose for reasons beyond its intelligence merit, which is not the same thing as saying they’re lying by changing the talking points, OK? But you write intel talk – you should never write intel talk for a political speaker. You let the political speaker write political speak, and then you check it for accuracy.

And so if they choose to say renegade militia, you could go, yeah, that’s true, but that’s a really weak description of what we know – you might want to raise your hand and say, you know – look, if you want, you can kind of buff up that word and say something more specific. But you’re not involved in creating the public speech, OK? And so that is an absolute non-winning hand. And so the right answer would have been, we don’t do this.

Once Michael got involved – and Michael’s a great guy and a good friend – actually a neighbor of mine in McLean, and he’s taken a lot of hits. And yeah, he probably made some – he said, yeah, I shouldn’t have done that, I should have done this, you know, and so on. But fundamentally, he can’t win that. He’s got to come of this in a bad place. And so the right was no, and unfortunately, they didn’t take that answer.

MR. MAY: Go ahead. That’s fine.

Q: Jack Berger (sp) from Chicago, Illinois. I had a chance to talk to a fellow named Norman Schwarzkopf after he retired, and we talked specifically about, what would have been the situation had Israel not bombed Osirak in 1981? And I have a picture in my office of what I call – “God Bless Israel,” is what he said. Today, we have a similar situation. If Israel were to bomb, without the approval or consent or whatever you want to call it of the United States, how do you think the government – this particular administration would react, seeing as, back in the Reagan days, they not only withheld arms, but they were one of the first people or first countries to condemn Israel at the United Nations.

GEN. HAYDEN: Yeah, first of all, the lead pilot for the raid is a good friend, and most of you probably know it’s Amos Yadlin, former head of Israeli Defense Force Intelligence. And Amos and I do some tag teams occasionally at events like this. When I get a question about that sort of thing, well, there’s only one guy on the stage that actually bombed a nuclear reactor; why
don’t you ask Amos?  (Laughter.)  So that’s one reality.  It’s been done, and done successfully, and we all now look back and go, phew, good choice.

This is a different scenario.  Number one, it’s farther away.  And number two, it is not an isolated, very discrete, small number of aim points that you have to service.  This is – this is a very dispersed, very hardened enterprise on the part of the Iranians.  And frankly, I don’t think either we or the IDF intel guys would claim we know where everything is.  And so – and then finally, the Israeli Air Force is very good, but rather small.  And so now you’ve got the problem of multiple aim points and great distances and a small air force.  And so you really have to ask yourself, just in raw military calculations, how much could they do with just their forces?  And I would add the additional dynamic, they get to do a raid; they don’t get to do a campaign.

Now, I’m – I actually see Sunni-Israeli convergence on some issues here, and I can actually imagine circumstance – I’m making this up.  I know no secrets.  But I can actually imagine circumstances where after that single raid, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia says, no, we don’t know nothing about no jets; no, don’t know nothing about anything that went through our airspace, but we’ll check, all right?  Say – but even if the Saudis were sympathetic, I don’t think it’s possible to let it happen again.  And so you really have very, very concrete limitations on what the Israelis can do.

I actually am of the opinion what they can do is not – is not worth a candle.  Amos is different.  Amos thinks they can.  Amos thinks they can.  So, you know, we’re kind of in that space.

We of course could.  I mean, our Air Force is bigger.  It’s closer.  We’ve got TLAMs.  We can – we can launch from Missouri with B-2s, and we can conduct a campaign.  And so you’ve really got that dynamic.

Two things come to mind with regard to the Israeli strategic decision.  Number one, A, like I said, is it worth the candle?  And number two, is it worth putting at risk the only strategic relationship on which the survival of Israel depends?  And that’s – those are – that’s a really, really hard question.

One thing I think that would be very destructive of the relationship would be if the raid were carried out under circumstances in which it was clear, even before it began, that someone else would have to finish what it was the Israelis started.

MR. MAY:  Let’s go to Dan Raviv.  And actually, I’ll take the liberty of introducing him.  He’s a CBS News correspondent who’s written very interestingly on (lies ?) himself.

GEN. HAYDEN:  Hey, Dan!

Q:  Hi, Mike.  Congratulations, General, on your award.

GEN. HAYDEN:  Thanks.
Q: I’m wondering – and you mentioned Snowden’s name first – (laughter) – so here’s the simple question. Do you perceive now from the –

GEN. HAYDEN: I mentioned Snowden? I mentioned Snowden? (Chuckles.)

Q: You said – you said the post-Snowden period.

GEN. HAYDEN: Oh, OK. Oh, OK. (Laughter.)

Q: So is it – the question is, is it a post-Snowden period, as you view it from the outside, but you know the inside? Do you think the NSA and the intelligence community have adjusted, have gotten past it, you know, back to doing the job that’s needed?

GEN. HAYDEN: Yeah, thanks, Dan. Great question. No, they’re not past it yet. There’s an awful lot of things to be done. And let me just quickly kind of tick off a few of them.

Number one, there are foreign intelligence relationships that have to be tended to. And it’s not so much what we may or may not have done against one country or another’s chancellor or something, all right? It’s can you guys keep anything secret? And that really is corrosive.

A second major impact is on American business, American industry, commerce, that has been incredibly unfairly singled out. American business doesn’t do anything more or less for American intelligence than Deutsche Telekom does for the BND or French telecoms provide – actually, to be totally honest, they do more, OK, and they do it with less oversight than happens here. But it’s the Americans that have been singled out and American firms that have been made to suffer.

A third – a third impact is just on raw operational capacity. And don’t believe the stories when they say no one has shown any concrete examples where America has been harmed by the leaks. You got the heads of both intel committees, head of NSA, the DNI, the president of the United States, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency – the list goes on – saying we are seeing concrete shortfalls in collection based upon the exposures of – by the way, I mean, Snowden’s secrets aren’t like, here’s how much HEU the Iranians have, but you’re kind of like, you know, little boxes of things. They can be bad. Snowden’s secret – you know, you call them leaks, so was it – was it a cup? Was it a bucket? Was it a barrel? It was the plumbing. He revealed how we do this. And therefore you just haven’t lost that bunch of data; you’ve lost the capacity to gain – to gain data.

In addition to an operational blivet, Dan, in addition to, you know, the enemy responding, right, the – or targets responding – not everybody you spy on is an enemy, but targets responding – you also have our doing things to ourselves which, you know, might be necessary for the moment, but the president’s kind of doubled down. I mean, he really hasn’t stopped very much. But he’s paying for the doubling down by increased self-restraint, by increased transparency and by increased oversight, OK? All three of those things actually make you less operationally efficient, all right? And I’m – you know, and I understand oversight’s necessary, and some
measure of transparency is necessary, but all of that is more than we used to have, and that’s all at the expense of agility.

Then one final really noteful end point. People at NSA have been slapped around for almost a year now. They wake up in the morning, whether they, you know, get the Baltimore Sun or the Washington Post, and they go out on their porch and read the daily indictment. That’s horrible. And that has to have a long-term effect on the morale.

Keith and Chris, Keith Alexander and Chris Inglis, director and deputy, over the holidays actually wrote a letter to the extended families of NSA officers and had them bring it, you know, to Thanksgiving, like, so you can give it to your crazy uncle Fred or, you know, say, oh, you guys – (inaudible) – spy on American – well, Fred, here. And it was a letter – it in essence said, the bearer of this letter is an American patriot, not a criminal. I mean, in more detail, but – (applause) – but the fact of should be really troubling.

So those are all the kind of bills to pay.

MR. MAY: We’ll go right here. Yeah, wait for the microphone. Identify yourself.

Q: Thank you. Michael Kutting (ph), formerly with Department of Agriculture. Do you think, sir, that the Syrians have gotten rid of their chemical warfare – chemical – I guess you call it warfare? And number two, what do you think should be done when the president of the United States draws a red line and doesn’t follow up on it?

GEN. HAYDEN: Yeah. All right, so with regard to the chemical weapons, I don’t – I just don’t have a window into the intelligence as to how thorough this has been, but frankly it’s been more successful than I thought it would be in terms of bundling up and moving chems. Get to zero? Probably not, but more successful than I thought. So, check, pretty good.

The red line thing. My raw emotion watching it from the outside was just embarrassment, all right? I mean, as someone who has actually kind of played this sport you kind of look at it and go, wow, is that Casey Stengel in the – what was it, the 60-something Mets, you know: “Can’t anybody here play this game?” It just cost in so many ways. And that sounds judgmental and it probably was, but – and I try not to do that, being an intelligence officer, but I just don’t understand.

I mean, so I’m – we live in McLean, you know, lived there five years and my wife said it’s time to wash the windows. I said, OK. So we’re washing windows the day I think we’re going to go to war. And I said, OK, we’ve got to wash the windows in a room with a flat screen while Secretary Kerry gives his speech. It was a Friday morning, and I’m watching it and, you know – (laughter) – and we got all done and she said, well, what do you think? I said, well, I think I should have gone to work. And she said, why? I said, because there’s been a coup. (Laughter.) OK?

I mean, that was a presidential speech. I mean, it really was, and a good one, I mean if you were going to go to war. And so we were all geared up for the Saturday morning
announcement the next day where the president would have said: I’m informing the American public that two hours ago – and so on and so forth. And he didn’t. What he said was, Denis and I took a walk on the South Lawn last night and we decided we’ll toss this to Congress. They’ll decide.

I just – you know, the – sometimes the certainty of an action is far more powerful than the severity of an action. And we’ve made everything uncertain, which actually makes you appear weak at some times but also then demands that when you want to appear strong, you may have to be overly severe to overcome the uncertainty. It’s just bad all around.

MR. MAY: I’ve got a question there and then I’ll come back.

Q: Thank you. My name is Savri Hamid (ph). Congratulations, General.

GEN. HAYDEN: Thank you.

Q: I actually wear two hats, and all my career was a professor but now after the coup in Egypt in July 3rd I became an activist, and I’m actually the president of Egyptian Worldwide for Democracy. And I would like to talk to you – you know, being an American citizen myself, of course I care very much about the national security of my country, my adopted country. I want to talk about two concepts.

Capturing the hearts and the souls of the people in the Middle East is, I think, a very important objective for you guys in the intelligence, but there is a problem now, at least in the masses in the Arab world, that – I refer to it as the guilt by association. Many of the people who are really on the scene who are considered villains, just like General Sisi for instance, comes from the intelligence establishment and, in a way, can be said he’s your student. How do I answer Egyptians who are saying that; who are saying – you know, being a university professor, I know. I take account of every student I graduate. How would you say?

GEN. HAYDEN: Yeah. First of all, you know, I need to say I bear no peculiar expertise about this issue, but you asked for a – for a response, or at least a reflection. Yeah, he was a student up at Carlisle for a year. Apparently it was a very good year for General Sisi.

One of the purposes we have for those meetings is, you know, not to change the belief system of our allied students but to – but to, in essence, just establish personal relationships between allied students and American officers. We suffered mightily in Pakistan because we stopped that program for a whole generation of Pakistani officers and now we don’t know anybody there and they don’t know anybody here, and that suffers. So I think the first thing you need to understand is what our objectives were in terms of the military education and training program.

The Egyptian thing is disappointing on multiple levels. So you had the events in Tahrir Square. You had a million people there. The Mubarak regime is overthrown. I was good friends with Suleiman, another intelligence chief. And Omar was about the world’s greatest counterterrorism partner, and he was really good on the Palestinian-Israel issue as well, in a – in
a very positive way. And Omar also had a job of keeping his friend Hosni in power, which he did quite efficiently for 30 years, and all of a sudden he loses everything. And he loses everything because a million people show up in Tahrir Square three to four weeks after a Tunisian fruit merchant self-immolates.

And what I’m suggesting is that the speed of this revolution overwhelms someone even as talented as Omar Suleiman in creating stability for Mubarak. And that last part is all morally neutral; it’s just how it worked. It was a peculiar revolution. It usually takes a long time to get a million people together to do something. And in that period stuff happens, like leaders emerge, platforms are agreed, going-in positions are negotiated. I mean, a whole bunch of things. This revolution did not just overwhelm Mubarak and Omar; it overwhelmed the million people in the square. They never had a chance to get an act together.

And then after Mubarak is overthrown, my understanding of what happened in Egypt is that two institutions, neither of which were represented in Tahrir Square, then serially competed for control of the Egyptian state, because those were the only two that were organized enough to give it a shot. One was the Muslim Brotherhood and the other was the Egypt army, and both have governed with excesses. Neither have been – neither have been as – I’ll choose my words carefully here – democratic might be a bridge too far, but how about pluralistic? How about responsive? How about inclusive? Neither have been that.

And I think most Americans think that a successful policy for Egypt requires a government, whatever it is, to be more inclusive, to be more transparent, to be more responsive, to be more responsible. And it really doesn’t matter whether it’s the Brotherhood or the army or the people in the square. That’s the formula to win. And unfortunately, neither of the – neither of the two groups outstanding have that as their formula, and so it’s a fairly depressing scenario from my point of view.

MR. MAY: We could go on for a long time but I want to keep on schedule, so I’m going to ask everyone to thank General Hayden. (Applause, cheers.)

GEN. HAYDEN: Thank you. Thank you.

MR. MAY: Congratulate him on his award once again. (Applause.)

GEN. HAYDEN: Thank you. Thank you.

MR. MAY: Thank you so much.

(END)