Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran

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Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, members of the Committee, on behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and its Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance, thank you for the opportunity to testify.

This morning, I would like to address three of the major design flaws in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA):

1. The JCPOA effectively dismantles the U.S. and international economic sanctions architecture, which, in key areas, was designed to address the full range of Iran’s illicit activities. The JCPOA also emboldens the most hardline element of the regime, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which will be a major beneficiary of this agreement;

2. The JCPOA creates an Iranian “nuclear snapback” instead of an effective economic sanctions snapback. This “nuclear snapback” provides Tehran with the ability to immunize itself against both political and economic pressure, block the enforcement of the agreement, and diminish the ability of the United States to apply any sanctions, including even non-nuclear sanctions, against the full range of Iran’s illicit conduct; and,

3. The JCPOA provides Iran with a patient path to a nuclear weapon over the next decade and a half. Tehran has to simply abide by the agreement to emerge as a threshold nuclear power with an industrial-size enrichment program; near-zero breakout time; an easier clandestine sneak-out pathway; an advanced long-range ballistic missile program, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); and hundreds of billions of dollars in sanctions relief to immunize its economy against future economic snapback sanctions, increase its conventional military power, and support terrorism and other rogue regimes.

ALTERNATIVES TO THIS NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

Instead of this current JCPOA, Congress should work with the Obama Administration to amend and strengthen the agreement so that it much more effectively “cut[s] off every single one of Iran’s pathways”\(^1\) to a nuclear bomb and retains tools of effective and peaceful sanctions enforcement against Iranian illicit behavior on multiple fronts. President Obama and his Cabinet have repeatedly said, “No deal is better than a bad deal.”\(^2\) In making this commitment, the president clearly had an acceptable alternative path in mind during the negotiations or he would not have threatened to walk away from the table if Iran didn’t come to an agreement.\(^3\) It is


\(^3\) For example, June 30, 2015, President Obama said that he would “will walk away from the negotiations if, in fact, it’s a bad deal.” Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama and President Rousseff of Brazil in Joint Press Conference,” The White House, Washington D.C., June 30, 2015. (https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/30/remarks-president-obama-and-president-rousseff-brazil-joint-press)
reasonable to assume that no president would enter negotiations, especially over something as fundamental to American national security as preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, unless that president had a well-developed best alternative to a negotiated agreement.

That alternative path of American coercive diplomacy still exists as a viable alternative, and includes: 1) leveraging the power of U.S. secondary sanctions to persuade international financial institutions and companies to stay out of Iran; 2) the use of military power, either directly or through the support of allies, against Iranian regime interests in Syria, Iraq, Yemen; and 3) the credible threat of conventional and cyber-enabled force against Iran’s nuclear program.

If the president believes in the power of U.S. sanctions to maintain an effective economic snapback a decade or more in the future, then such an option exists today when the Iranian economy is still fragile and international investors have yet to return to Iran. If the president believes, however, that the multilateral sanctions regime cannot withstand a renewed commitment to negotiate an improved agreement, then he is admitting that the United States does not have sufficient peaceful economic leverage to enforce this agreement in the future when Iran’s nuclear program will be much bigger, Iran can leverage its “nuclear snapback” against the re-imposition of sanctions, and the regime’s economy will be much stronger.

If economic leverage is unavailable, then a future president will be left with only two options: concede Iran’s nuclear weapons development or use military force against a much stronger Iran when its nuclear breakout or sneak-out options will be much greater, and the consequences of force will be much more severe.

Congress should insist on an alternative to this deeply flawed deal and keep the president to his commitment that such alternatives always did—and continue to—exist. An agreement that gives Iran patient pathways to a nuclear weapon, access to heavy weaponry and ICBM technology, while enriching the leading state sponsor of terrorism, should be unacceptable. An agreement that undermines the use of peaceful economic leverage should be unacceptable. An agreement that leaves military force as the only effective option for a future president to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons development should be unacceptable.

This testimony now turns to an analysis of the fundamental flaws in the construction of the JCPOA.

**FLAWED DEAL CONSTRUCTION: THE PATIENT PATHWAYS TO A BOMB**

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is fundamentally flawed in its construction. Even if Iran doesn’t violate the JCPOA, over time, it will have patient pathways to nuclear weapons, an ICBM program, access to heavy weaponry, an economy immunized against sanctions pressure, and a more powerful regional position where it can continue its destabilizing and aggressive behavior. Even if Iran abides by the deal, it can re-open and expand each of the pathways to a nuclear bomb.

Under the JCPOA, Iran will be permitted over the next 8.5 to 15 years to expand its nuclear program. The deal allows certain restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities to lapse after 8.5 and 10
years, and many additional restrictions to terminate after 15 years (see Figure 1). Additionally, once Iran has implemented its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA to reduce its operating centrifuges, reduce its low-enriched uranium stockpile, and modify the Arak heavy-water reactor, the international economic sanctions architecture will be nearly completely unwound (see Figure 2).

**Figure 1: Iran’s Nuclear Expansion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>After Implementation Day, Iran can:</th>
<th>Iran will retain its Arak heavy water reactor, albeit subject to modernization and redesigning.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enrichment capacity:</td>
<td>• Continue enriching uranium up to 3.67% at Natanz.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enrich uranium using 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges in up to 30 cascades at Natanz.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Put surplus centrifuges in storage.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Maintain a stockpile of up to 300 kg of 3.67% enriched uranium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrifuge R&amp;D:</td>
<td>• Continue R&amp;D, so long as it does not lead to increases in Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Engage in limited enrichment R&amp;D using advanced centrifuges.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Engage in uranium testing at Natanz.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Convert Fordow into a nuclear physics and technology center and will be open for “international collaboration.”</td>
<td>• Operate 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges provided they are not using uranium.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Maintain other cascades in “idle” position.</td>
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<tr>
<td>After Transition Day (8 years):</td>
<td>Iran will seek ratification of Additional Protocol in Majles (Parliament).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iran can start building up to 200 IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges per year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 10 years, Iran can:</td>
<td>Increase its enrichment capacity at Natanz.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Expand R&amp;D enrichment using advanced centrifuges.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expand testing of the IR-4 and IR-5 centrifuges.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enrich using advanced centrifuges and/or more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz (unless otherwise specified in Iran’s long-term, voluntary commitment with the IAEA).</td>
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<td>Breakout time drops to “almost down to zero,” according to President Obama.</td>
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</table>

(http://www.npr.org/2015/04/07/397933577/transcript-president-obamas-full-npr-interview-on-iran-nuclear-deal)
After 15 years, Iran can:

- Build additional heavy water reactors and stockpile heavy water.
- Build additional enrichment facilities.
- Enrich uranium and conduct uranium R&D at Fordow.
- Increase its uranium enrichment levels to above 3.67%.
- Engage in spent fuel reprocessing (Iran states that it intends not to but is not bound not to).
- Deploy, at an industrial-scale, advanced centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow and new facilities.
- Increase without limit its stocks of LEU.
- Build and/or operate facilities related to the conversion of scrap or fuel plates back to UF6.

After 20 years:

The “containment and surveillance” measures of rotors and bellows for Iranian centrifuges by the IAEA will lapse.

After 25 years:

The IAEA will cease monitoring the production of uranium ore concrete from all such plants in Iran.

- Iran will no longer have to provide the IAEA with information that would allow the agency to authenticate Iran’s inventory of uranium ore concrete or Iran’s production or import of this material.

Permanent restrictions:

- Iran has promised to ship-out all of Arak’s spent fuel for the duration the reactor’s life.
- Should Iran fail to attain a fuel-supply contract for its research reactor in Tehran (TRR), the P5+1 are required to provide Iran with near 20% U308 that will be used for fuel fabrication for the entire time the TRR remains in operation.

Figure 2: Dismantlement of the International Sanctions Architecture

After Implementation Day:

The EU will terminate sanctions on the following from Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP and Council Regulation 267/2012:

- Financial, banking, and insurance
  - Financial messaging sanctions remain on the books but entities are de-listed and thus allowed back into SWIFT.
- Oil, gas, and petrochemicals
- Shipping, shipbuilding, and transport related to Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and civil aviation
- Gold, precious metals, banknotes, and coinage
- Metals are allowed through single procurement channel
- Software is allowed through single procurement channel
The EU will amend counter proliferation-related sanctions consistent with what is permitted by the new UNSC resolution.

The EU will remove designated entities (most major Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran (CBI)) from its list.

The United States will cease the application for non-US persons of the following sanctions:

- Financial and banking (including financial messaging services and transactions with CBI, National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), and National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC))
- Insurance
- Energy and petrochemicals
- Shipping, shipbuilding, and port sectors
- Gold and other precious metals
- Software
- Automotive

Remove designated entities including major banks (Melli, Mellat, Sepah, Central Bank of Iran), shipping companies, EIKO, and major oil and gas firms from its lists. Of the nearly 650 entities that have been designated by the U.S. Treasury for their role in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs or for being owned or controlled by the government of Iran, more than 67% will be de-listed within 6-12 months.

Terminate executive orders:

- 13574 – prohibiting financial transactions with ISA designated entities.
- 13590 – prohibiting provision of goods and services to Iran’s energy and petrochemical sectors
- 13622 – prohibiting transactions with NIOC and NICO.
- Sections 5, 6, 7 and 15 of 13628 – prohibiting goods and technology to expand Iran’s domestic refined petroleum production.
- 13645 – prohibiting transactions in rials, transactions with the shipping sector, transactions with the automotive sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Actions</th>
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<tr>
<td>After 5 years:</td>
<td>The U.N. arms embargo will be lifted.</td>
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<tr>
<td>After Transition Day (8 years):</td>
<td>The EU will terminate sanctions on the following:</td>
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<tr>
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<td>• SWIFT (Most major Iranian banks including the Central Bank of Iran are permitted onto SWIFT after Implementation Day)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Shipping, shipbuilding, and transport related to the nuclear and missile technology control lists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>• Ballistic missiles</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The EU will also remove additional banks (Saderat, Ansar, Mehr) and the IRGC, IRGC-QF, Qassem Soleimani, and nuclear and missile related entities from its counter proliferation lists.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The United States will terminate the statutory sanctions.

The United States will remove additional entities including:

- Some of those designated during the JPOA negotiations like Aria Nikan Marin Industry which sources goods for Iran’s nuclear program and whose customers include Khatam Al Anbiya, and Iran Pooya, which supplies material for centrifuge production;
- Two central figures in Iran’s weaponization and nuclear activities, Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani and Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and the AQ Khan of Iran’s nuclear weapons development, respectively;
- The Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), an entity involved in research related to nuclear weapons; and
- Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars and Mandegar Baspar Kimiya Company, which were involved in illicit procurement.

After eight years, only 25 percent of the nearly 650 entities that have been designated by Treasury over the past decade for their role in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program or for being owned and controlled by the Government of Iran will remain sanctioned.

<table>
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<th>After Termination Day (10 years):</th>
<th>The U.N. will no longer be “seized of the Iran nuclear issue.”</th>
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<tr>
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<td>The EU will terminate all remaining sanctions in Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP and Council Regulation 267/2012</td>
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Sanctions that remain after 10 years:

- EU human rights sanctions.
- U.S. terrorism and human rights sanctions (for example, U.S. sanctions on Bank Saderat and Qassem Soleimani, although neither will be under EU counter proliferation sanctions. Terrorism and Syria-related sanctions on Soleimani will remain.).
- No U.N. sanctions.

The administration states that the goal of the nuclear deal is to cut off Iran’s “four pathways to a nuclear weapon”: the two uranium pathways through Natanz and Fordow, the plutonium pathway at the Arak reactor, and the clandestine pathway.\(^5\)

The JCPOA is fundamentally flawed in its design because if Iran abides by the deal, it can still re-open and expand each of these pathways.

During the first ten years, Iran can test advanced centrifuges in a way that does not accumulate enrichment uranium; however, after 8.5 years, Iran can commence R&D and testing with uranium in up to 30 IR-6’s and IR-8’s.\(^6\) After ten years, Iran can increase the number and type of enrichment.


centrifuges operating at the Natanz facility, further reducing the limited restriction on this pathway.

As restrictions on Iran’s enrichment program lapse, Iran can operationalize an unlimited number of advanced centrifuges. These centrifuges can more easily be used in a clandestine program because they are more efficient than Iran’s basic models, can enrich uranium to weapons-grade faster requiring a fewer number of machines, and can be housed in smaller, harder-to-detect facilities. Iran’s breakout time—the amount of time it takes to enrich enough uranium for one bomb to weapons-grade—will begin to drop below the one-year breakout time after year 10 and hit near-zero breakout by year 13, according to President Obama. Even if there is a “softer landing” on breakout time after year 10 than the president predicted, Iranian breakout time will fall to near-zero after year 15 given the end of restrictions on the type and quantity of centrifuge deployment, the accumulation of low-enriched uranium, and the enrichment of uranium above 3.67% to 20% and 60%. As a result, Iran’s nuclear program will no longer be at the one-year breakout time that the Obama Administration established as its benchmark.

Additionally, after fifteen years, Iran can build an unlimited number of advanced centrifuge-powered enrichment facilities. Iran will also be permitted to enrich uranium at its undergrounded facility at Fordow—a facility possibly impenetrable to U.S. military strikes. Indeed, under the deal, Iran will be permitted to build multiple Fordow-type facilities. Thus, in a decade and a half, Iran will be on a path to an industrial-sized, widely-dispersed nuclear program with an ICBM program and will have the capability to enrich very quickly to weapons-grade at hardened, buried under mountains, Fordow-type enrichment facilities.

After fifteen years, Iran can also build an unlimited number of heavy water reactors. The JCPOA prohibits Iran from building additional heavy water reactors for 15 years and after that, relies on a non-binding Iranian intention to build only light water reactors. This intention might change. The deal also relies on Iranian intentions not to engage in spent fuel reprocessing, a process from which plutonium for a nuclear bomb can be recovered.

The only permanent restriction on Iran’s ability to use its heavy water reactors to reprocess plutonium for weapons purposes is the requirement to ship all spent fuel out of Iran “for the lifetime of the reactor.” When Arak is no longer operational, does this restriction also lapse? When Iran has multiple heavy water reactors and assesses that the United States has limited

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8 The JCPOA notes that Iran will only enrich to 3.67% for 15 years but does not specify the restrictions after that. Iran’s enrichment levels after 15 years will be governed by its “voluntary commitments” in its long term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan, submitted to the IAEA. There are non-military uses for 20% and 60% enriched uranium, and therefore Iran may argue that it needs to enrich to those higher levels after 15 years. “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” Vienna, July 14, 2015, Annex I, paragraphs 28 and 52. (http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-e eas/docs/iran_agreement/annex_1_nuclear_related_commitments_en.pdf)
10 Ibid., paragraph 45.
11 Ibid., paragraph 16.
12 Ibid., paragraphs 18-19.
13 Ibid., paragraph 11.
coercive options outside of military force to respond a violation of this ban, it may feel emboldened to retain spent fuel inside the country.

While abiding by the terms of the JCPOA, Iran can exercise strategic patience and wait patiently to open up these multiple pathways to nuclear weapons while building up immunity against economic sanctions, leveraging its nuclear snapback to constrain Western retaliation to violations, and increasing its regional power.

How would Iran achieve these objectives based on the JCPOA’s deal terms?

1. **Do the bare minimum to address the PMD issue** and fulfill the initial nuclear commitments.

Iran is required to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve past and present issues of concern regarding the possible military dimensions (PMDs) of Iran’s program. The IAEA will have tight deadlines to which it has to adhere in a politicized post-Iran deal environment. The IAEA will have limited time and space to resolve the outstanding issues. It remains unclear what will happen if the IAEA is not satisfied. What will be its path of recourse? Will Iran be required to make an expanded declaration of all of Iran’s nuclear activities, including past activity, to set a credible baseline for monitoring and verification?

Iran has reportedly already refused to allow certain scientists and facilities to be included in the list requested during the negotiations. The bilateral IAEA-Iran agreement may reportedly include only one visit to Parchin. Will the IAEA be able to interview all of the scientists, visit all of the sites, and see all of the documents to address their questions from the November 2011 IAEA report? What about questions that have arisen since that 2011 IAEA report? These appear not to be permitted under the “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues.”

2. **Use sanctions relief to build economic resiliency and benefit the IRGC.**

After Iran completes specific, but reversible, nuclear steps, most EU and U.S. economic sanctions will begin to unwind, and Iran can increasingly immunize its economy against future economic pressure. The economic impact of sanctions relief is likely to be substantial, starting slowly after a deal and building over time.

Economic forecasts prior to the announced deal based on expectations of the sanctions relief

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assessed that Iran’s economic growth would likely stabilize around 2.6% in FY2015/16, and then accelerate to about 4% in FY 2016/17. In the second half of the decade, Iran’s economic growth would likely average 3.5-4%. Depending on Iran’s economic policy choices, in FY 2017/18, growth might reach 5-6%.

The IRGC will be a significant beneficiary of the sanctions relief. Combined with the de-listing of IRGC officials and IRGC-linked entities, the relaxed banking standards will grant the Iranian regime the ability to move its money anywhere in the world. With EU sanctions also set to be lifted on major Iranian banks, Europe will become an economic free zone for Iran’s most dangerous people and entities.


According to the U.N. Security Council resolution, the arms embargo will end in five years. After five years, Iran can begin purchasing “battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, [and] missiles.” Iran can purchase these goods with the cash it has received through sanctions relief to build its own military capacities. Tehran may also illicitly provide these heavy arms to its allies and proxies.

4. Develop a long-range ballistic missile system after the termination of the ballistic missile sanctions.

U.N., U.S., and EU ballistic missile sanctions will be terminated. Notably, the JCPOA permits this to happen after eight years or after the IAEA reaches a so-called “broader conclusion” that Iran’s program is entirely peaceful and contains no undeclared activities, “whichever is earlier.” (emphasis added). In short, whether or not the IAEA has determined that Iran’s program is peaceful, Tehran will be permitted to engage in an expansion of its ballistic missile program after a maximum of eight years. Iran may also be able to expand its intercontinental ballistic missile program under the guise of satellite testing. The U.S. Defense Department notes, “Iran has publicly stated it may launch a space launch vehicle by 2015 that could be capable of intercontinental ballistic missile ranges if configured as a ballistic missile.”

Even with the current sanctions in place, Iran reportedly has the “largest and most diverse” ballistic missile program in the Middle East. The U.S. Defense Department has repeatedly

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assessed that Iran’s ballistic missile could be “adapted to deliver nuclear weapons.” Last year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified before Congress that if Iran chooses to make a bomb, Iran would choose “a ballistic missile as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons.” According to Clapper, these missiles are “inherently capable of delivering WMD.”

Why is Iran permitted to engage in ballistic missile development—the development of the likely delivery vehicle if Iran builds a nuclear warhead—before the international community is certain that Iran’s existing nuclear program is peaceful?

5. **Reap additional economic and military benefits** when additional sanctions terminate and more entities are de-listed by the United States and EU.

Of the nearly 650 entities that have been designated by the U.S. Treasury Department for their role in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs or for being owned or controlled by the government of Iran, more than 67 percent will be de-listed from Treasury’s blacklists within 6 to 12 months. After eight years, only 25 percent of the entities that have been designated over the past decade will remain sanctioned.

After eight years—whether or not the IAEA has determined that Iran’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful—additional significant EU sanctions will be lifted. These include sanctions on the IRGC, Quds Force, IRGC Air Force, and the Ministry of Defense. Additionally, the United States will lift sanctions on two central figures in Iran’s nuclear development: Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani and Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. Abbasi-Davani is the former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Fakhrizadeh is the AQ Khan of Iran’s nuclear weapons development. The United States will also de-list—among other entities involved in Iran’s nuclear program—the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), an entity “primarily responsible for research in the field of nuclear weapons development.”

Additionally, Iran could argue that other “non-nuclear” sanctions should also be lifted under the JCPOA according to paragraph 26:

“The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.”

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24 Ibid.


Paragraph 29 of the preface states:

“The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA.” (emphasis added)  

While paragraph 26 only refers to the imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, Iran may be able to argue that U.S. terrorism-related sanctions to the extent they have any economic impact on Iran are in violation of the JCPOA because they block the normalization of trade and economic relations. For example, Iran could claim that the imposition of sanctions on Iranian banks for terrorist financing would impede normal trade and economic relations. Tehran also can threaten to use its “nuclear snapback” (described below) to persuade the EU and other countries not to comply with any new U.S. non-nuclear sanctions, complicating Washington’s ability to constrain and deter the full range of Iran’s illicit conduct.

6. Transform from a nuclear pariah to a nuclear partner.

After ten years, the United Nations will remove the Iranian nuclear file from its agenda and will “no longer be seized of the Iran nuclear issue.” At that time, Iran will no longer be under any Chapter 7 resolutions and will have a legitimate and legal nuclear program. Iran can also build additional scientific knowledge because research and development restrictions will be lifted. Even prior to the lifting of restrictions on R&D, Iranian scientists can acquire knowledge and skills which can be used to move quickly to nuclear breakout at the time of Iran’s choosing. Under the JCPOA, all parties also commit to cooperate on enhancing Iran’s ability to respond to nuclear security threats “including sabotage,” which may limit the use of cyber and other tools to counter Iran’s nuclear expansion or to respond to Iranian noncompliance.

7. Use the threat of a “nuclear snapback” to ward off any attempt to use the sanctions snapback.

The JCPOA explicitly states, “Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.” Using snapback sanctions cancels the JCPOA. In short, if the United States or its partners attempt to re-impose sanctions, Iran may simply walk away from the deal. If Iran cheats and gets caught, and the international community attempts to punish Iran, Iran can threaten to back out of the deal and expand its nuclear program. This may create reluctance to punish Iran for any violations short of the most flagrant and egregious violations and create a permissive environment for Iranian cheating and stonewalling of the IAEA.

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27 Ibid., paragraph 29.
8. **Build an advanced centrifuge-powered, industrial-size nuclear program.**

After fifteen years, the significant restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program will have lapsed. Iran will in effect be permitted to have:

- Multiple enrichment facilities;
- A near-zero breakout time with faster advanced centrifuges;
- An easier clandestine sneak-out with fewer machines deployed in smaller facilities;
- Plutonium reprocessing;
- A stockpile of enriched uranium to 20 or 60% levels; and,
- An expanded ballistic missile program.

9. **Stymie IAEA inspections.**

Throughout the duration of the JCPOA, Iran can delay IAEA inspections of suspected sites without facing consequences. The JCPOA creates a 24-day delay between the IAEA request to access a suspicious site and the date on which Iran must allow access. As former Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration William Tobey explains, “24 days … [is] ample time for Iran to hide or destroy evidence.”

Former Deputy Director General for Safeguards at the IAEA Dr. Olli Heinonen explains that for small facilities, 24 days is enough time for Iran to “sanitize” suspected sites, including, for example, where Iran may be engaged in weaponization activities. Iran is also likely to have developed contingency plans to respond to IAEA demands to visit these sites. According to Dr. Heinonen, Tehran may only need two days to remove nuclear equipment from a small facility and remove any traces of uranium, which even environmental sampling may be unable to detect. As Dr. Heinonen notes:

> “Time for ‘scrubbing’ takes on special salience in nuclear-related developments without nuclear material present. Some of the past concealment events carried out by Iran in 2003 left no traces to be detected through environmental sampling.”

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10. Become a threshold nuclear weapons state.

While adhering to the letter of its commitments under the JCPOA, Iran will emerge in 15 years with multiple pathways to a nuclear weapon. Iran will have a powerful economy, immunized against sanctions pressure and increased military and regional power. Iran will likely be the dominant power in the region and a threshold nuclear weapons state. Iran will have achieved its goals through strategic patience by following the terms of the deal.

The JCPOA does not prevent a nuclear-armed Iran; rather it provides multiple patient pathways for Iran.

JCPOA & CHALLENGE TO CONDUCT-BASED FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

The JCPOA also dismantles the international economic sanctions architecture which was designed to respond to the full range of Iran’s illicit activities, not only the development of Iran’s illicit nuclear program. The United States has spent the last decade building a powerful yet delicate sanctions architecture to punish Iran for its nuclear mendacity, illicit ballistic missile development, vast financial support for terrorist groups, backing of other rogue states like Bashar Assad’s Syria, human rights abuses, and the financial crimes that sustain these illicit activities. More broadly, a primary goal of the sanctions on Iran, as explained by senior Treasury Department officials over the past decade, was to “protect the integrity of the U.S. and international financial systems” from Iranian illicit financial activities and the bad actors that facilitated these.  

The goal of sanctions was to provide the president with the tools to stop the development of an Iranian nuclear threshold capacity and also to protect the integrity of the U.S.-led global financial sector from the vast network of Iranian financial criminals and the recipients of their illicit transactions. This included brutal authoritarians, terrorist funders, weapons and missile proliferators, narco-traffickers, and human rights abusers.

Tranche after tranche of designations issued by the Treasury, backed by intelligence that often took months, if not years, to compile, isolated Iran’s worst financial criminals. And designations were only the tip of the iceberg. Treasury officials traveled the globe to meet with financial leaders and business executives to warn them against transacting with known and suspected terrorists and weapons proliferators. This campaign was crucial to isolating Iran in order to deter its nuclear ambitions and also to address the full range of its illicit conduct.

Following years of individual designations of Iranian and foreign financial institutions for involvement in the illicit financing of nuclear, ballistic missile, and terrorist activities, Treasury

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issued a finding in November 2011 under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act that Iran, as well as its entire financial sector including the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), is a “jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern.”

Treasury cited Iran’s “support for terrorism,” “pursuit of weapons of mass destruction,” including its financing of nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and the use of “deceptive financial practices to facilitate illicit conduct and evade sanctions.”

The entire country’s financial system posed “illicit finance risks for the global financial system.” Internationally, the global anti-money laundering and anti-terror finance standards body the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) also warned its members that they should “apply effective counter-measures to protect their financial sectors from money laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks emanating from Iran.”

As recently as June 26, 2015, FATF issued a statement warning that Iran’s “failure to address the risk of terrorist financing” poses a “serious threat … to the integrity of the international financial system.”

The Section 311 finding was conduct-based; it would be appropriate, therefore, to tie the lifting of sanctions on all designated Iranian banks, especially the legislatively-designated Central Bank of Iran, and their readmission onto SWIFT and into the global financial system, to specific changes in the conduct of these Iranian entities across the full range of Iran’s illicit financial activities. However, the JCPOA requires the lifting of financial sanctions—including the SWIFT sanctions—prior to a demonstrable change in Iran’s illicit financial conduct.

In the past, Washington has given “bad banks” access to the global financial system in order to secure a nuclear agreement. In 2005, Treasury issued a Section 311 finding against Macau-based Banco Delta Asia, and within days, North Korean accounts and transactions were frozen or blocked in banking capitals around the world. North Korea refused to make nuclear concessions before sanctions relief and defiantly conducted its first nuclear test. The State Department advocated for the release of frozen North Korean funds on good faith, and ultimately prevailed.


38 Ibid.


As a result, however, Washington lost its leverage and its credibility by divorcing the Section 311 finding from the illicit conduct that had prompted the finding in the first place. Undeterred, North Korea moved forward with its nuclear weapons program while continuing to engage in money laundering, counterfeiting, and other financial crimes.

Compromising the integrity of the U.S. and global financial system to conclude a limited agreement with North Korea neither sealed the deal nor protected the system. The JCPOA appears to repeat this same mistake by lifting financial restrictions on bad banks without certifications that Iran’s illicit finance activities have ceased.

The JCPOA stipulates that of the nearly 650 entities that have been designated by the U.S. Treasury for their role in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs or for being owned or controlled by the government of Iran, more than 67 percent will be de-listed from Treasury’s blacklists within 6-12 months. This includes the Central Bank of Iran and most major Iranian financial institutions. After eight years, only 25 percent of the entities that have been designated by Treasury over the past decade will remain sanctioned. Many IRGC businesses that were involved in the procurement of material for Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs will be de-listed as will some of the worst actors involved in Iran’s nuclear weaponization activities. Even worse, the EU will lift all of its counter proliferation sanctions on Iran. Although human rights-related sanctions will remain, and terrorism and Syria-related sanctions will remain on notorious Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani,45 sanctions against the Qods Force itself will be lifted (although certain Syria-related sanctions will remain).

What is especially notable about the lifting of designations is that the Obama Administration has provided no evidence to suggest that these individuals, banks, and businesses are no longer engaging in the full range of illicit conduct on which the original designations were based. What evidence, for example, is there for the de-designation of the Central Bank of Iran, which is the main financial conduit for the full range of Iran’s illicit activities, and how does a nuclear agreement resolve its proven role in terrorism and ballistic missile financing, money laundering, deceptive financial activities, and sanctions evasion? In other words, with the dismantlement of much of the Iran sanctions architecture in the wake of a nuclear agreement, the principle upon which Treasury created the sanctions architecture—the protection of the global financial system—is no longer the standard.

SWIFT: CASE STUDY IN THE JCPOA’S PRECIPITOUS SANCTIONS RELIEF

The sanctions relief provided to Iran through its re-admission into the SWIFT financial messaging system is a case study in the scale of precipitous sanctions relief afforded to Iran.

under the JCPOA. It is also a cautionary study in how difficult it will be to snap back the most effective economic sanctions.

The JCPOA obligates the United States, European Union, and United Nations to lift sanctions at two specific intervals: On “Implementation Day” when the IAEA verifies that Iran has implemented its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA to reduce its operating centrifuges, reduce its low-enriched uranium stockpile, and modify the Arak heavy-water reactor, among other requirements; and on “Transition Day” in eight years or when the IAEA has reached a “broader conclusion” that Iran’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful, whichever comes first. This last clause is critical: Even if the IAEA cannot verify the peaceful nature of Iran’s program, Iran will receive additional sanctions relief.

The JCPOA will provide Iran with more than $100 billion in sanctions relief, if you include the funds reportedly tied up in oil escrow accounts, and as much as $150 billion based on figures quoted by President Obama,46 which presumably includes funds that are legally frozen and those to which banks have been unwilling to provide Iran free access, even though they weren’t under formal sanctions. These funds could flow to the coffers of terrorist groups and rogue actors like Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Iraqi Shiite militias, the Houthis in Yemen, and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus. President Obama has claimed the money would not be a “game-changer” for Iran.47 As Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, however, stated in a speech less than one week after the JCPOA announcement, “We shall not stop supporting our friends in the region: The meek nation of Palestine, the nation and government of Syria … and the sincere holy warriors of the resistance in Lebanon and Palestine.”48 This infusion of cash will relieve budgetary constraints for a country which had only an estimated $20 billion in fully accessible foreign exchange reserves prior to November 201349 but was spending at least $6 billion annually to support Assad.50

The real prize for Iran in the JCPOA sanctions relief package is regaining access to SWIFT, (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) a little-known, but ubiquitous banking system that has been off-limits to the country since March 2012. Iran’s successful negotiation of the lifting of this sanction is a case study in how the JCPOA provides precipitous sanctions relief to Iran prior to a demonstrable change in Iranian financial practices.

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46 Jeffrey Goldberg, “‘Look ... It’s My Name on This’: Obama Defends the Iran Nuclear Deal,” The Atlantic, May 21, 2015. (http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/05/obama-interview-iran-isis-israel/393782/)
SWIFT is the electronic bloodstream of the global financial system. It is a member-owned cooperative comprising the most powerful financial institutions in the world, which allows more than 10,800 financial companies worldwide to communicate securely.51

By 2012, SWIFT represented one of Tehran's last entry points into the global financial system, as the United States and the European Union had sanctioned scores of banks, energy companies, and other entities under the control of the IRGC. In March 2012, SWIFT disconnected 15 major Iranian banks from its system in 2012 after coming under pressure from both the United States and the European Union.52 It was a substantial blow to Tehran since SWIFT was not only how Iran sold oil but how Iranian banks moved money. According to SWIFT’s annual review, Iranian financial institutions used SWIFT more than 2 million times in 2010.53 These transactions, according to The Wall Street Journal, amounted to $35 billion in trade with Europe alone.54

As a result of congressional legislation targeting SWIFT,55 EU regulators instructed SWIFT to remove specified Iranian banks from the SWIFT network.56 It was congressional pressure, and an unwillingness by Congress to accept arguments advanced by Obama Administration officials that such action would undercut the multilateral sanctions regime, which finally persuaded the Obama Administration and EU officials to act.

Today, the JCPOA explicitly calls for the lifting of sanctions on “[s]upply of specialized financial messaging services, including SWIFT, for persons and entities… including the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions.”57 EU will lift SWIFT sanctions for the Central Bank of Iran and all Iranian banks58 originally banned from SWIFT.59

58 On Implementation Day, the EU will lift sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and Bank Mellat, Bank Melli, Bank Refah, Bank Tejarat, Europaische-Iranische Handelsbank (EIH), Export Development Bank of Iran, Future Bank, Onerbank ZAO, Post Bank, and Sina Bank. On Transition Day, the EU will also lift sanctions on Ansar Bank, Bank Saderat, Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International, and Mehr Bank. See Attachment 1, parts 1 and 2 and Attachment 2, parts 1 and 2. (http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/annex_1_attacments_en.pdf)
The nuclear deal also lifts U.S. sanctions on 21 out of the 23 Iranian banks designated for proliferation financing—including both nuclear and ballistic missile activity. The designation of Bank Saderat for terrorist financing will remain in place, but the sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran will be lifted. Twenty-six other Iranian financial institutions blacklisted for providing financial services to previously-designated entities (including NIOC which is being de-listed on Implementation Day) or for being owned by the government of Iran will also be removed from Treasury’s blacklist.

The Obama Administration is assuming that the SWIFT sanctions (and other economic sanctions) can be reconstituted either in a snapback scenario or under non-nuclear sanctions like terrorism. However, the JCPOA notes that Iran may walk away from the deal and abandoned its nuclear commitments if new sanctions are imposed: “Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.” This gives Iran an effective way to intimidate the United States, and in particular, Europe into not reinstating sanctions, except for the most severe violations.

The threat of this “nuclear snapback” will prevent a response to technical and incremental violations for fear that Iran will walk away from the agreement and escalate its program, provoking a possible military crisis. It will also be used to make it very difficult for the United States and EU to ever reimpose SWIFT sanctions, which the Iranian government is likely to see as an act of economic or financial war, and will threaten to retaliate accordingly. This nuclear snapback will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section.

The IRGC: THE JCPOA’S BIG WINNER

The IRGC stand to be the greatest beneficiary from the economic relief granted under the JCPOA through both an improvement in Iran’s overall macroeconomic environment and through the dominance of the Revolutionary Guards in key strategic areas of the Iranian economy. Already, the sanctions relief provided as part of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) enabled Iran to move from a severe economic recession to a modest recovery. During the JPOA negotiations, $11.9 billion in direct sanctions relief, sanctions relief on major sectors of Iran’s...
economy such as the auto and petrochemical sectors, permission to trade in gold, and President Obama’s decision to de-escalate the sanctions pressure by blocking new congressional sanctions, rescued the Iranian economy and its rulers, including the IRGC, from a rapidly deteriorating balance of payments.63

In 2014, Iran’s exports to Europe increased 48% year-over-year. Overall, between March 2014 and February 2015, Iran’s non-oil and gas exports increased 22%.64 The JPOA facilitated imports from the EU through a relaxation of the bloc’s banking restrictions which increased the authorization thresholds for “non-sanctioned trade” ten-fold, from €40,000 to €400,000. Iran had better access to European goods, including spare parts for its automotive industry. The JPOA also suspended petrochemical sanctions; these exports rose 32% to $3.17 billion.65

Economic forecasts prior to the announcement of the JCPOA based on expectations of the sanctions relief assessed that Iran’s economic growth would likely stabilize around 2.6% in FY2015/16, and then accelerate to about 4% in FY 2016/17.66 In the second half of the decade, Iran’s economic growth would likely average 3.5-4%. Depending on Iran’s economic policy choices, in FY 2017/18, growth could reach 5-6%.

In addition to the improvement in Iran’s macroeconomic picture, which reduces threats to the political survival of the regime, the big winner from the unraveling of European and American sanctions will be the IRGC, which will earn substantial sanctions relief. The IRGC not only directs Iran’s external regional aggression, its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, and its vast system of domestic repression; the Guards also control at least one-sixth of the Iranian economy.67 Their control over strategic sectors of the Iranian economy—banking, energy, construction, industrial, engineering, mining, shipping, shipbuilding, amongst others—means that any foreign firms interested in doing business with Iran will have to do business with the IRGC.

In anticipation of the sanctions relief in a final nuclear deal, President Rouhani’s 2015 budget rewards the IRGC. It includes a 48% increase on expenditures related to the IRGC, the intelligence branches, and clerical establishment. Iran’s defense spending was set to increase by

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65 Ibid.


one-third, to $10 billion annually—excluding off the books funding. The IRGC and its paramilitary force, the Basij, are set to receive 64% of public military spending, and the IRGC’s massive construction arm Khatam al-Anbiya (which will be delisted by the European Union and is the dominant player in key strategic sectors of Iran’s economy) will see its budget double. Rouhani’s budget also included a 40% increase ($790 million) for Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence. Iran’s latest five-year plan, announced days before the JCPOA, calls for an additional increase in military spending to 5% of the total government budget. With access to additional revenue around the corner and with the termination of the arms embargo just over the horizon, Iran knows how it will spend its new cash.

My colleagues at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies Emanuele Ottolenghi and Saeed Ghasseminejad have done an extensive review of the sanctions relief and the entities that will be de-listed under the JCPOA. The following is based on their analysis.

Access to Europe and the De-Listing of IRGC Entities

With the lifting of EU sanctions under the JCPOA, Europe will increasingly become an economic free zone for Iran’s most dangerous people and entities. In addition to the lifting of specific types of economic and financial sanctions, the JCPOA requires the United States and Europe to remove numerous IRGC-linked entities from their sanction lists.

Europe will de-list significant IRGC entities and persons including the Quds Force. Some of these de-listings will occur on Implementation Day, but many more will fall off after eight years (assuming that they are even enforced over the next eight years).

Khatam al-Anbiya (KAA), a massive IRGC conglomerate, was designated by the United States as a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction. It is Iran’s biggest construction firm and, according to my colleagues’ estimates, “may be its largest company outright, with 135,000 employees and 5,000 subcontracting firms.” The value of its current contracts is estimated to be

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69 Ibid.
nearly $50 billion, or about 12% of Iran’s gross domestic product.\textsuperscript{74} KAA has hundreds of subsidiaries in numerous sectors of Iran’s economy including its nuclear and defense programs, energy, construction, and engineering. The company is also is also involved in “road-building projects, offshore construction, oil and gas pipelines and water systems.”\textsuperscript{75} EU sanctions against the company will be lifted after eight years, whether or not the IAEA concludes that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful.

Similarly, the IRGC Cooperative Foundation (aka \textit{Bonyad Taavon Sepah}), the IRGC investment arm, was designated by the U.S. Treasury as a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction,\textsuperscript{76} but is slated to be de-listed by the EU after eight years as a result of the JCPOA. It is not listed among the entities that the United States will de-list. The portfolio of IRGC Cooperative Foundation controls more than 20% of the value of the Tehran Stock Exchange.\textsuperscript{77}

Ansar Bank and Mehr Bank, which are both IRGC-linked and were designated by the Treasury for providing financial services to the IRGC,\textsuperscript{78} will also be de-listed by the EU (but not by the United States). They will be allowed back onto the SWIFT system and may open branches, conduct transactions, and facilitate financial flows for the IRGC. Other IRGC-linked banks, like Bank Melli,\textsuperscript{79} will be de-listed by both the United States and Europe upon Implementation Day and allowed back onto SWIFT.

The Quds Force, the IRGC’s external arm, will also be a beneficiary of sanctions relief. In addition to the EU de-listing, the JCPOA will lift both U.S. and EU sanctions on Iran’s commercial airline Iran Air, on which the Quds Force depends to “dispatch weapons and military personnel to conflict zones worldwide. … The Quds Force will have access to newer, larger, and more efficient planes with which to pursue its strategic objectives.”\textsuperscript{80}

The JCPOA also de-lists several IRGC military research and development facilities. For example, EU sanctions on the Research Center for Explosion and Impact will be lifted after eight years. This entity was designated by the EU for connection to the possible military dimensions of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
Iran’s nuclear program. Whether or not the IAEA has reached a broader conclusion that Iran’s program is peaceful and this center is not engaged in weapons-related activities, the sanctions will be lifted.

In eight years, United States will also lift sanctions on central pillars of Iran’s nuclear and weaponization activities. Two central individuals, Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani and Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, will be de-listed. Abbasi-Davani is the former head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Fakhrizadeh is the AQ Khan of Iran’s nuclear weapons development and, according to the U.S. State Department, “managed activities useful in the development of a nuclear explosive device” and designated “for his involvement in Iran’s proscribed WMD activities.”

The United States will also de-list the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND), an entity “primarily responsible for research in the field of nuclear weapons development,” according to the U.S. State Department. The organization was designated less than a year ago, during the P5+1 negotiations with Iran, and was created by Fakhrizadeh. The EU will also de-list SPND and Abbasi-Davani and Fakhrizadeh at the same time.

Additionally, the United States will de-list Aria Nikan Marin Industry, which sources goods for Iran’s nuclear program and whose customers include Khatam al-Anbiya, Iran Pooya, which supplies material for centrifuge production; and the Kalaye Electric Company, which was designated as a proliferator in 2007 for its involvement in Iran’s centrifuge research and development efforts. Kalaye Electric was a site of centrifuge production in 2003. When the IAEA requested access and the ability to take environmental samples, Iran delayed granting access and, according to experts, took “extraordinary steps to disguise the past use and purpose of this facility.”

Jahan Tech Rooyan Pars and Mandegar Baspar Kimiya Company will also be delisted. These two entities were involved in illicit procurement of proliferation-sensitive material.

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84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
Additional Entities Potentially Eligible for Sanction

In the spring of 2014, my colleagues provided the British and American governments with a database of companies and individuals tied to the IRGC. The full lists are submitted with this Testimony as Exhibits A and B. Entities in this database, which were not previously sanctioned, have not subsequently been sanctioned by either the United States or the European Union. These governments had 16 months to verify and add these companies/individuals to their sanctions lists but refrained from doing so. The non-listing of these entities also provided the IRGC with economic benefits as these companies and persons operate without restrictions.

EXHIBIT A is a database of 217 enterprises of the inner circle of the IRGC’s business empire. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps intervene in Iran’s economy through three channels: The IRGC Cooperative Foundation, The Basij Cooperative Foundation, and Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters. These three holding companies are direct shareholders of businesses listed in Exhibit A, which also includes the names of their 1,073 board members, CEOs, and CFOs since 2003. Iran’s Official Journal is the source for this information; hyperlinks to entries for each company are provided in the database.90

Due to lax filing obligations for Iranian non-publicly traded companies, open-source information does not detail the percentage of ownership of companies by each shareholder nor enables us to ascertain the affiliation of each board member and executive to the IRGC. Nevertheless, this database lists companies in which the IRGC, as a direct stakeholder with the power to select at least one member of the board, exercises considerable influence and enjoys profits from the company’s dividends.

EXHIBIT B is a list of companies publicly traded on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE), in which the IRGC Cooperative Foundation, the Basij Cooperative Foundation, or the Armed Forces Pension Fund jointly or separately own at least 50%+1 of the shares or control the majority of the votes on the Board. The combined value of these holdings amounts to 20%, or $17.5 billion, of the total market value of the Tehran Stock Exchange.91 Of the companies listed in Exhibit B, only three have been sanctioned by the United States—one of which, Ghadir Investment Company, will be de-listed by the Treasury Department within 6-12 months.

An earlier version of Exhibit A was submitted to the Department of Treasury at a March 2014 meeting with FDD analysts, for their review. The database provided, to date, the most accurate map of IRGC direct holdings in Iran’s economy and offered the potential for additional designation of IRGC companies. Companies listed on Exhibit B were repeatedly mentioned in articles and research by FDD experts.92

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91 The information on which this conclusion is based is available on the Tehran Stock Exchange website (http://www.tsetmc.com/Loader.aspx?ParTree=15)
Since the information in the exhibits was made available to the Obama Administration, none of the companies which were not sanctioned at the time have been subsequently added to Treasury’s designations.

**THE JCPOA’S IRANIAN NUCLEAR SNAPBACK**

The **JCPOA contains a weak enforcement mechanism.** Throughout the negotiations, Obama Administration officials have explained that under a final deal, the United States and its allies would be able to re-impose sanctions quickly in order to punish Iranian non-compliance and bring Iran back into compliance with its nuclear commitments. This was the so-called “snapback” sanction.

Even as originally conceived, this enforcement mechanism was flawed because there would likely be significant disagreements between the United States, European states, and members of the U.N. Security Council on the evidence, the seriousness of infractions, the appropriate level of response, and likely Iranian retaliation. In addition to this diplomatic hurdle, the snapback sanction mechanism was economically flawed because it took years to persuade international companies to exit Iran after they had invested billions of dollars; once companies re-enter the Iranian market, it will be difficult to get them to leave again. Just yesterday, Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif noted that the “swarming of businesses to Iran” is a barrier to the re-imposition of sanctions, and once the sanctions architecture is dismantled, “it will be impossible to reconstruct it.” Zarif boasted that Iran can restart its nuclear activities faster than the United States can re-impose sanctions.

Furthermore, sanctions impacted reputational and legal risk calculations of private companies evaluating potential business deals with an Iranian government, economy, and entities that had consistently engaged in deceptive and other illicit conduct. The question of risk and the integrity of Iran’s economy and financial dealings cannot be turned on and off quickly. The snapback sanction in the JCPOA also has an additional economic delay because it grandfathers in existing deals, providing an incentive for companies to move as quickly as possible to sign major long-term so that any existing contacts will not be subject to snapback sanctions.

The **JCPOA further undermines the snapback sanction—the United States’ only peaceful enforcement mechanism—through the dispute resolution mechanism,** which is governed by a Joint Commission compromised of the United States, EU, France, U.K., Germany, China, Russia and Iran. The mechanism creates a 60-plus day delay between the time that the United States (or another P5+1 member) announces that a violation has occurred and the time that United Nations sanctions are re-imposed.

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If the United States believes that Iran has violated the deal, Washington will refer Iran to the Joint Commission, which consists of the P5+1, Iran, and an EU representative. If the issue cannot be resolved by consensus within the Joint Commission, after a process of 35 days, the United States can then unilaterally refer the issue to the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council must then pass a resolution (which the United States can veto) to continue the current sanctions relief. If that resolution is not passed within another 30 days, the previous U.N. sanctions will be re-imposed. The “snap” in “snapback” therefore takes more than two months. The mechanism also does not provide for any unilateral re-imposition of sanctions, nor does the U.N. Security Council resolution, Resolution 2231, which the Obama Administration pushed forward to a vote despite congressional requests to delay until after Congress had thoroughly reviewed the deal.\footnote{Steny Hoyer, Press Release, “Hoyer: U.N. Security Council Vote Should Wait for Congressional Review Period,” July 17, 2015. (http://www.democraticwhip.gov/content/hoyer-un-security-council-vote-should-wait-congressional-review-period); House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Press Release, “Chairman Royce, McCaul to President on Iran Deal: UN Security Council Should Wait Until Congressional Review is Complete,” July 16, 2015. (http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/chairmen-royce-mccaul-president-iran-deal-un-security-council-should-wait-until); “Congress Leaders Ask White House To Delay UN Vote on Iran Deal,” JTA, July 17, 2015. (http://forward.com/news/breaking-news/312210/congress-leaders-ask-white-house-to-delay-un-vote-on-iran-deal/)}

Furthermore, the resolution states that the \textit{snapback mechanism is for issues of “significant non-performance,” implying that it would not likely be used for incidents of incremental cheating}. The Iranian regime cheats incrementally, not egregiously, even though the sum total of its incremental cheating is egregious. The snapback provision incentivizes Iran to continue this behavior because there is no enforcement mechanism to punish incremental cheating.

\textbf{More importantly, JCPOA has armed Iran with its own nuclear “snapbacks” against attempts to re-impose U.N. sanctions in respond to Iranian nuclear violations.} The JCPOA explicitly states, “Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.”\footnote{“Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” Vienna, July 14, 2015, paragraph 37. (http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf)}

This nuclear snapback also is included in text relating to both EU and U.S. economic snapbacks:

\begin{quote}
“\textit{The EU will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions that it has terminated implementing under this JCPOA without prejudice to the dispute resolution mechanism provided for under this JCPOA. There will be no new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures.”}\footnote{Ibid, paragraph 26.}
\end{quote}

In addition:

\begin{quote}
“\textit{The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions specified in Annex II that it has ceased applying under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA… [and] will refrain from imposing}
\end{quote}
new nuclear-related sanctions. Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease preforming its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.”99 (emphasis added)

Finally, the JPCOA contains an explicit requirement for the EU and the United States to do nothing to interfere with the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran:

“The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA.”100 (emphasis added)

Iran can use these provisions to argue that any re-imposition of sanctions, even if implemented on non-nuclear grounds “adversely affects the normalization of trade and economic relations” and will challenge attempts by the EU or United States to re-instate sanctions on non-nuclear grounds. Iran will threaten to simply walk away from the deal and expand its nuclear program.

Even while incrementally cheating on its commitments, Iran could force the United States and Europe to choose between not strictly enforcing the agreement and abrogating the whole agreement. Given the normal political and diplomatic environment, which encourages parties not to undermine existing agreements, it is highly likely that that the United States and Europe would choose not to address incremental cheating. Iran is likely to get away with small- and medium-sized violations, since both the United States and Europe are heavily invested in this deal and would only abrogate it for a major violation. The JCPOA’s language also provides Iran with an opening to insist that other non-nuclear sanctions measures, including Iran’s inclusion on the state sponsor of terrorism list, hinders trade and therefore should be terminated.

This JCPOA is flawed in its design; it contains no peaceful, effective means to enforce the deal and explicitly provides Iran with an opening for a nuclear snapback that it can use to characterize itself as the aggrieved party if the EU or U.S. re-imposes sanctions. This nuclear snapback could be particularly effective against the Europeans, who will be loath to do anything that leads to Iranian nuclear escalation, and on whose support the United States needs on the Joint Committee, at the U.N. Security Council, in a coordinated transatlantic snapback scenario of EU and U.S. sanctions, or, at a minimum, to comply with U.S. secondary sanctions. To neutralize the effectiveness of economic snapbacks, Iran could target Europe as the weakest link through threats of nuclear escalation or through inducements of substantial investment and commercial opportunities.

CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE OF THE SANCTIONS ARCHITECTURE

Congress should require the administration to renegotiate certain terms of the proposed JCPOA and resubmit the amended agreement for congressional approval. It is not

99 Ibid.
100 Ibid, paragraph 29.
unprecedented that Congress and the administration should work together to renegotiate the terms of a treaty or non-binding agreement. Congress can use this precedent to encourage the strengthening of the deal on its technical and conceptual merits. Specifically, Congress can ensure that the sanctions architecture is not precipitous unraveled. This defense of the sanctions architecture will provide peaceful economic leverage to enforce a better deal.

Tie Sanctions Relief to Demonstrable Changes in Iranian Conduct

Since sanctions snapbacks are a flawed mechanism, the lifting of sanctions should be tied to changes in Iran’s conduct that prompted the sanctions in the first place. The provision of sanctions relief should only occur after Iran meets specific, verifiable nuclear and illicit finance benchmarks.

Congress should require that the Obama Administration renegotiate the terms of the sanctions relief. The administration and Congress should work together to create a more effective sanctions relief program that deters and punishes Iranian non-compliance and supports the monitoring, verification, and inspection regime. The United States should also make it clear to Iran that Washington will continue to impose sanctions and target Iran’s support for terrorism and its abuse of human rights, and particularly the dangerous role played by the IRGC across a range of illicit activities.

The following recommendations outline how Congress can defend the conduct-based sanctions architecture. These recommendations are aimed at providing a more effective mechanism for sanctions relief under an amended JCPOA.

1. Develop a rehabilitation program for designated Iranian banks that puts the onus on Tehran to demonstrate that the banks are no longer engaged in illicit financial conduct.

While U.S. financial sanctions are implemented and enforced by the Treasury Department, Congress can play a crucial role by legislating the terms of a rehabilitation program for designated Iranian banks and by laying out specific benchmarks that must be met prior to the suspension of financial sanctions.

Congress should require that Treasury submit a financial sanctions rehabilitation program plan that includes specific benchmarks that institutions must meet before Treasury suspends or terminates key designations. The rehabilitation program should focus on industry standards of financial integrity. Congress should also require Treasury to include a certification, subject to periodic reviews, that will be published in the Federal Register prior to de-designation.
2. Work with the Obama Administration on licenses to foreign financial institutions and foreign companies engaging in business transactions with Iran.

Given the significant presence of the IRGC in key strategic sectors of Iran’s economy, including the financial sector, it will very difficult for foreign financial institutions to confirm that their counterparts on any transaction are not connected to the IRGC. Only those institutions with the strictest compliance procedures may be able to differentiate between upstanding Iranian corporations and corrupt firms. Western banks, especially those that have previously run afoul of U.S. sanctions, may be hesitant to re-enter the Iranian financial market and reportedly only considering financing non-Iranian firms working in Iran.

The United States can incentivize the implementation of strict due diligence and “know your customer” procedures by granting special licenses to companies to operate in Iran, but only for transactions not connected to the IRGC and not in support of terrorism, ballistic missile development, and human rights abuses. Even those foreign financial institutions will face significant risks from IRGC, ballistic missile, terrorism, and human rights sanctions; from lawyers seeking to collect on tens of billions of dollars in judgments on behalf of victims of Iranian terrorism; and from the reputational damage from association with repressive and dangerous regime elements. Buyer and seller beware will likely still be the operating principle for heads of global compliance of these banks long after a nuclear deal is concluded.

3. Legislate criteria for the suspension of sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and the lifting of the Section 311 finding.

The suspension of sanctions against the Central Bank of Iran, even more than the de-designation of individual Iranian banks, will provide significant relief to Iran and should therefore also be tied to verifiable changes in Iranian behavior. Lawmakers could require the president to certify to Congress, prior to suspending sanctions against the CBI and prior to the lifting of the Section 311 finding, that Iran is no longer a “jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern” and that the CBI, as the central pillar of Iran’s illicit financial activities, is no longer engaged in “support for terrorism,” “pursuit of weapons of mass destruction,” including the development of ballistic missiles, or any “illicit and deceptive financial activities.” Congress should stipulate that Treasury must certify that the entire country’s financial system no longer poses “illicit finance risks for the global financial system.” Congress should consider enshrining the Section 311 finding in legislation and making the lifting of the 311 subject to specific termination criteria relating to Iranian illicit conduct.

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4. **Legislate under what circumstances funds in escrow accounts can be released.**

An estimated $100 billion in Iranian oil revenues have accumulated in semi-restricted escrow accounts and can only be spent on non-sanctionable goods in the countries where they are accumulating or on humanitarian goods from a third country. Between January 2014 and June 30, 2015, under the JPOA, Iran received $11.9 billion in installments from these escrow accounts. Instead of allowing the repatriation of the funds to Iran, Congress should amend the Iran Threat Reduction Act (ITRA) to create a mechanism for the release of specific amounts in installments if Iran is complying with its commitments. However, these funds should not be repatriated to Iran and be moved to escrow accounts where Iran can spend them on non-sanctionable European goods and where they can be more easily recaptured in a snapback scenario (European banks are more likely to comply than Chinese banks, for example). None of these escrowed oil funds should be repatriated back to Iran until Treasury certifies that Iran is no longer a “primary money laundering concern” and a state sponsor of terrorism and Congress approves this certification.

5. **Enforce and expand designations of IRGC-affiliated entities.**

Even an amended JCPOA will not address Iran’s support for terrorism, threatening and destabilizing behavior towards its neighbors, and systematic human rights abuses. As such, Congress should require presidential certifications that no sanctions relief will go to the IRGC or IRGC-affiliated entities.

Congress could clarify that it expects that no sanctions on IRGC-linked entities, whether based on nuclear, ballistic missile, or terrorism activities, will be lifted against any entity or financial institution until the president certifies that Iran is no longer a state sponsor of terrorism and the IRGC no longer meets the criteria as a designated entity under U.S. law. Congress should go further and designate the IRGC in its entirety under Executive Order 13224 for its role in directing and supporting international terrorism (it is currently only designated under Executive Order 13382 for proliferation purposes; the Quds Force is designated under EO 13224).

6. **Enforce and expand IRGC, terrorism- and human rights-related designations.**

Iran’s continued support for global terrorism requires that U.S. terrorism sanctions be maintained and expanded. Iran’s human rights record has, by numerous expert accounts, deteriorated under President Hassan Rouhani. Congress should work with the Obama Administration to enhance terrorism sanctions, particularly focused on the IRGC and Quds Force and its various officials, entities, and instrumentalities. Congress should work with the Obama Administration to

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significantly expand U.S. human rights sanctions against any and all Iranian officials, entities, and instrumentalities engaged in human rights abuses. The penalties for both of these sanctions should go beyond travel bans and asset freezes and target the sectors, entities, and instrumentalities that provide revenues to fund Iranian terrorism activities and/or human rights abuses.

CONCLUSION

As a result of the sunset of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program and ballistic missile program and the access to heavy weaponry, Iran over time will be permitted not only to maintain its current nuclear capacity, but also to develop it further to an industrial-size nuclear program with a near-zero breakout time, an easier-to-hide and more efficient advanced-centrifuge-powered clandestine sneak-out pathway, and multiple heavy water reactors. Iran will be able to buy and sell heavy weaponry with the expiration of the arms embargo, bolstering IRGC military capabilities, and arming the most destabilizing and dangerous regimes and terrorism organizations. Iran will also be able to access key technologies to further develop its long-range ballistic missile program, including for the building of an ICBM that threatens the United States.

At the same time, the JCPOA dismantles much of the international sanctions architecture, while abandoning the core principles of the conduct-based sanctions regime that the Obama and George W. Bush administrations had built up for more than a decade. The unraveling of the U.S. and EU sanctions regimes leaves Iran as a growing economy increasingly immunized against future economic sanctions snapbacks. It provides Iran with $150 billion in early sanctions relief and hundreds of billions of dollars in future relief with which the leading state of terrorism can continue to fund its dangerous activities. Of great concern, the JCPOA provides Iran with a “nuclear snapback” to intimidate Europe, the United States, and other countries, to refrain from using sanctions as an effective mechanism to enforce the nuclear agreement and to target the full range of its illicit conduct including its support for terrorism.

The JCPOA is a fundamentally flawed deal in its inherent design. Rather than block Iran’s pathways to a nuclear bomb, it provides a new path, the “patient path.” Congress should require the Obama Administration to renegotiate and fix the major flaws of the agreement and resubmit an amended JCPOA to Congress for review. Simultaneously, Congress should defend the economic sanctions architecture it helped create and tie all future sanctions relief to verifiable changes in Iranian conduct that prompted the sanctions in the first place.