Pension Systems and Investment Regulations Analysis, Diagnosis and Recommendations

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Agenda

- Background
- Chile & Mexico
- A Better Way
- Conclusions

Background

The Pension Debate... So Far


Public Policy

- □ Should women and men retire at the same age?
- □ Same mortality tables?
- □ Private or state-owned asset managers?
- □ Competition among asset managers?
- □ Are the management fees high?
- ☐ Can I take my money out and buy real estate?

Portfolio Management

- ☐ How should the risk be controlled?
- ☐ Is short-term volatility relevant?
- What is the role of alternative investments?
- □ Should there be a mandatory currency hedging?
- **□** Use of leverage?

The Pension Game: What Really Matters...



Average Return or Cumulative Return?


PERIOD	return	1+ return		PERIOD	return	1+ return	
1	0.10	1.10		1	0.10	1.10	
2	0.60	1.60		2	0.10	1.10	
3	-0.29	0.71		3	0.10	1.10	
	0.14				0.10		
		0.25				0.33	
100.00					100.00		
124.96					133.10		
	1 2 3	1 0.10 2 0.60 3 -0.29 0.14	1 0.10 1.10 2 0.60 1.60 3 -0.29 0.71 0.14 0.25	1 0.10 1.10 2 0.60 1.60 3 -0.29 0.71 0.14 0.25	1 0.10 1.10 1 2 0.60 1.60 2 3 -0.29 0.71 3 0.14 0.25	1 0.10 1.10 1 0.10 2 0.60 1.60 2 0.10 3 -0.29 0.71 3 0.10 0.14 0.25 100.00 100.00	1 0.10 1.10 1 0.10 1.10 2 0.60 1.60 2 0.10 1.10 3 -0.29 0.71 3 0.10 1.10 0.14 0.10 0.33 100.00 100.00 100.00

Chilean Funds, October 2002—June 2017 Inflation-Adjusted Monthly Returns

	Α	В	С	D	E
Mean (%)	0.65	0.53	0.46	0.39	0.32
St. Dev. (%)	3.57	2.58	1.73	1.11	0.90
Sharpe Ratio	0.18	0.21	0.26	0.35	0.36


Sharpe Ratio =
$$\frac{E(R) - (Risk-Free \ Rate)}{St.Dev. (R)}$$

8-Year Cumulative Return-Box Plot Charts (All Windows within the Period)



Period: January 2006—December 2014

8-Year Cumulative Returns; All Possible 8-Year Windows, OCT 2002—JUN-2017



Chile & Mexico

CHILE

Starting in 2002: Five Funds, A, B, C, D, and E

A = Riskiest (in theory)

E = Most Conservative

Lower Lim	it	Upper Limit
L(1)	Chilean Equities	U(1)
L(2)	Chilean Corporate Bonds	U(2)
L(3)	Chilean Sovereign Bonds	U(3)
L(4)	Chile Money Market	U(4)
L(5)	International Equities	U(5)
L(6)	International Corporate Bonds	U(6)

Penalty for underperforming: based on the last 36 months (measured against industry average)

MEXICO

Starting in 2008, Four Funds: SB1, SB2, SB3, and SB4

SB4 = Riskiest


SB1 = Most Conservative

	Upper Limit	
Mexican Equities	U(1)	
Mexican Corporate Bonds	U(2)	
Mexican Sovereign Bonds	U(3)	
Alternative Assets	U(4)	
International Equities	U(5)	
International Corporate Bonds	U(6)	


VaR Limit, (1-day VaR), based on previous 1,000 trading days


Limits: SB1 (0.70%), ..., SB4 (2.10%)


CHILE: Same Fund, Different Managers 5-Year Cumulative Returns




MEXICO: Same Fund, Different Managers 5-Year Cumulative Returns











CHILE: 5-Year Cumulative Returns, Different

Managers


HABITAT




MEXICO: 5-Year Cumulative Returns, Different Managers



CHILE: Sharpe Ratio, Different Managers



MEXICO: Sharpe Ratio, Different Managers



Rank Order Metrics

In terms of cumulative returns the funds should be ranked: 1, 2, 3, 4, (5)

(We reverse the order of the Mexican funds to run this test)

Hamming distance


Spearman footrule

Kendall Tau rank distance


After normalization,

0 = perfect order = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 1 = worst possible situation = 5, 4, 3, 2, 1


CHILE, C-VaR




MEXICO, C-VaR



CHILE, 5-Year Cumulative Return



MEXICO, 5-Year Cumulative Return



A Better Way

Let us consider the following six indices

1	Chilean Equities	MSCI Index
2	Chilean Corporate Bonds	DJLaTixx Chile Corporate Index
3	Chilean Sovereign Bonds	DJLaTixx Chile Government
4	Chile Money Market	LVA MM Index
5	International Equities	MSCI All Country Index
6	International Corporate Bonds	Barclays US HY Index

$$\Omega = (\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_6)^t$$

$$Return = R = \omega_1 r_1 + ... + \omega_6 r_6 = \Omega^t r$$

$Max_{\Omega} \Omega^{T} r$

Subject to

$$\omega_i \geq 0$$
 for $i = 1, ..., 6$


and


$$\sum_{i=1}^{6} \omega_i = 1$$

return

Application to the Chilean Case

We focus on the 9-year (2006-2014) period, using data from (2003-2013)





Cumulative (Actual) Returns, for windows of different sizes, for each Chilean fund

Let us use our approach now...

$$Max_{\Omega} \Omega^{T} r$$


Subject to

$$CVaR_{\alpha}\left[\Omega^{T}r\right] \leq \gamma$$

 γ = from 0% to 8%

Our Proposal (Values of γ) for Each Fund:

A = 8%; B = 7%; C = 6%; D = 5%; and E = 4%



Let us maximize the return, subject to the Chilean regulation asset-class constraints


$$Max_{\Omega} \Omega^{T} r$$

Subject to

$$CVaR_{\alpha}[\Omega^{T}r] \leq \gamma$$

Lower Limi	Opper Limit		
L(1)	Chilean Equities	U(1)	
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L(4)	Chile Money Market	U(4)	
L(5)	International Equities	U(5)	
L(6)	International Corporate Bonds	U(6)	

Add These



Conclusions


- ✓ Mexican funds are ranked correctly in terms of risk, cumulative return, and risk-adjusted return almost always. In short, they exhibit the desired risk-return profiles
- ✓ Chilean funds exhibit erratic risk-return profiles

In terms of risk-adjusted returns they are always ranked in a sequence which is the exact opposite of what it was intended

And in terms of cumulative returns, more than half of the time they are ranked, again, in the "reverse" order

✓ BOTTOM LINE: The Mexican regulation is working; the Chilean regulation is NOT working as intended

- √ Min/Max constraints by asset class do not work
- √ Min constraints are very dangerous (more than Max)
- ✓ Portfolio-level risk constraints work much better
- ✓ Our idea (CVaR-based) proposal is very promising
- ✓In light of our results, it is obvious that the Chilean pension debate is (and has been) missing a critical issue



The Discussion To have NOW !!!

The Discussion To have NOW:

How to Implement a Portfolio-Level Risk-Based Investment Regulation...

- □ VaR, C-VaR, other metrics/combinations?
- □ Computation-related Issues, Time-Frame?
- □ Risk Limits?
- ☐ Transition Regime?

Appendix -- References

"A Two-Step Hybrid Investment Strategy for Pension Funds" In **The North American Journal of Economics and Finance** (2017), 42 (November 2017): 574-583; Pagnoncelli, Cifuentes & Denis

"Can asset allocation limits determine portfolio risk-return profiles in DC pension schemes?" In **Insurance Mathematics and Economics**, Vol. 86, May 2019, Pages 134-144; Gutierrez, Pagnoncelli, Valladao & Cifuentes

"Fifteen Years of Defined Contributions: Assessing the Chilean Pension Experience", https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3222793, Schlechter, Pagnoncelli & Cifuentes

"Pension Funds in Mexico and Chile: A Risk-Reward Comparison", Clapes, April, 2019; Schlechter, Pagnoncelli & Cifuentes